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

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EPICURUS *his* MORALS

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Walter Charleton

EPICURUS'S
MORALS:

Collected,

And faithfully Englished.

*

With an Introductory Essay

by FREDERIC MANNING.

LONDON,

Printed for *Peter Davies*, Publisher:

No. 30 Henrietta-street, Covent-Garden, 1926.

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THE INTRODUCTION

WALTER CHARLETON, son of Walter Charleton, M.A., sometime vicar of Ilminster, and afterwards rector of Shepton Mallet in Somerset, was born at Shepton Mallet on the 2nd of February, 1619. He is said to have made a sudden entry on a separate existence 'at about 6 p.m., his mother being then at supper,' but his horoscope, which according to Aubrey 'is my lord Brouncker's doeing, and in his owne handwriting' has the legend 'Dom. G. Charleton, D.M.: nascitur die Mercurii, 2 Febr. æræ Christi $16\frac{19}{20}$, hor. 12, mom. 18 p.m.' This of course leaves us with the alternative of dinner, but whether he were born at table or not, which may have been one of Aubrey's fables to account for his later Epicurean tendencies, he came of 'an antient and genteel family,' which is of greater moment. He had his grammar learning of his father, and in his sixteenth year went up to Oxford, and was entered as a commoner at Magdalen Hall in Lent term, 1635. There he had for his tutor the famous Dr. Wilkins, who is described by Aubrey as 'no great read man; but one of much and deepe thinking, and of a working head; and a prudent man as well as ingeniose . . . a lustie, strong growne, well sett, broad shouldered person, cheerfull and hospitable . . . the principall reviver of experimentall philosophy (*secundum mentem domini Baconi*) at Oxford'; and one moreover who owed his first rise 'from goeing accidentally a coursing a hare; where an ingeniose gentleman of good quality falling into discourse with him, and finding him to have a very good witt, told him he would never gett

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any considerable preferment by continuing in the university; and that his best way was to betake himselfe to some lord's or great person's house, that had good benefices to conferre. Sayd Mr. J. Wilkins; I am not knowne in the world; I know not to whom to addresse myselfe upon such a designe! The gentleman replied, "I will recommend you myselfe," and did so, to (as I thinke) lord viscount Say and Seale.'

THOUGH he was a Parliament man, Wilkins had powerful friends among the Royalists, and his prudence is perhaps sufficiently indicated by the preferments he obtained. After the Parliamentary visitation of Oxford he became Warden of Wadham, 'where he had weekely an experimentall clubbe, which began in 1649, and was the incunabula of the Royall Society.' He married in 1656 Robina French, the relict of Dr. Peter French, and sister to Oliver Cromwell, who rewarded him two years later with the Mastership of Trinity College, Cambridge, of which he was deprived at the Restoration. Though he was in some danger for a time, according to Pepys, for having sought to rally the Cromwellian party, he became minister of St. Lawrence Jewry Church, and later Dean of Ripon. And then Charles II., who could discern and appreciate genius as well as beauty, and selected a bishop with an even finer judgment than he brought to the choice of a mistress, appointed him to the see of Chester. Anthony à Wood tells us, that under Dr. Wilkins' instructions Charleton 'profited much beyond his years in logic and philosophy; but his genius soon after leading him to the study of physick, he in short time made as great progress in that faculty as he had before in arts, and therefore by the favour of King Charles I. was actually created doctor thereof in February 1642, and about that time made one of his physicians in ordinary, he being then observed by those

that knew him to set an high value upon his own worth and parts, as he always afterwards did.'

IN those days the teaching of medicine was almoſt entirely literary and dogmatic, there was no well-defined boundary separating the arts from the sciences, or the sciences from each other, and in turning to medicine Charleton was only applying his learning, and the 'experimentall philosophy' into which Dr. Wilkins had initiated him, to a particular field. A generation or two later Locke could ſtill write disparagingly of 'the four humours; *sal. sul.* and mercury; acid and alkali,' and press the claims of observation. When Harvey published his *Exercitationis de motu cordis et sanguinis* he sent it to Descartes, who at once accepted his beautiful demonſtration as conclusive, but it was received by the medical profession only gradually and with reluctance. While the Court was at Oxford Harvey was in attendance on the King, and having been at Magdalen himself, it is likely enough that he met Charleton, and approved even if he did not himself recommend the appointment. At that time Harvey was inveſtigating the development of the embryo, observing the formation of the chick in the egg, and in the British Museum there is a copy of Needham's *De formato fœtu* published about fifteen years later, with MS. notes by Charleton, witnessing to his own intereſt in the same subject. The influence of Harvey on the mind of the younger man could only have been brief and intermittent; but it was ſtrong, and about forty years later, in the course of three lectures on the motion of the blood through the veins and arteries, the organic ſtructure of the heart, and the efficient cause of the heart's action, Charleton vindicated the prior claim of Harvey to the discovery againſt the pretensions put forward on behalf of the Venetian, Fra Paolo Sarpi; and on two occasions he was chosen to

deliver the Harveian Oration before the Royal College of Physicians.

A MORE constant influence was that of Hobbes, who admired his worth and parts and, according to Aubrey, Charleton was one of his closer friends. Hobbes was a friend of Gassendi, who had inherited Montaigne's partiality for Diogenes Laertius, and was responsible for that revival of Epicureanism in France, which was subsequently known as *libertinism*, a movement to which curiously enough Pascal, for whom the genius of Montaigne had a terrible fascination, attached himself for a brief moment before succumbing to Jansenism. Almost inevitably therefore Hobbes was ranged against Descartes, whom Mersenne had invited him to criticize, and was more in the tradition of Galileo and Kepler. Probably it was Hobbes who turned the attention of Charleton to the work of Gassendi, though his own hedonism was not strictly Epicurean; and in this connection it is worth remark that Benthamism, which M. Guyau related so closely to Epicureanism, is perhaps more directly derived from the social philosophy of *Leviathan*. Charleton himself seems to have alternated between the rival schools of Descartes and Gassendi, the influence of Harvey perhaps inclining him to one, and that of Hobbes to the other. His natural bias, however, carried him rather towards Epicureanism and away from the Stoic element in Descartes, and neither influence was sufficiently strong to obliterate from his mind the character impressed on it by his early training under Wilkins in the Baconian philosophy.

ON the failure of the King's cause, he removed from Oxford to London, where he lived in Russell Street, Covent Garden; and he was admitted of the College of Physicians in 1650. In the same year he published *Spiritus Gorgonicus*, or as it came to be called generally,

De Lithiasi Diatriba, in Holland; and in London two translations from Jean-Baptiſte Helmont: *Deliramenta Catarrhi*, and *A Ternary of Paradoxes*. The latter is dedicated to William, Viscount Brouncker of Caſtle Lyons, a friend as well as a patron, who had caſt his horoscope, and was a member of Dr. Wilkins' 'clubb of virtuosoes.' It was a friendship which endured through many vicissitudes. The only time Pepys seems to have met Charleton was at 'the Pope's Head, where my lord Brouncker and his miſtresse dined and Commissioner Pett, Dr. Charleton, and myself, entertained with a venison paſty by Sir W. Warren. Here very pretty discourse of Dr. Charleton's, concerning Nature's fashioning every creature's teeth according to the food she intends them; and that men's, it is plain, was not for flesh, but for fruit, and that he can at any time tell the food of a beaſt unknown by his teeth. My Lord Brouncker made one or two objections to it, that creatures find their food proper for their teeth rather than that the teeth were fitted for the food, but the Doctor, I think, did well observe that creatures do naturally and from the firſt, before they have had experience to try, love such a food rather than another, and that all children love fruit, and none brought to flesh but againſt their wills at firſt.' We, who have loſt faith in the providential designs of Nature, would take sides with Brouncker on this point; and Pepys admits his fine intellect which a confused way of talking would seem to have obscured. On another occasion, when Charleton introduces to the Royal Society a paper on music by Birckenshaw, Brouncker, who had translated Descartes' Treatise on Music, is asked to report on it; and it is not flattery, but a real sense of obligation, which moves Charleton in the Epiſtle Dedicatory of *A Ternary of Paradoxes* to remind him of 'your Animadversion and

careful influence bestowed upon each sheet of this Work, successively, before the Ink could be fully dry.'

ONE need have no illusions about the medical knowledge of that day, though the name of Helmont is remembered in the history of medicine, chiefly I think in connection with the chemistry of gases, and as continuing the tradition of Paracelsus, while Charleton's is ignored. It is an error to reconstruct the past, as we habitually do, from its greater elements. When we think of Descartes now, we do not think of him as of one who attempted to surprise the secret of the Rosicrucians; we make him one of our own contemporaries. We forget the credulous imaginings of a vanished age, and retain of it only what is congenial to our own way of thinking. To us the ideas and principles of Descartes and Harvey have an extension and significance which they did not have for their contemporaries, and the historical value to us of such men as Charleton consists in the fact that he presents these principles and ideas to us in direct relation to the age surrounding them, and bare of the additional significance and extension which they have acquired in the course of three centuries.

IN the Epistle Dedicatory to Lord Brouncker, Charleton asks him to witness 'whether my Scepticity, even in such Notions as myself hath, to the most precise anatomical subdivision, and abstracted perpension of each minute particle thereof (not much below the accurate Method, invented by the Stoicks, and lately revived into use by that most ingenious Mons. Des Cartes) examined and transmitted to the World for indubitate and irrefragable Truths; be not evidence strong enough to make good, that I prefer the manifestation of any one single Verity to all other sinister interests in this Vale of Error, and therefore should embrace and assimilate the decisive Contradiction of riper heads, with Joy equall to that of benighted Mariners, at

the eruption of their faithfull Pilot, the North ſtarre, as the Soveraigne remedy to my former Wandrings.' One could not invite correction with a greater zeal for truth, or a more studious care for rhetoric; and then, with no longer pause than it took to mend his quill, he puts before us clear evidence of his Scepticity: 'Sir K. Digby (a noble Person, who hath built up his Reason to so transcendent a height of Knowledge, as may seem not much beneath the state of man in innocence) immediately before his late exile, was pleased to tell me; that not many years paſt, Mr. James Howel (who planted the *Vocal Foreſt*) interceding betwixt two Brothers of the sword, received a dangerous wound through the Arm: By the violent pain whereof, and other grievous Accidents concomitant, he was suddenly dejected into extream Debility and Danger. That in this forlorn plight, despairing to find ease or benefit, by the fruitless continuance of Chirurgery, and fearing the speedy invasion of a *Gangraen*, he consulted Sir K. D. who having procured a Garter cruentate, wherewith the hurt was firſt bound up, inspersed thereon, without the privacy of Maſter Howel a convenient quantity of *Roman Vitriol.* That the Powder no sooner touched on the blood in the Garter than the Patient cryed out that he felt an intolerable shooting, and penetrative torment, in his arm: which soon vanished, upon the remove of all Emplaſters and Topical Applications, enjoyned by Sir *K. D.* that thenceforward, for three days, all former symptomes departed, the part recovered its priſtine lively colour, and manifeſt Incarnation and Consolidation ensued: but then Sir K. D. to compleat his Experiment, dipt the Garter in Vinegar, and placed it upon glowing coals; soon whereupon the Patient relapsed into an extream Agony, and all former evils inſtantly recurred. And finally, that having obtained this plenary satisfaction,

of the *sympathy* maintained betwixt the blood extravenated, and that yet conserved in the veins; as also of the Soveraigne *Balsamick Faculty* of the *Vitriol*: he took again the Garter out from the Vinegar, gently dryed it and freshly dressed it with the Powder; whereupon the Sanation proceeded with such admirable success, that within few days, there remained only a handsome *Cicatrice*, to witness there was once a wound.'

SIR KENELM DIGBY, as Evelyn remarked dryly, was 'a teller of strange things'; but what can one think of a Scepticity, not much below that of the ingenious Mons. Des Cartes, which admits a sympathy 'betwixt the blood extravenated and that yet conserved in the veins' as a fact indubitate, for to Charleton this was the cardinal point established by the experiment, the Soveraigne Balsamick Faculty of the Vitriol being of secondary importance? One need not, however, dismiss the matter with a supercilious smile, for as we read Charleton's subsequent discussion of Sir *K. D.*'s experiment we realize that here, if anywhere, one can witness the actual process of transition from magic to science, both equally mechanistic in their conception of the universe. When he speaks of wounds infected by 'the ambient Aer,' or says, 'I am bound to believe that in the infinite Magazins of Nature are to be found various Agents, not obliged to the dull conditions of Corporeal Contact, but richly endowed with an *Influential* or *Radial Activity* (so have I taken the liberty to Christen it, in reference to the *Cognation* and neer Analogy, betwixt the manner of the Stars transmitting their Influence, by invisible Deradiations; and the imperceptible Emissions streaming, in a semi-immaterial thread of Atomes from sublunary bodies, qualified with this kind of *Astral Faculty*. . . .),' one is almost tempted to find in the words an obscure prophecy, though one would be immediately

undeceived by his conclusion: 'that the sanation of Wounds, by remote means applied to the Weapon, or cloth imbued with the blood, is no Diabolical, nor prestigious, but a meer ordinary effect of Natural Causes, operating by Magnetism.' But the theory of infection from 'the ambient Aer . . . repleted with the various Evaporations, or Aporrhoea's of mixt bodies' shows us that his mind is playing with an analogy: ἀπορρόαι being in Epicurean physics the films which given off by an object entering the eye cause sight. The doctrine of sympathy is more curious than this, and reaches its climax when he tells us 'how a Tagliacotian Nose, enfeoffed with a community of Vitality and Vegetation, by right of Transplantation, upon the face of a Gentleman at Bruxels, hath grown cadaverous and dropt off, at the instant of that Porters death, in Bononia, out of Whose arm it was first exected.' A tale which might have moved Sterne, whose wide survey of the field comprehended indeed these very noses of Tagliacozzus, to a further digression or *inquirendo* as to how in the first instance the gentleman at Bruxels had lost his nose. In this matter, however, Charleton did not rely entirely on the statements of Sir Kenelm Digby, or the authority of Helmont. He attempted to verify them in his own practice, with apparent success; and he was fortified in his conclusions by the experience of Sir Gilbert Talbot, who had treated soldiers in the King's army by the same method, which was, in effect, to leave them to the normal processes of nature, while their disastrous art of medicine was diverted upon the offending weapon, or the bloodied rags. It would be idle to criticize further an experiment so imperfectly controlled, or a record of treatment in which only the favourable cases are enumerated, and in which two distinct events, simply because they had occurred proximately to each other, are

considered in the relation of cause and effect. It is only in their anatomical researches that the doctors of that age can be considered scientific, though here and there may emerge some promising lines of investigation.

IN the next few years, while he was gradually acquiring a considerable practice among the Royalist families, Charleton published *The Darkness of Atheism discovered by the Light of Nature* (1652), and turning to Petronius, *The Ephesian Matron* (1653); and in the next year his account of Epicurean physics with the portentous title of *Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltoniana*, which he described further as 'a fabric of science natural, upon the hypothesis of atomes, founded by Epicurus, repaired by Petrus Gassendus, augmented by Walter Charlton.' In the following year he published *Epicurus's Morals* in quarto, of which a later edition in octavo was printed for Herringman in 1670, the text of the present reprint being that of the second edition. It is not, of course, simply a translation of the existing fragments of Epicurus. He describes it as 'collected partly out of his own Greek Text, in Diogenes Laertius, and partly out of the Rhapsodies of Marcus Antoninus, Plutarch, Cicero, and Seneca,' that is to say, it is another 'fabric' which he has augmented, interpreted, and arranged in his own way. Apart from the somewhat arbitrary order which he imposed on his material, the intrusion of extraneous matter, as in some passages translated from Lucretius where poetry has suffused with radiance the sober hues of philosophy, he feels the difficulty, which beset Gassendi also, of making Epicurus speak conformably with Paul and Augustine. It was no longer purely a question as to the rival claims of Stoicism and Epicureanism; the theological controversies on predestination and free-will affected the position of the determinist Cartesians and the libertinarian Gassendists

equally; and neither could afford to neglect the maxim: *Intus ut libet, foris ut moris est.* In England conditions were no more favourable. Charleton's object is therefore to interpret the doctrines of Epicurus in such a way as to render them tolerable to his age. The doctrine, 'that man is not obliged to honour, revere, and worship God in respect of his beneficence, or out of the hope of any Good or Fear of any evil at his hands, but meerly in respect of the transcendent Excellencies of his Nature, Immortality, and Beatitude,' may be matched, as M. Joyau has shown, with similar passages from Augustine and Abelard, but such opinions, while they may be tolerated in a saint, are not wholesome for the generality of mankind, and may become even actively dangerous to orthodoxy as a kind of Quietism. Charleton's apology for Epicurus resolves itself ultimately into the plea that after all he was only a pagan, for whom one may make the excuse of invincible ignorance, even while marvelling at his closeness to the light; but a defence which appeals to our charity implies that the grounds of reason have been abandoned at the command of faith. Such reserves, however, are slight. The revival of Epicureanism in the seventeenth century is a proof of its vitality, and a fact interesting in itself. One wonders that Charleton's exposition of the philosophy of the garden should have been so long neglected. His style is worthily representative of a great age; and it needs not his reference to 'the skill and sweat of those two Heroicall Wits, the Lord St. Alban, and the now flourishing Dr. Browne' to discern who were his masters in the art of prose. It has not the heat and vehemence of Milton, nor the elaborately organized movement of Browne; it is simpler and more fluent, though occasionally the charm of archaism may have glozed away a piece of pedantry or mere rhetoric; but it is full of colour, and by a singular

music seems to flatter the ear with echoes from a courtlier age.

ON the death of Charles I., the new King while still in exile had continued Charleton as a Physician in Ordinary, and on the Restoration the appointment was confirmed. Charleton had acquired a considerable practice, while scarcely a year passed in which he did not issue a new book from the press. These were mainly medical, and may be relegated to a bibliography, which is the ritual form of acknowledging the books one has not read. But one of his controversies may be mentioned as showing the extent of his interests. Inigo Jones, by command of James I. in 1620, had written an account of Stonehenge, which he concluded had been built by the Romans. This discourse, which was incomplete at his death, came into the possession of his son-in-law and cousin, John Webb, who completed and published it in 1655, and the theory it propounded seems to have been generally accepted at the time. 'But so it was,' says Anthony à Wood, 'that our author Charlton being not at all satisfied with that discourse, he sent, or caused others to send a copy of the said book to Olaus Wormius, the great antiquary of Denmark, who thereupon returning his sentiments of Stonehenge, in several epistles to Dr. Charlton, he did thereupon draw up a discourse, with the help of the books of Wormius, and other Danish authors, concerning the said monument of antiquity, entitling it, *Chorea Gigantum: or the most famous Antiquity of Great Britain, vulgarly called Stonehenge, standing on Salisbury Plain, restored to the Danes.* This book tho' exploded by most persons when 't was published, yet some of the noted antiquaries of this nation, particularly Sir Will. Dugdale did applaud it, and hath said in my hearing more than once, that he verily thought that Dr. Charlton was in the right, in what he delivered in the said *Chorea Gigantum*.'

HE was chosen President of the College of Physicians in 1689, and continued in that office until 1691, but his practice had declined, and poverty at length compelled him to leave London. 'I think,' says Anthony à Wood, 'he hath been some few years, as he is now (1695) in the isle of Jersey, a learned and an unhappy man, aged and grave, yet too much given to romances.' He returned from exile, and delivered the Harveian Oration in 1705, after which is silence. He died on April the 24th, 1707.

THE chief source of our information concerning Epicurus, and that on which Charleton principally relied, is the Tenth Book of *The Lives and Opinions of the Philosophers* by Diogenes Laertius, of whose own life, apart from his work, we know nothing. It is said to have been written during the first twenty years of the third century; and if this date be taken as approximately correct, then he was separated from Epicurus by the lapse of about five hundred years. The manuscript copies of his work which have come down to us were probably not made before the thirteenth century, or about nine hundred years after he had died. They would seem to be poor and untrustworthy. In these conditions it is not surprising that some modern critics, professing to doubt his very name, and unable to fix his date with any certainty, should have reduced him, in the exercise of their peculiar virtuosity, to a bundle of authorities and a succession of scribes. The classical example of this kind of solution to a fairly common difficulty is Bentley on Milton, with his hypothesis of an uneducated amanuensis and an unscrupulous editor to account for a text manifestly corrupt.

IN the case of Diogenes Laertius the alternative to an individual authorship presupposes the existence of an earlier work, dating perhaps from the first century; to

this a later reader has added supplementary matter, parallel passages, marginal notes, and even letters and documents; and finally, by the negligence of the scribe employed in copying the book, these supplements have been intruded, not without some disturbance of the sense and continuity, into the structure of the primitive and original text. Such are the conclusions of Usener, briefly and perhaps imperfectly summarized. We have come at last to distrust a method which produces, even when applied to a number of very different cases, invariably the same results. Its success is always in inverse proportion to the amount of external evidence which we possess concerning the author in question. In the case of Milton, or of Shakespeare, tradition has a sufficient backing of circumstantial detail to defeat or endure it; even in the case of Saint Mark's Gospel tradition is not wholly unsupported; but in the case of Homer or in this particular case of Laertius tradition is the sole authority, and yet even here the attack of criticism has never been completely effective. In each of these cases, a critical examination of the text has resolved it again into the separate elements of which it was composed, and the character which the author impressed on his material has been ignored or destroyed in the process. Or the several functions of authorship, which in practice are so closely correlated as to have the character of a simple and indivisible action, are distinguished from each other, and considered separately: the measure of critical appreciation shown in selecting the materials; the power of assimilating the materials selected; and finally the constructive imagination which expresses them in a new form. Once having separated these functions, it is not really difficult to personify them as distinct if anonymous individuals; though clearly the work of an accomplished artist will offer a more effective resistance to dissolution under this critical analysis than

the works of lesser men. It would be absurd, however, to set up a standard by which to measure the author's success in these several functions, and then to suggest that he had only existed in so far as he had conformed to this standard. Textual criticism will never of itself lead us beyond the limits of the text, in which the author is only present to us as an integral part of his own work. Without, then, denying the validity of these critical processes, which are probably scientific since they are purely mechanical, one may hold reasonably enough that their results are only valid in so far as they affect the literary position, and that in so far as the historical problem is concerned, as in the question of authorship, they need the concurrence of external testimony if their validity is ever to be sufficiently well established. In the meantime it is simpler, as Mr. R. D. Hicks says in his introduction to the *Lives*, to assume that the 'biographer' was also the 'reader' and the eventual 'transcriber': to retain the traditional Laertius, however great his defects may be, rather than pursue an impossible trinity of abstractions lacking even his attenuated reality.

ONE difficulty in connection with the problem of authorship is the apparently careless order followed in the arrangement of the material. Even Bignone, a defender of tradition, has considered it necessary in his reconstruction of the Tenth Book to alter this arrangement as a concession to modern opinion. It is very doubtful, to say the least, how far modern standards apply to the works of classical authors. In his introduction to the *Academica*, the late Mr. J. S. Reid wrote: 'The most careless readers cannot fail to find in the philosophic writings of Cicero many superficial contradictions and inconsistencies, much inconstancy in the use of terms, no little inconsequence in argument, and considerable want of lucidity in the arrangement of subject-matter . . . the

defects complained of existed already in the Greek authors whom Cicero copied. . . . In the sense for orderly arrangement and regular development of arguments, and in stringency in the use of technical terms, the whole of the ancient philosophy is very deficient when judged by a modern standard.'

THIS argument would apply with even greater force to the work of Laertius, who had none of Cicero's brilliant literary gifts. In every age, of course, there has been a marked difference between the form which language assumes when it is being used as a medium for artistic expression and that which it has naturally as a means of communication or of record; and there is no reason to suppose that Laertius was greatly occupied with considerations of form. Indeed, as all the *Lives* are constructed in accordance with a conventional type, which is not always adequate to the material, it may even be said that he was comparatively indifferent in this matter. Language as an art found its most perfect form in poetry, and since form is only the expression of action, when prose took over some of the functions of poetry it tended necessarily, and more or less consciously, to reproduce its forms also; and as the literature of their age had found its most complete and coherent expression in tragedy, Thucydides gives to his history and Plato to his philosophy a semi-dramatic form. But the standard to which Mr. Reid referred was not purely a literary standard. At the beginning of the modern world we find an enigmatic figure, a kind of Janus, of ambiguous mind, being at once a master of style and a precursor of science, Francis Bacon; and from him onwards there is a progressive influence in prose of that *experientia litterata*, which he advocated, the rigorous discipline imposed on language by the scientific method. The pen follows a purely mechanistic experience, step by

step, in an inalterable sequence, with scrupulous precautions against error, error being no more than the intervention, in an experience imperfectly controlled, of some unknown agent causing a new series of equally natural and necessary effects : it becomes a lens, a prism, a scalpel by turns. The scientific method isolates, as the art of tragedy does also, a particular series of events ; but it excludes chance and contingency and personal values from its operations, as unreal ; and accompanies the events by an inferential process, so that its passage through the whole series represents a single and continuous action qualifying the material with its own characteristic form.

WHERE there is no representation of a single and continuous action, a natural order and sequence of events shown in their causal relation to each other is no longer necessary. The Lives of Laertius represent a series of portraits : his concern is principally with character, with action only intermittently, and in so far as particular incidents may illustrate certain moral qualities and characteristics of a particular man. Character is invariable, and action only serves to elicit its true nature. When a man considers his own life, time has very little significance for him ; events may present themselves almost in any order, and some quite trivial details will emerge with a sharpness and precision that may be completely lacking in the more important ; indeed the most curious thing in memory is its timelessness, the illusion, if it be one, of our own eternal existence : it is only by some effort, however slight, of reason that we are able to recapture the sequence of events, and then proceed to rationalize our experience and impose some kind of order on its natural incoherence. In Laertius there is often the same lack of continuity. He pours out at our feet, as it were, and pell-mell, his whole store of curious learning. Sometimes he indulges a wilful

and deliberate irrelevance, as when at the end of his Life of Heracleitus, perhaps to cover its nakedness, he quotes the epigram by Callimachus on another Heracleitus, an elegiac poet, lines of generous warmth and tenderness, which but for him would have been lost to us. Sometimes he may quote the work of a forger, or accept evidence of doubtful value, but on the whole his selection has been made either with care and skill, or with a singular instinct for truth. In some of the more important Lives he is embarrassed by a multitude of conflicting authorities, and tends to pass too abruptly from one to another, and if he is unable to decide between two opposed statements, he will give them both to us, achieving by his mere nature an impartiality often denied to the more sophisticated processes of art. It is a perverse mind that would dismiss such qualities as defects. If his Life of Epicurus had not come down to us, it would have been possible to reconstruct Epicurean physics from Lucretius, and the morals from Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch, all of whom were superior to him in critical ability and literary accomplishment: and yet, precisely because of their own great qualities, these men have interposed themselves between us and their subject. His mind provided a more candid and a more transparent medium; and that he remains, in spite of his greater rivals, our principal authority is admitted even by those critics who have most consistently depreciated his value.

EPICURUS, the son of Neocles and Chærestrate, was born at Samos, seven years after the death of Plato, on the seventh day, or perhaps the tenth, of the month Gamelion, in the third year of the 109th Olympiad, in the archonship of Sosigenes, which corresponds roughly in our chronology to the beginning of the year B.C. 341. His father was an

Athenian citizen, of the deme Gargettos, and if Metrodorus was right in saying that he belonged to the ancient family of the Philaidæ, then Epicurus was descended, appropriately enough, from Ajax. Neocles was one of the *cleruchs*, a garrison rather than a colony, sent by the Athenians to Samos, after they had suppressed a rebellion there; and Cicero tells us that, unable to support his family on the land which had been granted to him, he eked out his means by teaching in a school, which was perhaps his hereditary vocation. It was said, too, that Chærestrate was a sorceress, like the wise Diotima in Plato's Symposium; and that as a child Epicurus used to accompany her to the houses of her clients, to recite charms and incantations. Certainly the tale is told by an enemy, but a libel is always the more effective for being barbed with truth. Magic assumes, if only implicitly, that all events represent a natural sequence of cause and effect: it differs from science in the belief that the individual may determine the nature of the sequence in virtue of his own particular, contingent, and empirical consciousness; or, in other words, that he is independent of the laws governing the universe, and even superior to them. The parallel with Epicureanism which would reconcile a deterministic theory of the universe with the instinctive assumption of free will is sufficiently close to be worth remarking.

APPARENTLY in his youth he helped his father as a schoolmaster. At the age of eighteen he went to Athens. Xenocrates, whose austere character was mitigated by a personality of singular charm, had succeeded the more brilliant Spensippus in the chair of Plato; and if, as seems probable, Epicurus attended his course at the Academy, the prominence of ethics and a tendency to atomism in the teaching of Xenocrates may have given his mind its first impulses in the direction it afterwards followed. Critics

on the whole have been inclined to place too much stress on his obligations to Democritus, which he, on his side, fully admitted ; and to forget that his philosophy in certain aspects is that of a Socratic born out of due time. He could not have been at Athens much longer than a year : after the death of Alexander of Macedon, Perdiccas expelled the Athenians from Samos, and Epicurus rejoined his father, who had gone to Colophon.

HE is said to have been a disciple of Nausiphanes of Teos, who before turning to the doctrines of Democritus had followed Pyrrho ; but from a saying of Nausiphanes, reported by Laertius, it would seem that Epicurus frequented him mainly to gratify his own curiosity about Pyrrho, who had brought back from his travels with Anaxarchus something of the mystic nihilism of India, and was a source of wonder to the whole Hellenic world. Praxiphanes, and Pamphilus the Platonist, also are said to have been his masters ; but if by the former was meant that Praxiphanes who was a pupil of Theophrastus, this is unlikely since, as Usener pointed out, he must have been of the same age, or perhaps even younger, than Epicurus himself. The case of Pamphilus is different : according to Cicero, Epicurus admitted having been his pupil during his youth at Samos, and there is seldom any reason to doubt the facts of Cicero, however strongly one may distrust the inferences he draws from them. To Cicero the study of philosophy is chiefly valuable as a training in dialectics and rhetoric ; he is a casuist moving among ideas which mean nothing to him. He blames Epicurus for seeking to enhance his originality by denying any obligation to his teachers : *quum quidem gloriaretur, ut videmus in scriptis, se magistrum habuisse nullum. Quod et non prædicanti, tamen facile quidem crederem, sicut mali ædificii domino glorianti, se architectum non habuisse. Nihil*

enim olet ex academia, nihil ex lyceo, nihil ne e puerilibus quidem disciplinis. Laertius, on the other hand, says quite simply: 'Apollodorus in his Chronology tells us that our philosopher was a pupil of Nausiphanes and Praxiphanes; but in his letter to Eurylochus Epicurus himself denies it and says that he was self-taught.' Epicurus may mean only that the time he spent under Pamphilus and Xenocrates and Nausiphanes was too brief for their influence to have fixed the direction of his thoughts; and even if he denied the force of originality to their teaching, this is not to claim that he himself had remained unaffected by the influence of his age, which he would necessarily share with them. When he tells us that his favourite philosophers were Anaxagoras and Archelaus, the masters of Socrates, when we see him pass in the natural course from Pamphilus to Xenocrates, and trace the influence of Aristippus, of Plato, and of Aristotle on his theory of pleasure, we may think, as Cicero evidently does, that he owes greatly to his predecessors, more especially to those of the Socratic tradition, and yet that he is their heir rather than their debtor, since what he has derived from them has been transformed by reflection into an actual experience of his own mind.

AT the age of thirty-two Epicurus formulated his own doctrines and attracted to himself a school, first at Mitylene, and later more successfully at Lampsacus, where some of the richest and most eminent citizens became his disciples. Metrodorus, who from their first acquaintance never left him except once for six months to revisit his home, Polyænus the geometrician, Leonteus and his wife Themista, Colotes and Idomeneus were all natives of Lampsacus. Hermarchus, who began as a poor student of rhetoric, and became afterwards head of the school, was of Mitylene. A few years later, in the archonship

of Axanicrates, 307-6 B.C., Epicurus returned to Athens, and, except to visit his friends in Ionia once or twice, he did not leave it again.

PROBABLY his coming attracted little attention in a city of philosophers, where Theophrastus lectured to about two thousand disciples; and it is said that for a time he frequented some of the existing schools. Then he bought a garden, perhaps for profit as well as pleasure, and there he discoursed to his friends. Pliny says: *Primus hoc instituit Epicurus otii magister. Usque ad eum moris non fuerat in oppidis habitari rura.* Plato and Theophrastus each had their gardens, which they used apparently for the same purpose; and yet, for some reason not clear, Epicurus is peculiarly the philosopher of the garden, and the garden itself is a sanctuary which, more than a century and a half later, Atticus will compel even Cicero to defend from violation. What gave it this peculiar character one may only guess. The wise man, said Epicurus, will found a school, but not in such a manner as to draw the world after him; he will give readings in public, but only when invited to do so: φιλαγρήσειν, he will love the fields. Even though M. Joyau will have it that the garden was one property with the house at Melite, we must imagine it on the extreme borders of the town, somewhat aloof from it, and perhaps reaching towards the country; but wherever it is situated, a place of conventual seclusion. Some have seen in it an Abbey of Theleme; but, though Theleme was a dream only, a comparison with Port Royal des Champs would not be more of an anachronism. It was a community of friends living together, as though the world about them were only an idle tumult from which they could withdraw themselves at will. There is nothing singular in the fact that women were among the most zealous of his disciples, or

that these women were courtezans. The only thing that could have distinguished the garden of Epicurus from those of other philosophers must have been some additional secrecy veiling it from the eyes of the world. Having the infinite riches of wisdom, said Epicurus, neither Metrodorus nor myself counted it a slight that this illustrious Greece not only ignored us but had not even heard our names.

SENECA says that the great Epicurean soul owed less to the doctrines than to the daily company of Epicurus, but the implied distinction is too arbitrary: that in his life his success owed much to his personal influence and example is doubtless true, but after his death his teaching and the common life of the school were the only means of continuing this influence, which steadily increased. The natural inference is that in these his character is perfectly mirrored. If any monastic community had ever been completely autonomous, it might have reflected the character of its founder as clearly. It is curious to remark how many moderns, impressed by his influence over his disciples, should have described him as the first director of conscience, how they tend more or less involuntarily to consider him as a religious teacher, to find in him premonitions, as it were, of characteristics one is accustomed to consider exclusively Christian, as though Christianity had wrought in human life some sudden and miraculous transfiguration. To my own mind there is nothing inherently improbable in the statement of Clement of Alexandria that the Epicureans possessed an esoteric doctrine, and Laertius refers to a similar statement by Timocrates. One cannot infer its nature, but in any case it is necessary to make some distinction between the Epicureanism of the garden and the more relaxed rule of those who moved, with however great reserve and

circumspection, among the affairs of the world. Friends, indeed, came to him from all parts and lived with him in his garden, as to one original source the lesser stars

Repairing, in their golden urns draw light,

and left again, carrying with them the memory of that tranquil place, and of the serene and tolerant mind inhabiting there, as a possession to be cherished, and a perfect exemplar of the divine life. For in that desirable peace it was impossible that all should share, unless by the contemplation of it; the mind might become a mirror of its quietude.

EPICURUS died of strangury and renal calculus at the age of seventy-two, in the second year of the 127th Olympiad (272-271 B.C.). Shortly before he died he wrote to Idomeneus: 'I write this to you on the last day of my life, which is also the happiest. My sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could exceed them. But against all this I set the joy of my mind at the memory of our past intercourse; and as you have been constant to me and to philosophy from your youth, I would have you watch over the children of Metrodorus.'

BY a will, which Laertius has preserved to us, he left all his property in trust to Amynomachus and Timocrates, with whom, later in the text, he joins Hermarchus as a third trustee, on condition that the garden and all pertaining to it should be at the disposal of Hermarchus, his fellow-members, and those whom he should appoint as his successors, to live and study in; and he entrusted to his school for ever the task of aiding Amynomachus and Timocrates, and their heirs, to maintain so far as possible the common life of the garden. It is rather as though, with the intention of maintaining unimpaired the character which he had given it originally, he had appointed hereditary

governors, with whom Hermarchus, and those succeeding him as scholarchs, would consult on all matters affecting the school. He provided that during the life of Hermarchus, he and his fellow-members should have the use of the house in Melite. To Hermarchus also he left his books; and he ordered that sufficient provision should be made for the children of Metrodorus and the son of Polyænus. He freed his slaves Mys, Nicias, Lyson, and Phædrion. He required his trustees to provide for funeral offerings to his father and mother, and to his three brothers, as well as for the celebration of his own birthday on the tenth day of Gamelion, and the commemoration of himself and Metrodorus by a feast on the 20th of each month; and he ordered that a day in Poseidion should be sacred to the memory of his brothers, and a day in Metageitrion to that of Polyænus. Cicero criticizes him severely for instituting a feast on his own birthday: '*Res tota, Torquate, non doctorum hominum, velle post mortem epulis celebrari memoriam sui nominis. . . .*' But the fortitude with which the apostle of pleasure endured the agonies of his last illness drew from him, as from Seneca, Plutarch, and Marcus Aurelius, a reluctant but unreserved tribute of admiration.

THE secret of his influence not only during his life but after his death, and apart altogether from that personal charm which he undoubtedly had, was that he had set free the individual conscience and enabled it to realize its true nature, as perfectly as the conditions of life allowed. Bacon reproached him with having subordinated natural to moral philosophy, with having excluded from his theory of physics any opinion which might have troubled that serene enjoyment of life which he set before man as the supreme end. It would be more true to say that he did not separate, but reconciled them: the theory of the declension

of atoms, the denial of the law of the excluded middle, the doctrine of free-will were different aspects of the same law. Rejecting the logic of his day, he recognized the need for a logic of facts as distinct from a logic of concepts, and on this point, as on so many others, his insight, or that habit of profound reflection than which nothing was more precious to him, anticipated a difficulty which is only modern because it is apparently insoluble. His *Canon*, which he conjoined with physics, is a kind of psychology. The following account of it, supplemented with some passages from the letter to Herodotus, is taken from Laertius :

'EPICURUS affirms that our sensations and prenotions and our feelings are the criteria of truth. . . . Every sensation, he says, is irrational and does not partake of memory, for neither has it any activity of itself, nor, as being moved by an external object, does it add to or subtract from it. Nor is there anything which can refute sensations or convict them of error : one sensation cannot convict another and kindred sensation, because they are both equally valid, nor can one sensation refute another which is not kindred but heterogeneous, for the objects which they record are different ; nor again can reason refute them, for reason is wholly dependent on the senses ; nor can one sense refute another, since we pay equal heed to all. And the reality of separate perceptions guarantees the truth of our senses. And seeing and hearing are as real as feeling pain. Hence, about all those things which do not come under the senses it is proper to proceed by induction from the phenomena. For all our notions are derived from sensations, either by incidence, analogy, resemblance, or synthesis, the reason also in some measure contributing. And the visions of madmen and the dreams of those asleep are true, since they produce movements

in the mind; and the things which are not produce no movements.'

THE difficulty of fixing the meaning of the term πρόληψις is apparent from the way in which Laertius attempts it: 'By prenotion they mean a sort of apprehension (κατάληψις) or right opinion, or notion, or universal idea stored in the mind, that is, a *recollection of an external object often presented* . . . for no sooner is the word "man" uttered than suddenly by prenotion we think his form in the mind in accordance with sensations previously experienced. Thus the primary signification denoted by each term is immediately evident. We should never have started an inquiry unless we had known for what we were to seek. We should never be able to name anything unless by prenotion we recognized its typical form (τύπος). Prenotions then are immediately evident.' The type or general outline is presented to the mind first, and then the characteristic details may be filled in, as he says in his letter to Herodotus; and he adds that 'the primary significance of every term used should be self-evident, and ought to need no definition.' Clearly, 'the recollection of an external object often presented' is a recollection of a series of particulars associated as similar, or a complex idea of concrete objects.

THEN, there are two states of feeling (πάθη), pleasure and pain, which arise in every living being, the first favourable, and the second hostile to that being, and these feelings determine our choice and aversion; and there are two kinds of inquiry, the one concerned with things and the other with words.

SENSATIONAL theories naturally resemble each other; and M. Joyau has pointed out that, at first sight, the Platonic criticism of the Protagorean thesis, μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, would seem to have some relevance here.

But, however fairly Plato may have handled the thesis of Protagoras, we can only see it through his eyes; he has been able to control the discussion at every point, and thus give its development the direction he wished: he represents Protagoras, however, in the character which he had for his contemporaries, as a master of eristic, but he is on the whole sympathetic. Opposed to the theory of Protagoras, he may have shifted skilfully the whole ground of the argument. Of the Epicurean doctrine M. Joyau remarks: '*Les hallucinations, dit-il, les rêves sont vrais* (ἀληθῆ), *puisqu'ils produisent une impression* (κινεῖ γάρ), *ce qui ne pourrait faire ce qui n'est pas* (τὸ μὴ ὄν). *Epicure n'aurait-il pas dû insister sur cette distinction entre le réel et le vrai?*' To me it seems that Epicurus makes no distinction between truth and reality because to him reality represents the limit of truth. He denies the reality of abstract ideas, as for instance when he tells us that there never was an absolute justice, but only an agreement made in reciprocal intercourse on grounds of expediency. Just as we can only infer the Protagorean theory of truth from a single sentence, unless we accept the Platonic version of it, so we can only infer the Epicurean theory of error from a few sentences in the epistle to Herodotus. Truth he understands in its primary significance: truth as reality. 'For the presentations which are received in a picture or arise in dreams, or from any other form of apprehension by the mind or by the other criteria of truth, would never have resembled what we call the real and true things had it not been for certain actual things of the kind with which we come in contact. Error would not have occurred if we had not experienced some other movement in ourselves, conjoined with but distinct from (διαλῆψιν) the perception of what is presented. And from this movement, if it be not confirmed or be contradicted, falsehood results;

while if it be confirmed or not contradicted, truth results. And to this opinion we must hold our mind, so that faith in the criteria of truth, regarding the effective evidence of phenomena, be not destroyed, and so that we do not fall into doubt and confusion by giving an equal value to those things which are true and to those which are false.'

THE typical form with which the act of πρόληψις compares the particular sensation is not the Platonic ideal form, but the recollection of an object often presented, that is to say, a series of particulars associated as similar, not simple and abstract, but complex and concrete. Curiously enough, it is not static, or dynamic, but kinetic, for πρόληψις is not only memory but anticipation, and the particular sensation simply takes its place as one of a series, which it does not even complete. The psychological experience would seem to be reflected in his theory of vision, which he explained as a series of films given off by visible bodies in such rapid succession as to be apparently continuous: a constant and invariable repetition, in fact, constituting their clearness (ἐνάργεια), which is the sign of truth and reality.

IN the same way the doctrine of free-will reflects the theory of the *clinamen*, in which the atoms cease to be regarded as inert, but are invested with a power of inclination, a power, that is, of spontaneous movement. Primitive and rudimentary as it is, it represents the source of consciousness and free-will, for the whole theory of Epicurus, in all its branches, is a theory of determinate forces: the difference between the movement of simple attraction or repulsion in an atom, and the co-ordinate movements of atoms combined in a more complex body, being only a difference in degree. Since Epicurus held that all things which caused a movement in the mind were real and true because of that movement, it is scarcely an exaggeration

to say that he identified movement and reality: the form of a thing being determined by the separate simple movements co-ordinated in it. The imperceptible swerve of the atom was his answer to the criticism of the Democritean theory by Aristotle, who not only objected, that in regard to space *up* and *down* were terms without meaning, but also, that falling or moving at an equal speed in a straight line the atoms could never combine. Epicurus says that 'we must not assert "up" or "down" of space as though there were an absolutely extreme limit in height or depth,' and having taken this precaution, and added that the whole motion must be considered as equally infinite in all directions, he is content to express the theory in the form in which it is most readily comprehensible.

LAERTIUS says nothing about the theory of the swerve, nor does Epicurus mention it, though it may seem to be implied, in the letter to Herodotus. The notion that he devised it as an artifice to account for his doctrine of free-will, since man is only responsible if his choice is free, and only moral if he is responsible, is itself an artifice. He had no interest in making man a moral being, that was the concern of the Stoics: to him morality was the order arising from the conflict of rival egoisms equally valid. His doctrine of free-will is a necessary implication of that which makes the feelings (πάθη) a criterion of truth, a means by which choice and aversion are determined, for where there is an element of choice there is an element of freedom, even though, as Lucretius says of the swerve, it is only *perpaucum nec plus quam minimum*. In that unending procession of images which throngs the consciousness of man, there is one alone which is invariably present, which is repeated with so much rapidity as to seem constant and continuous, and that is the image of oneself. It is because this fundamental self-consciousness pervades the whole

system of Epicurus that he is reproached with egoism by those who forget, or ignore, the words, Know thyself; and the *Cogito, ergo sum*, of Descartes. In self-consciousness we have the clear and evident proof of our existence, and the guarantee of our freedom; but our existence is not distinct from other existences, nor from the whole of existence; and our freedom is not distinct either, though we are none the less free because we obey the law of our own nature, which is the universal law finding in the consciousness of man perhaps its highest if still imperfect expression. Our freedom is in direct proportion to the degree of consciousness possessed by us; and Thales, standing at the very source of Greek philosophy, from the properties of amber and the magnet predicated some rudimentary form of consciousness even of inanimate objects.

A MAN who is conscious of his condition at all, says Cicero, quoting Epicurus, must necessarily feel either pleasure or pain: *Quisquis enim sentit, quem ad modum sit affectus, eum necesse est aut in voluptate esse aut in dolore.* Epicurus did not admit a neutral state, and affirmed that the complete absence of pain constituted pleasure, and indeed constituted the supreme point and limit of pleasure. The school of Aristippus, the Cyrenaics, accepting the doctrine of Heracleitus, that everything is in motion, could not admit a pleasure which was repose: the removal of pain which is put forward in Epicurus seems to them not to be pleasure at all, any more than the absence of pleasure is pain; for both pleasure and pain they hold to consist in motion, whereas absence of pleasure like absence of pain is not motion, since painlessness is the condition of one who is, as it were, asleep. This complete misunderstanding of the doctrine of Epicurus is shared by Cicero; and in attempting to explain the error

of this position, it is necessary to consider other theories of pleasure.

THE Heracleitean dogma that everything is movement was accepted by Aristippus, Plato, and Epicurus alike. To the Cyrenaics, the past and the future are not, since one is no more, and the other is not yet. There is only the present enjoyment (τὸ παρόν) and the wise man is unaffected by the past or the future. In *La Théorie du Plaisir d'après Épicure*, Victor Brochard has shown the relation of the theory of Epicurus to those of his predecessors, and it is an extremely acute appreciation worked out with the most scrupulous care for detail. M. Brochard says: The *Theætetus* shows that Plato had an exact knowledge and had examined very closely the theories of sensation formulated in the school of Heracleitus, as well by Protagoras as by the Cyrenaics. The *Philebus* is a similar proof in what concerns the theory of pleasure. Plato remains faithful, with the Cyrenaics, to the Heracleitean doctrine of an universal flux in a world of becoming. There is thus no place in his psychology for the pleasure in repose, ἡδονὴ καταστηματική (a questionable statement); but Plato separates himself from Aristippus in so far as he considers pleasure as a determined movement having a definite end. His object is order and harmony; it is produced when the body is fit and well, and the limits between which it is produced are emptiness and repletion. It tends thus to a kind of equilibrium. So, in *The Banquet*, Eros is the child of Want and Plenty. As M. Brochard observed, the theory of Epicurus bears a very marked resemblance to the theory of Plato, but he proceeds to show the influence on Epicurus of the Aristotelian correction of Plato. Aristotle held that pleasure is neither a movement nor a becoming, but a stable and definite condition, a positive and durable manner of being, a

quality, ποιότης, not a κίνησις nor a γένεσις. Pleasure is not in the pursuit but in the possession; it partakes more of the nature of repose than of the nature of movement; it accompanies the act but is not confused with it; though one may admit a connection between the pleasure and the act. Action differs from motion, of which it is the term and the achievement, motion being divisible, while the act is simple and indivisible. The act contains everything that is real in the movement; it may continue for a short or a long time, but when it continues it remains the same, without increase or diminution; and if it is not a matter of indifference whether it continues for long or not, at least its duration does not change the nature of the act itself. M. Brochard connects it with the Aristotelian notion of '*une énergie d'immobile*, ἀκινησίας ἐνέργεια,' with regard to which, as well as on other points, he has been influenced by the always stimulating work of Dr. Schiller; and he concludes: '*Ainsi de même que chez Aristote l'acte auquel le plaisir est attaché est immobile sans être inerte, de même, chez Épicure, l'équilibre, condition du plaisir, est stable sans être la négation du mouvement. L'immobilité produite par l'équivalence de mouvements contraires qui se neutralisent dans un équilibre stable n'est pas de l'inertie, et le plaisir comme la condition dont il dépend est une réalité parfaitement positive.*'

THE objection of the Cyrenaics and of Cicero with regard to the pleasure in repose (ἡδονὴ καταστηματική, ἡδονὴ ἐν στάσει) that it was merely negative is shown to be unreal, for in the opposition of equivalents a balance results only because each has reached the limit of its energy: it is not then a negative or immobile state, a state of not-being, but one of intense activity. It would be extremely interesting if we could find that Epicurus, who held that time and matter were discontinuous and

rejected Euclidean geometry, had also some notion, which seems at least implicit in his theory of the swerve, of the inertia of energy, quite apart from the fact that the moral doctrine is a consequence of the physical, being the law of man's nature in relation to universal law. The analyses of the Platonic and Aristotelian theories of pleasure by M. Brochard are invaluable in that they show us the ambient ideas which influenced the development of the Epicurean doctrine and shaped its character. But the balance of equivalent opposites, or one might almost say the reconciliation of opposites, offers only a partial solution: M. Brochard was well aware that the act which accompanies the movement represented a metaphysical principle to which Epicurus would have been indifferent; and that (though as regards Epicurus, to whom repose would have been relative only, it is a point of minor importance) the process by which pleasure from being a κίνησις or a γένεσις becomes a ποιότης is a little artificial. The solution appears to me to be simpler and to depend on how the term καταστηματική is to be interpreted.

IN distinguishing between the pleasure in motion, and the pleasure in repose, as it has come to be called, one is really distinguishing between the doctrine of Aristippus and the doctrine of Epicurus; and when the followers of Aristippus wish to distinguish themselves from the Epicureans they deny that pleasure is derived from the memory or expectation of good, for they assert that the movement affecting the mind is exhausted in course of time. Clearly, then, what they deny will be characteristic of the true Epicurean doctrine. In the act of πρόληψις the particular sensation took its place as one of a series which it did not even complete, choice and aversion came into play and the mind awoke rich in memories and anticipations, so that it was no longer a single sensation, but a

whole series of similar movements gradually tending toward a stable equilibrium among themselves. The Cyrenaic opinion that particular pleasure is desirable for its own sake, whereas happiness is desirable not for its own sake but for the sake of particular pleasures, was also directed against the Epicurean doctrine; but Epicurus was not touched by this objection, neither past nor future is our concern except in so far as both are present: 'As men choose of food not merely and simply the larger portion but the more pleasant, so the wise seek to enjoy the time which is most pleasant and not merely that which is longest.' Or again: 'Unlimited time and limited time afford an equal amount of pleasure, if we measure the limits of time by reason; for the flesh receives as unlimited the limits of pleasure, and in such a way the limited time procures an unlimited pleasure; and the mind, taking into account what the aim and measure of the flesh is, relaxes from the dread of eternity and gives order and security to the whole life. It has no longer any desire for infinite time, nor does it fly from pleasure, and even at the going out of life it does not feel desire for anything which is lacking to the perfect life.' It is important also, in this connection, to refer to one of the sovran maxims, the ninth, in which he says: 'If all pleasure might be amassed with time in all our being or in the ruling parts of our nature, there would have been no difference in pleasures one from another.' M. Brochard is entirely right when he says that Epicurus rejects the notion of pleasure as a quantity capable of being increased indefinitely; but apparently he did not see that Epicurus also approached Aristotle in so far as he admits a difference between one pleasure and another. The ninth maxim is obviously directed against the Cyrenaics, Epicurus wishing to distinguish his position from theirs, a distinction which

Cicero ignored when he wrote: 'With you it is the recollection of pleasures enjoyed that gives happiness; and those must be bodily pleasures, for if it be any others it ceases to be true that mental pleasures all arise from the connection of the mind with the body. Yet if bodily pleasure even when past can give delight, I do not see why Aristotle should be so contemptuous of the epitaph of Sardanapalus.' The reference is to this King's tomb at Anchiala, or according to another account at Nineveh, on which was the figure of the King making an obscene gesture with his hand, and claiming to have taken with him all the sensual pleasures he had enjoyed in life. For the Cyrenaics held that 'pleasure does not differ from pleasure, nor is one pleasure more pleasant than another,' and that 'to accumulate the pleasures which are productive of happiness is a most irksome business.' It is only necessary to add that in the letter to Herodotus, Epicurus says that the soul has the greatest share in causing sensation.

THE distinction between the ἡδονὴ ἐν κινήσει and the ἡδονὴ καταστηματική is that the former is an isolated and irreflective pleasure, a simple sensation, which is irrational and does not partake of memory, for neither has it any activity of itself, nor as being moved by an external object does it add to or subtract from it, and one pleasure is equal to another, its single characteristic being that it is pleasant. It is by the act of πρόληψις that the ἡδονὴ καταστηματική, or constitutive pleasure, arises, for it is only by comparison with the recollection of an object often presented, that is to say of particulars associated as similar, not simple and abstract but complex and concrete, that pleasure acquires a value and a qualitative difference. It is not an indefinitely increasing quantity of pleasure which Epicurus offers to us, it is an enhanced value in it; it is not so much that he prolongs its duration, though

indirectly this may be the result of his discipline, as that the moment of its being is qualified by the whole experience of the past. When he, or when his disciples, spoke of the ἡδονὴ ἐν στάσει, the pleasure in repose, they were neither opposing the Heracleitean doctrine of motion, which M. Brochard seems to suggest with reference to Plato's theory of pleasure, nor assenting to the Eleatic doctrine of rest, they were considering only the relative stability of character, of self-consciousness; and since to Epicurus the soul has the greater share in causing sensation, so the nature of the soul is what characterizes and qualifies, or in a more special sense constitutes, the highest kind of pleasure. Pleasure to the followers of Aristippus is nothing but the passive reception by the senses of some stimulus from an external object; and it is worth remarking in this connection, that in all those decisions which a man takes as it were against the sense of the world, in which he feels that he acts most freely and spontaneously, as in some passion of love or heroism, it is precisely at such moments that he ceases to control his action and becomes the irreflective puppet of necessity or fate. To the Epicurean, on the contrary, αὐτάρκεια, a perfect self-mastery, was the condition of any free activity of the mind, of all right choice; for as Epicurus said: 'We regard self-mastery as a great good, not so as in all cases to limit ourselves to little, but so as to be contented with little if we have not much, since we are fully persuaded that they have the smoothest enjoyment of plenty who stand least in need of it, and that all those things which our nature needs are easy, and only our idle fancies difficult to gain.' The fundamental error of all those who have misinterpreted the doctrines of Epicurus has been the attempt to read into his terms a metaphysical sense which they were never intended to convey.

FREDERIC MANNING.

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AN APOLOGIE FOR EPICURUS,

As to the three Capital Crimes whereof he is accused.

Written in a Letter, to a Person of Honour.

SIR,

YOur beloved EPICURUS, *having lately learn'd English, on purpose to converse more familiarly with you; comes now at length to wait upon you, and at your vacant hours to entertain you with grave Discourses touching the Happiness of Man's life, and the right means of attaining it, Wisdom. I have no reason to doubt of his welcome and kind reception by you, considering that he comes not, but upon your frequent, and (I am confident) hearty invitations of him; your own ingenious and commendable desire to be intimately acquainted with his Principles, and Doctrine of Morality, and to hear him speak his own Thoughts purely and sincerely, having been the only occasion and motive to my assistance of him in his Travels from* Greece *into this Country, and my accommodation of him with such an Equipage, as might be exactly suitable as well to your wishes, as to his own mind. Nay more, I have reason to presume, that a few days conversation will create in you a very great dearness towards him, as well because I am assured you will soon find him what you expect, a sublime Wit, a profound Judgment, and*

a great Master of Temperance, Sobriety, Continence, Fortitude and all other Virtues, not a Patron of Impiety, Gluttony, Drunkenness, Luxury and all kinds of Intemperance, as the common people (being mis-inform'd by such learned men as either did not rightly understand, or would not rightly represent his opinions) generally conceive him to be ; as because I have perceived him not only to give strong and lively hints to sundry of those sublime Speculations, wherewith your thoughts are sometimes delightfully employed ; but also solidly to assert many of those Tenents which I have often heard you defend, with the like Reasons, and which indeed nothing but the voluntary and affected Ignorance of Superstition will deny. So that, if the Rule hold, that Similitude of Opinions is an Argument of Similitude in Affections, and Similitude of Affections the ground of Love and Friendship, certainly I am not altogether destitute of support for my conjecture, and consequently that you will soon admit him into your Bosom, and treat him with all the demonstrations of respect due to so excellent a Companion.

But, as there is no Beauty without some moles, no Chrystal without some specks ; so is not our EPICURUS *without his imperfections, and you will discover in him some things which cannot escape your reprehension ; and yet I expect, that your censure of him should be much more moderate and charitable, than that of the ignorant and scarce humane Multitude hath been for many ages together. And therefore I ask leave to state the Nature of his guilt unto you, and afterwards to give you my Judgment thereupon ; in the mean time humbly leaving you to the Liberty of your own more judicious sentiments of both the one and the other. For, my design therein, is not to possess your breast with my thoughts concerning the crimes usually charged upon this Philosopher, but to dispossess it of an opinion that I might have the same indignation against him in respect of some unjustifiable positions of his, as not only the common people, but even the greatest number of Scholars, have for many hundred of years, entertain'd. And what I shall say to that purpose I humbly desire you will be pleas'd to understand to be intended*

as an Exercitation, *to take off from his memory the greatest part of that unjust Odium, and Infamy which envy and malice on one hand, and Ignorance and Inhumanity on the other, have cast upon it, to the eclipsing even of all his excellent merits from the Commonwealth of Philosophy, and not as a defence of any unreasonable or dangerous Errour, whereof he is found really guilty. Which was more perhaps then was needful for me to advertise you of, who well understand the difference betwixt a* Vindication *and an* Excusation *; that it is one thing to mitigate a too severe and rash sentence, and another to justifie the Offender. And therefore without any further Apologizing for my short Apology for* EPICURUS, *I directly address to my Province.*

The Opinions, which, being asserted by him in this Treatise concerning Ethicks, *have so much incens'd the world against him, are principally these three.* (1.) That the Souls of men are mortal, and so uncapable of all, either happiness or misery after death. (2.) That Man is not obliged to honour, revere, and worship God, in respect of his beneficence, or out of the hope of any Good or Fear of any evil at his hands, but meerly in respect of the transcendent Excellencies of his Nature, Immortality, and Beatitude. (3.) That Self-homicide is an Act of Heroick Fortitude in case of intolerable or otherwise inevitable Calamity. *These, I confess, are Positions to be rather wholly condemned and abominated, than in the least measure patroniz'd by us Christians, whose understandings (thanks be to the mercy of the Fountain of Wisdom) are illuminated by a brighter light than that of Nature ; and yet notwithstanding when I remember, that our Philosopher was a meer Naturalist, born and educated in times of no small Pagan darkness, and consider that neither of these Tenents will be found upon due Examination so destitute of all support of Reason, as rash and unexamining heads have apprehended, I profess I cannot but think it an argument of much more inhumanity than judicious zeal in any man, upon this account alone, to invade him with the*

crimination of superlative Impiety, Blasphemy, *and absolute* Atheism. *For,*

As to the FIRST, viz. *That the humane soul doth not survive the funerals of the body, but absolutely perish in the instant of death; as I need not tell you, how uncomfortable an Opinion it is to all Virtuous Persons, and how manifestly repugnant to Christianism, and indeed to the fundamental* Reason *of all* Religions *beside* (*if I may be admitted to use that improper phrase of the vulgar, while I well know that there can be but one* Religion *truly so called, and that all the rest are more properly called Superstitions*) *so I need not advertise you how highly difficult it is to refute it, by satisfactory and convincing Arguments desumable from meer* Reason. *For, to suspect the light of Nature, is scarce strong enough by its own single force, to dispel all those thick mists of difficulties, that hinder our discernment of the full nature of the humane soul, and scarce bright enough clearly to demonstrate the immortality of that noble Essence, so, as to leave no room for diffidence or contradiction; I hope it can be no Heresie in any man, because no disparagement to either his Faith or* Reason. *You have, Sir, I presume, attentively perused that so worthily commended Discourse of* Plato, *touching the immortality of Mans soul, and acquainted your self moreover with all those mighty Arguments, alledged by Saint* Thomas, Pomponatius (*who will hardly be out-done in subtlety, touching the same Theam, by any that comes after him, and yet he was forced to conclude himself a Sceptick, and leave the Question to the decision of some other bolder Pen*) Des Cartes, *our noble friend Sir* Kenelm Digby, *and divers other great Clerks, to prove the Soul of Man to be a substance distinct from, and independent upon that of the body, and to have eternal existence* a parte post; *and yet if I were not assured, that your perswasion of its immortality is founded upon a much more firm basis, than that of the most seemingly apodictical of all their* Reasons, *I might well doubt of the impregnability thereof. And this I may say somewhat the more freely and boldly, both because I my self, having with all possible attention, and equity of*

mind, examined the validity of moſt of those Arguments, for the immortality of mens ſouls, which their Authors have presented as perfect Demonſtrations thereof, cannot find any of them to make good that glorious Title, or ſatisfie expectation to the full; and because I have observed many learned men, Divines, and others, who have long laboured their thoughts in the same Disquisition, to concur with me in opinion, That to believe the Soul of Man to be immortal, upon Principles supernatural, is much more easie, then to demonſtrate the same by Reasons purely Natural. *Now, if for the moſt sublime Wits, even of our times (wherein the Metaphysicks have, doubtless, received a very great encrease of clearness, and mens Speculations seem to be highly refined, in regard of sundry lively and fruitful hints, that are inſpersed upon the leaves of sacred Writ, concerning as well the Original and Nature of the Soul, as the ſtate of it after death) it be so hard a task to erect a firm perswasion of the immortality of the humane soul, upon a foundation of Natural Reason alone; I appeal to every imprejudicate man, with what juſtice our* EPICURUS *is so highly condemned, for being ignorant of that unattainable Truth, when he could ſteer the course of his judgment and belief by no other Star, but that remote and pale one of the Light of Nature, that bright North-Star of Holy Scripture appearing not at all to the Horizon of* Greece, *till many Ages after his death.*

Again, EPICURUS *is not the only man amongſt the Ancients that is to be accused, for entertaining and divulging erroneous conceptions of the nature and condition of the reasonable soul after death, it being well known, that moſt of the Grecian Philosophers did indubitate the incorruptibility thereof, either implicitly and upon consequence, or immediately, and in direct terms. This perhaps may seem a Paradox to you, and therefore I ask leave to make it good. The Grecian Scholiarchs may all be divided into two Classes, in reference to this subject; the* First *conſisting of those who* Asserted, *the other of such as expresly* Denied *the Immortality of Man's Soul, the former containing the greater, the latter*

the lesser number. And among all those that are on the Affirmative part, you shall not find one that is not (*more or less*) *tainted with that so common Errour, of the* Refusion of all mens Souls after death, into the *Anima Mundi*, or general Soul of the Universe, *which is upon consequence, That*, they cease to exist, *per se*, or to be what they were before, so soon as they are separated from the body. *For your further satisfaction of this unfrequent Truth, be pleased to observe, that, as they generally conceived the soul of every individual man, to be a certain particle of the Mundane, or universal soul, immitted into the body at its conception, and therein contained during life, as a drop of water is contained in a Glass Phial; so did they also conceive, that the same soul, upon the breaking of the Glass, or dissolution of the Body, doth flow forth, and again return and unite it self to the universal soul, from whence it was at first desumed. Thus* Plutarch (4 Placit. 9.) *expresly tells us, that* Pythagoras *and* Plato *maintained, that Mans Soul having taken its farewel of the body* [εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν ἀναχωρεῖν πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενές] in congeniam sibi animam Mundi concedere, *doth return to the soul of the world, which is of the same substance and nature with it. Now by this common soul of the world, it is manifest, that they sometimes meant* God, *in respect they acknowledged him to be the supreme Intelligence, or Mind, which disposeth and ordereth all parts of the body; and sometimes the* Heavens, *because as Heaven is the most pure and noble part of the Universe, so is the soul the most pure and noble part of Man.*

This considered, you have here an opportunity (*at least, if a short and pertinent digression may be opportune*) *of taking notice in what sence we are to understand some remarkable passages in their Writings, touching the humane soul, which are often mentioned, but seldom rightly interpreted.*

First, we may hence collect what their true meaning was, when they said, Animam esse divinæ auræ Particulam, *that the Soul is a particle of Divine breath, or as* Cicero *speaks* (*in* Cato Major) Ex Divina mente universa delibutos animos habemus: *We*

have our souls derived from the Universal Divine Mind; And again, when they affirmed, that our Souls were taken from Heaven, and to return thither again after their emancipation from the body: All which the Prince of Poets elegantly insinuateth in these Verses;

——Deum namque ire per omnes
Terrasque tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum;
Heinc homines, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,
Quemque fibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas,
Scilicet huc reddi deinde ac resoluta referri
Omnia, nec morti esse locum; sed viva evolare
Sideris in numerum, atque alto succedere cœlo.

Secondly, we may hence learn the sence of Empedocles, *as well in that saying quoted by* Plutarch (de exilio) Præsentem vitam esse exilium, e quo tandem animus sit in pristinam sedem demigraturus, *That this present life is a banishment of the soul, from which it is at length to be recall'd to its primitive place; as in that mentioned by* Clem. Alexandrinus (Lib. 4. Stromat. 2. hypotypos. 24.) Animos sapientum Deos fieri, *That the souls of Wise-men become Gods.*

Thirdly, we may hence know how to understand the true sence of Plato*'s opinion*, that all Learning is only Reminiscence. *For supposing the Soul of the Universe to be omniscient, and each particle thereof to be of the same nature and faculties with the whole; he thereupon infers, that the soul of each man being a particle of that Universal and omniscient soul, must be likewise omniscient, though in the moment, when it is immers'd into the body, it becomes dim and beclouded, so that as if it had been made drunk with* Lethe, *or the Waters of Oblivion, it forgets all its Original knowledge, and must recollect and call to mind the notions of particular things, by the help and mediation of the senses.*

Lastly, why Pythagoras *and* Plato, *to this opinion of the Souls* Remigration *to the Universal Soul, connected that their other so famous one of the* Transmigration *of Souls from body to*

body successively. For, having imbibed this latter errour of the Souls transmigration, in their conversation with some Egyptian Priests, as Stobæus *informs us* (in Eccl. Physic.) *they strived to accommodate the same to their own former opinion, of the souls being a particle of the* Anima mundi ; *insomuch as it might thence follow, that the soul being exhal'd from its first body, and wandring up and down in quest of its Fountain, the universal soul, might probably enough light upon some other body then in the act of Conception, and being united thereunto, animate it, or being by inspiration attracted into some living creature, unite it self to the soul præexistent therein, and so become one with it, especially if the body it meet with be of the same, or like conditions and affections with the former, which it hath so lately forsaken. True it is, nevertheless, that they delivered this Doctrine of the Transmigration of souls, very obscurely, and wrapt up in Fables and Allegories, but their design herein was to make men more mansuete and mild in their dispositions, by bringing them to put a greater value upon the lives of Animals (for, according to this Doctrine, who would kill a Beast, when for ought he knew, his Fathers Soul might animate that Beast?) and a greater degree of horrour against shedding of Blood, that so having devested them of all savageness and cruelty, they might have a greater detestation against Homicide, and preserving the peace and safety of Societies.*

Nor can the Stoicks *be exempted from the same Errour, of the* Refusion *of all souls into the Universal one ; insomuch as it was their constant tenent, that the world was animated by a certain fire, which they called* Jupiter *; that mens souls were particles derived from that fire, and should again be reunited thereunto, some sooner, others later, but all in that general Conflagration of the Universe, when all things shall be (as they dreamt) sublimed into* Jove *again.*

Now if we look narrowly into the business, we shall discover even Aristotle *himself to be in some measure guilty of the very same delusion, as well in respect of his* Animal Heat, *which, discoursing*

of the Generation of Animals (Lib. 2. Cap. 3.) *he affirms to be respondent in some proportion to the Element of Celestial bodies, and wherewith all things in the world are impregnated, as of his* Intellectus Agens, *which he teacheth to be diffused through the whole world, after the same manner as the light of the Sun is diffus'd through the air, and so apply'd and conjoyned to the* Intellectus Patiens, *or proper soul of every man, as the external light is applyed and conjoyned to the eye; and as the eye by the conjunction of external light comes to see visible objects, so doth the proper passive Intellect of every man, by the illustration of the general active Intellect, come to understand intelligible Objects. Adding thereunto, that the Intellect passive is separable, corruptible, and capable of utter dissolution; but the Active, inseparable, incorruptible, immortal. For, thus much may be collected from several places of his Books* de Anima, *and thus are those places explained by the best of his Greek interpreters,* Alexander, *and the best of the Arabians,* Averrhoes, *whose opinion of the* Unity of the Intellect *in all the world, is sufficiently known.*

And thus much of the Philosophers of the former *Classis, who though they seem to affirm, do yet in reality, upon natural consequence, deny the Immortality of the Humane Soul, in that they all concur in that contradictory Errour of the Refusion thereof into the* Anima mundi. *For, the proper Notion of Immortality, is,* the eternal existence of a thing in the self same nature, and *per se; and therefore, if a thing be devested of its own proper nature, so, as to become invested with that of another, and to have no existence or subsistence, but what is dependent upon its union with that other, to which it is assimilated and identified; for my part, truly, I cannot understand how it can be said to be immortal without manifest contradiction. And whether it be not as gross an absurdity to say, that the soul of a man shall be for ever the same* (i.e.) *the soul of a man, and yet that it shall be identified, or made the same with the soul of the world; as to say, that such a thing shall be for ever the same, and not the same, is no hard matter to determine.*

As for those of the latter, *who in downright terms* denyed *the Immortality of the soul, they subdivide themselves into two different Sects, some having contended for the total* destruction, *or* absolute annihilation, *and others for only the* exsolution *and* dispersion *of it into the* matter *or* principles *of which it was composed.*

To the former *of these Sects we may justly annumerate all such, who conceived the soul of man to be only a certain harmony, not of Musical sounds, but a contemperation of parts, humours, and qualities; and consequently, that as of Musical Harmony, nothing can remain after the sounds are vanished, so of the soul nothing can remain, after death hath once destroyed that harmonious Contemperation of parts, humours, and qualities, from whence it did result. And this purely was the opinion of not only those ancienter Greeks,* Dicæarchus, Aristoxenus, Andræas, *and* Asclepiades, *all which are thereof strongly accused by* Plato (in Phæd.) *and* Aristotle (Lib. 1. de Anima. Cap. 5.) *but also our Master* Galen, *who was positive and plain in his definition of the soul, to be a certain Temperament of Elementary Qualities. In the same list may we also inscribe the names of all those, who imagining the soul to be nothing else but a certain* Act, *or* Form, *or* Quality *inseparable* (i.e.) *a certain special* Modification *of* Matter, *have accordingly concluded, that as the* Figure, *or special* Mode *of a thing must inevitably vanish, immediately upon the immutation or change of the thing figurate, so must the soul, being only a special Mode of the Matter, necessarily vanish immediately upon the immutation of that Mode by death. Which* Origen, Justine, Theodoret, *and some other* Fathers, *understanding to have been the Tenent of* Aristotle, *have written sharp invectives against him, as an assertor of the souls mortality, and this so justly, that if his Zealous Disciple, honest Mr.* Alexander Rosse, *were alive again, he would never be able to discredit that their charge.*

To the latter *we are to refer all such, as held the soul to be* Corporeal. *For, as they would have it to be composed of* material *principles, so would they also have it to be, by death, again resolved*

into the same material principles; so that in their sence, the extinction of the Soul is no other, but the dissipation thereof into those very corporeal particles, of which it was composed. And this seems to be the true meaning of Demonax *in* Lucian, *when being interrogated whether he thought the Soul to be immortal, he answered,* mihi videtur, sed ut omnia; *it seems to me to be immortal, but no otherwise than all things are immortal,* i.e. *as to the matter only, or component Principles of it, which are incapable of Annihilation. In this Catalogue we may worthily place* Marcus Antoninus, *in regard of his saying* (Lib. 4.) Animas hominum dispergi in auras, *that mens souls are dispersed into Aer: and* Seneca, *for his* Animam hominis magno pondere extriti permeare non posse, & statim dispergi, quia non fuerit illi exitus liber; *as also* Democritus *and* Epicurus, *who equally contested, that the soul was nothing but very* Atoms, *in such a special order, in such a special position, &c. contemperated, and Death nothing but a discomposure of that determinate Contexture, and a Resolution of the soul into separated Atoms again; and therefore are they always conjoined by the good* Lactantius (Lib. 3. cap. 7. & lib. 9. cap. 8. & 13.) *as confederates in the Doctrine of the Dissolution of Souls.*

And thus, Sir, you may at once plainly perceive the justice *of my Attainder of the most, and most eminent of the antient Grecian Philosophers, with the guilt of having been (either obliquely or directly) Impugners of the Souls Immortality; and the great* Injustice *of their Sentence, who more particularly condemn* Epicurus *for the same Errour, when so many others were equally culpable with him therein.*

As to the SECOND, viz. That man is not obliged to honour, revere, and worship God upon the motive of his Beneficence, or upon the account of either Good or Evil expected from him; but only out of a sentiment of the superlative Excellencies of his Nature, and chiefly of his Immortality and Beatitude. *I might well plead for him, that*

living in a time, when there was scarce any Religion, *but sottish Idolatry, when there were more Gods then Nations, yea, then Temples; and when all Devotion was absurd and ridiculous Superstition: He seems rather to be honour'd, for that he came so neer to the knowledge of the true God, then condemned for coming no neerer; rather to be admir'd for having so clear and genuine an apprehension of some of the Divine Attributes, then reproached for not comprehending them all. Especially, when I should not infringe the Law of charity, to doubt, that among us Christians, and even such as think themselves not a little vers'd in* Theologie, *there may be some, who, if they were put to give but an Adumbration of that mysterious piece, the Divine Nature, would discover themselves to have as imperfect an Idæa thereof, as* EPICURUS *had. But this excuse would be too general for his particular vindication, from the imputed crime of perfect* Atheism, *and therefore we shall fix only on such* Reasons *as are more properly accommodate to that purpose.*

First, I dare say, his Piety, *in deriding the incompetency of those Conceptions, that men in his time commonly entertained of the supreme Essence (for they ascribed generally unto it, all the self same passions and affections, which they perceived to be in themselves, and so copied out an imperfect Divinity, by the infinitely disproportionate Original of Humanity) was much greater than his* Impiety *could be, in teaching, that the Deity was of so transcendently excellent a nature, as to be wholly unconcern'd in any thing but it self, and far above all sentiments whatever, besides those of its own eternal and compleat* Felicity; *and consequently, that it was to be reverenc'd and worshiped solely and purely for its own sake, without the least mixture of self-Reflections. For, as by the one, he judiciously attempted to subvert the false and unreasonable* Religion, *or (rather) Superstition, in the worship of* Bacchus, *and other the Imaginary Deities, wherewith his Country swarmed in his days (there being no better way to alienate mens minds from the Veneration of False Gods, than to acquaint them with notions comprehending the Essential and Incommunicable attributes of the*

true God) *so by the other, he seems to have laid a very firm foundation for the true* Religion, *in that he would have the* Right *or Justice of all Divine worship to be founded wholly and entirely upon the Excellency of the Divine Nature. How far therefore he was from being a Professor and Seminary of down-right Atheism, as some* (*whose zeal may well be thought to have been much greater than their knowledge, as to that particular*) *have represented him to the World; every man, who hath but so much reason, as to understand, that* Polytheism *is the greatest* Atheism, *may easily judge.*

In the next place, I can hardly allow him to deserve the odious Epithete of, Most highly Impious, *which most men brand him withall, upon the account of this latter Doctrine only, because I meet with not a few, nor contemptible* Reasons, *that incline my judgment to more moderation. In particular, you well know, Sir, how highly unreasonable it is, for any man to expect, from* EPICURUS, *the knowledge of the true and legitimate worship of God, when that was by God himself prescribed only to the ancient Hebrews, and professed only by their Posterity, and no other Nation in the World; if so, why should more be expected from* Him, *than from* Plato, Zeno, Socrates, Aristotle, *or any other of the elder Grecian Philosophers, they being all equally benighted with Paganism? why should he be so severely sentenc'd, and all the rest pass unquestioned, one and the same charge of invincible ignorance of the true* Religion *lying against each of them? Besides, Humane Justice will hardly permit, that any man should suffer meerly for wanting that, which, without supernatural means, was impossible for him to obtain; and he that will adventure to determine, whether or no, at the Tribunal of Divine Justice, any one shall be condemned simply upon that score, must have dived very deep into that fathomless gulf of Prædestination.*

You likewise know, that our Christian Doctors assign only Two causes, *or* Fundamental Considerations, *why men should worship God: The* one *they teach to be the transcendent Excellency of the Nature of God, which singly, and without any respect to our own Utility or Advantage, doth justly claim the highest veneration*

of our minds. The other, *they admit to be the benefits, we either have received, or (which is the ſtronger motive of the two) hope to receive at his hands. Hereupon, if any man be induced to revere and worship the Divine Majeſty ſolely and ſimply upon the* former *motive, they say that he bears a* Filial *reſpect and affection to God; and if only by the* latter, *a meer* servile *or mercenary. Now though the servile or mercenary love of God, be not altogether to be diſliked, in regard it is a kind of gratitude due to him as a Benefactor; yet I conceive no man will gainsay, but the filial and free love is much the nobler and more acceptable, insomuch as it hath no other than the nobleſt of Objects, God Himself. And sure I am (however) that the moſt Learned, moſt Pious, and moſt Religious of our School Divines, have been earneſt in their advisoes to us, to extract all selfness from our love of God, and (as much as our frailties will admit of) to fix all our affections entirely upon Him, as he is infinitely Good, and Amiable in Himself.*

Moreover, you may remember, Sir, that Cicero *in his Book touching the nature of the Gods, hath these very words,* Quid eſt cur Deos ab hominibus colendos dicas, cum dii ipsi non modo homines non colant, sed omnino nihil curent? Et quæ porro Pietas ei debetur, a quo nihil acceperis? Aut quid omnino, cujus nullum meritum sit, ei deberi poteſt? *By which it is evident, that he would exclude all other inducements to Religion, besides a meer mercenary and servile reſpect: And yet I dare say, that you do not remember, that ever you heard him accounted Impious for that opinion. Why therefore should* EPICURUS *have such hard measure, as to be ſtigmatiz'd with the name of* Atheiſt, Impious wretch, Secretary of Hell, Enemy to all Religion, *&c.? and all for asserting, that man ought to be induc'd to a reverence and veneration of the Divine Majeſty, only by the Sentiments of a* Filial *Piety (not supernatural Piety, arising from Grace juſtifying, and by which we are made the Sons of God, but a pure Natural one) such as* Right Reason *had suggeſted unto him? Certainly, of the two opinions,* Epicurus's *will appear*

much more venial, to an Equitable Arbiter. Sundry other arguments there are, which might be advantagiously alledged on our Authors behalf, in this case. But, considering that these few already urged, are of importance enough, to evince the temerity of his Accusers judgment, and that the prolixity of this discourse, hath long since, given you juſt occasion to queſtion, by what right I call it a Letter; I perceive my self obliged in good manners, no longer to exercise your patience, then while I briefly express my sentiments of the LAST Article of his Charge.

Which is, His asserting of Self-Homicide, in case of intolerable, and otherwise inevitable Calamity. *This, as a* Chriſtian, *I hold to be a bloody and deteſtable opinion, because expresly repugnant to the* Law *of* God; *and yet in the person of a meer* Philosopher, *I might, without being unreasonably Paradoxical, adventure to dispute, whether it be so highly repugnant to the Law of* Nature, *as men have generally conceived. For,*

Firſt, if all the precepts of the Law of Nature concenter in this one point; Fly Evil, pursue Good; *as those who have moſt laboured to conduct our underſtanding out of that intricate Labyrinth, the ambiguous Sence of the word,* Law of Nature, *have unanimously determined; certainly, that man assumes no very easie task, who undertakes to prove, that in case of insupportable diſtress, and where all other hopes* [*fail*] *of evading, or ending that misery* (*than which there can be no greater* Evil) *for a man to free himself from that extremity of* Evil, *and seek the* Good *of ease and quiet, by taking away his own life, which chiefly makes him subject to, and only sensible of that misery, is an infringement of the Law of* Nature.

Again, if we underſtand Self-preservation (*which all men allow to be the foundation of Natural Law in General*) *to be no other, but an innate Love, or Natural affection to Life, as a* Good, *when Life ceaseth to be a* Good, *and degenerates into an* Evil, *as commonly it doth to men, in cruel torments of the body, or high discontent of mind,* (*the more deſperate affliction of the two by much*)

and when all the Stars of hope and comfort are set in the Weſt of black deſperation, why should not the force or obligation of that Law also, cease at the same time? Or rather, why should not self-homicid, in such cases, be an absolute accomplishment of the Law of Self-preservation, it being manifeſt, that we are by the tenour of that Law, obliged to use such means, as conduce to our preservation from the greateſt Evil *; and as manifeſt, that to free ones self from misery, which cannot otherwise be avoided, but by breaking asunder the Ligaments of Life, is a pursuance of the only means we can discover, to be conducible to our end: that is, to preservation from more sufferings, and to* Indolency, *which in Death we propose to our selves as a* Good *?*

But leſt we seem to give any encouragement to that, which God, *the* Church, *and the* Civil *Power so highly condemn; let us grant, that Self-murther, in whatsoever case, is a violation of the Law of Nature, and yet we shall have one consideration left, that seems ſtrong enough to refract the violence of their malice, who exclaim againſt* EPICURUS, *as the grand abettor of self-assasination; and that is, that he was not single, nor moſt vehement in the juſtification of it. For, if we look upon the* Doctrine *of other Philosophers, we shall soon perceive, that the* Stoicks *generally, not only approved thereof, but ſtrictly enjoyned men to embrace death voluntarily, and from their own hands; That* Cicero *doth* (Lib. de Legibus) *implicitly allow of it in these words,* Eum damnandum esse censeo qui seipsum interficit, si neque ex decreto Civitatis fecerit, neq; ullo Fortunæ casu intolerabili inevitabiliq; coactus, neque obrutus ullâ pauperis, miseræq; vitæ ignominia; *and expresly confirms it* (in 2. Tusculan.) *in these,* Eam in vita servandam Legem quæ in Græcorum conviviis obtinet, Aut bibat, aut abeat; quoniam ut oportet aliquis fruatur pariter cum aliis voluptate potandi, aut ne sobrius in violentiam vinolentorum incidat, ante discedat; sic injurias Fortunæ quas ferre nequeas, defugiendo relinquas. *And if their* Practice, *we shall assoon find many of them to have*

laid violent hands upon themselves, and that in cases of far less moment, than that of insupportable and inevitable Calamity, to which only EPICURUS*'s precept is limited; while He, leaving others to become examples of that Rule, with admirable patience, and invincible magnanimity, endured the tortures of the Stone in the Bladder, and other most excruciating Diseases, for many years together, and awaited, till extreme old age gently put out the Taper of his life. Thus* Zeno, *a man of the most spotless fame of any Philosopher among the Antients, having by a fall bruised one of his fingers against the ground, and interpreting that to be a summons of him to the earth, went presently home and hanged himself, and was therefore by* Diogenes Laertius *honoured with this Elogie;* Mira felicitate vir, qui incolumis, integer, sine morbo e vivis excessit. *Thus* Demosthenes, *you know, to prevent his being beholding to any man but himself, either for his life or death, drank mortal poyson out of his own Quill, which had given him immortality long before. Thus also* Democles, *to prevent his pollution, by the unnatural heat of a certain lustful Greek Tyrant, who attempted to force him, leaped into a Furnace of boyling Water. And thus* Cleanthes, Chrysippus, *and* Empedocles, *all brake open the Gates of Death, and forced themselves into the other World. To these you may please to adde the memorable Examples of that Prince of* Roman *wisdom* (*as* Lactantius *calls him*) Cato, *who with his own hands and Sword, opened a flood-gate in his Bowels, to let his life flow forth, having all the night before prepared himself to fall boldly, with the Lecture of* Plato*'s Discourse, of the Immortality of the soul; and of the famous* Cleombrotus, *who, upon no other incitement, but* Plato*'s reasons in the same Discourse, threw himself from a precipice, as if he went instantly to experiment the truth of what he had newly read; and though* Aristotle *would not admit, that he did it upon any other account, but that of* Pusillanimity *and* Fear, *yet Saint* Augustine (De Civit. Dei, Lib. 1. cap. 22.) *ascribes it altogether unto* Greatness of mind, *his words being these*; When no Calamity urged him, no

Crime, either true or imputed, nothing but greatness of mind moved him to embrace death, and dissolve the sweet bonds of life. *And* Lactantius, *who was severe enough in his censure, both of the* Act, *and the* Book *that occasion'd it, says of him* ; Præcipitem se dedit nullam aliam ob causam nisi quod *Platoni* credidit.

SIR,

By this time you are satisfied, both of the injuries done to the memory of the Temperate, Good, *and* Pious EPICURUS, *and of my willingness and devoir to redress them. And my dull and unequal Apology for him being now ended, I should begin another for* my self, *in that I have rather disturbed, than either delighted or informed you. But this being much the greater difficulty of the two, I think it safer for me, to put my self upon your mercy for an absolute forgiveness, than to trust to my own wit, to make excuses for my failings herein, especially, since your patience cannot but be already overcome by the tediousness of*

Your very Humble Servant,

W. Charleton.

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EPICURUS'S MORALS.

CHAPTER I.

Introduction.

IF Action be the end of Speculation, and the knowledge of Nature, but the way that leads Man to the knowledge of himself; and the best of mans knowledge be that which teacheth him how to order his Mind, and regulate his Actions, so as that he may assuredly attain to the highest degree of Happiness, of which his Nature is capable, during life: then certainly, must ETHICKS or MORAL PHILOSOPHY be the noblest part of all Human Learning, the Crown and perfection of all our studies; insomuch as it is that alone, which both gives us the infallible Tokens, by which we may know what is truly the *summum Bonum* of life, and prescribes us most plain and certain Rules for the Acquisition of it.

II. BY *Ethicks*, or *Morals*, we understand that part of Philosophy, which hath for its proper Object the End, or Final and main scope of Mans Life; containing certain Directions and Precepts, for the right information of his Understanding, and (consequently) the conduct of his Will, in the Election of real Good, and Avoidance of Evil, in order to his attaining the true End of his life, the Supreme Good, or Felicity.

III. THAT the End of Man's Life is *Felicity*; all men most readily allow: and, if you ask him, no man will deny, that he aims at that End. But, seeing it is too certain, that most men miss of that end; it cannot be doubted, that the Frustration of their Hopes and Endeavours doth of

necessity proceed from hence: either that they do not propose to themselves that Felicity, which they ought; or do not use such Means, or pursue such Courses, as do conduce thereunto.

IV. WE cannot but observe, that there are Myriads of men, who though their propitious Fortunes have abundantly accommodated them with all things necessary for the uses of life, (for, their Exchequers overflow with treasure, their bodies enjoy perfect health and vigour, their titles swell with attributes of honour, their fair, chast, and fruitful Wives furnish them with Troops of beautiful and ingenious Children, in a word, they possess all things, that all that are below them usually measure happiness by :) do yet live full of Anxiety and Complainings, having their minds perpetually on the rack of cares, sollicitude, and fears: so as they cannot but confess, that they lead lives truly miserable. Considering this, we may from thence safely conclude, that these men are wholly ignorant wherein true Felicity doth consist, and whence or how it is to be attained: and therefore, the heart of every such person may be fitly compared to a Vessel, which being in some part full of holes, can never be filled; and in other parts deeply imbued with some evil tincture, doth deprave and corrupt the most wholsom and cordial Liquor that is poured into it.

V. WELL worth our labour, therefore, is it, by the help of this Philosophy (which teacheth the nature of, and way unto Felicity) to cleanse and make sound that Vessel, the Heart of Man; that so it may be easily filled with a few things, and find a sweetness and comfort in every the smallest thing that occurrs unto it. And to this Philosophy we are to addict our selves betimes, as soon as possible, even this very day; not to defer it so much as till to morrow: because it highly concerns us to live happily to day; and Folly hath this evil always annexed unto it, that it doth

always begin to live, or purpose to begin to live, but in the mean time never doth live.

VI. ONCE we were, twice we cannot be Born ; and our Age must have a period ; but when we know not. If so, is it prudence, or folly in thee O man ! when thou hast not to morrow in thy power, to procrastinate thy making thy self happy till the Future, and in the mean time lose the opportunity of the present, of which only thou art certain ? By such delay is it, that the Lives of most men are lost : and hence comes it, that every one dies in the Immaturity, if not the beginning of his Designs. Every man so goes out of the World, as if he had but newly entred into it : and therefore old men may justly be affirmed, not to have survived the rawness and folly of their Infancy : because trifling away their years in business that concerns them not, they have scarce known that they have lived at all, and in the chief Harvest of life, they have never reaped the Fruits of it.

VII. LET us therefore, endeavour so to live, as that we need not repent us of our time past : and so enjoy the present day, as if we were nothing concerned in To morrow. For, He arives most sweetly at To-morrow, who doth the least need, or desire it : and an hour comes most grateful to him, who had the least expectation of it. Since it is troublesome, always to begin to live : let us make every moment, the total sum of life ; as if no part of it remained behind. The life of a Fool is unpleasant, and full of Fears, and depends wholly upon the Future : but it becomes us so to order our Minds and Actions, as that ours may be pleasant, secure, and fixt in the safety of the present.

VIII. CERTAINLY, the way, at length, to avoid Foolishness, is for a man to advance himself into the Arsenal, or Fortress of Wise men, from whence, as from a Watch-Tower, he may look down upon the swarms of other men, led, by their passions, wandring up and down in a

Wilderness of Errors; and uncessantly afflicting themselves in the pursuit of such things, which, being found, encrease their miserable Deviations. If you account it a pleasure, to stand upon a safe Rock, and behold Mariners at Sea distractedly striving with a Tempest; or, from a secure Castle to look upon two Armies maintaining a long and fierce Battail: assuredly, it must be much more delightful, from the serene Tower of Wisdom, to contemplate the Tumults, Hurries, and Contentions of the foolish Multitude below. Not that it is delightful, to see others afflicted with Evils; but, to see our selves not to be involved in those Evils.

IX. NOW that we may, to the utmost of our power, afford assistance to those, who desire to arrive at this height of Wisdom; we conceive our selves obliged, in humanity, so to collect and compile such Notions, concerning these things, which our frequent Meditations have brought unto our mind: that we may discourse first of *Felicity*, which is Mans *Chiefest Good*; and afterward, of such *Means*, as certainly conduce to the Creation and Conservation thereof, and which, indeed, are no other but the *Vertues* themselves.

CHAP. II.

Of Felicity, or the Supreme Good; as far as Man is capable thereof.

FELICITY is therefore called the *End*, *Extreme*, and *Highest* of Goods, because there are some things named Goods, which invite the Appetite to prosecute them immediately for themselves; and others again which are desireable mediately or in relation to others, that are Superior: but, as for Felicity, it is that Good, to which all other Goods ought to be referred, and cannot it self be referred to any thing.

II. NOR doth it hinder, since felicity and Beatitude, or a Blissful Life, are one and the same ; that it is sometimes ſtiled the End of a blissful life : for in that we speak the phrase of the Gentiles, which accept the End of a blissful life, and a blissful life it self, for the very same thing ; not that we thereby intend, that there is any further End, to which a blissful life may be conceived referrible.

III. THIS premised, it behoves us to diſtinguish Felicity into *Supreme*, viz. that which is incapable of intention and remission, or Flouds and Ebbs of pleasure : and *Subalterne* or *Gradual*, viz. such as is subject to Addition and Detraction, or Encrease and Decrease of pleasures.

IV. THE *Former*, we conceive to be a certain State, than which none can be thought more sweet, more desireable, more perfect ; wherein there is no Evil to be feared, no Good, which is not fully enjoyed ; wherein is nothing to which the Will can have an inclination, and may not possess it ; finally, which is more Conſtant than ever to be loſt.

V. THE *Later*, we underſtand to be a certain State, in which a man may be as Happy as the Frailty of his Nature will permit ; or such, wherein he may enjoy very much of necessary Goods, and suffer very little of Evils : and consequently, wherein He may spend his days pleasantly, calmly, and permanently, so far forth as the Condition of his Country, Society, Course of life, Conſtitution, Age, and other Circumſtances shall give leave.

VI. NOR is it without good Reason, that we thus Distinguish, and define Felicity. Because, though it be manifeſt, that the Former, or *Supreme* Felicity is competent only to the *Divine Nature*: yet there have been some*, who thinking over-highly of themselves, and speaking magnificently of their own Wisdom, have so far dared to promise and arrogate to themselves this perfect Felicity, as to affirm themselves to be, in that respect, equal to God, and account

the expression modeſt, when they said they were inferior only to *Jupiter* himself. [*The Stoicks.]

VII. THESE, truly, may be judged to have been forgetful both of the Mortality and Imbecility of their Nature; when all that are conscious or mindful of either, muſt soon acknowledge, that Men are capable only of the Latter, or imperfect Felicity: and that Wisdom doth perform a very high work upon a man, if, while moſt others remain surrounded with diverse Miseries, it advance him to such a condition, as renders him the leaſt miserable of all men; or, if, among those various Degrees of miseries, to which his Birth hath made him obnoxious, it place him in such a ſtate, wherein he may have the leaſt share of those miseries. For, to be happy, in this life, it is sufficient to be exempted from those miseries, by which one might have been afflicted: and in the mean time, to enjoy such Goods, as that the condition of our Nature is not capable of greater.

VIII. AND this, seriously, is the Reason, why we conceive; that a Wise man, though he be deprived of the two beſt of his Senses, his Sight and Hearing, may yet partake of a happy life: forasmuch as he may nevertheless continue in the fruition of such and so many Goods, as his maimed nature is capable of; and want those Evils, if not of his Body, yet at leaſt of his mind, which might otherwise have vexed him.

IX. NAY upon the same ground we further profess, that a Wise man may be Tormented moſt cruelly, and yet continue the possession of his Happiness. For, ſtill he may enjoy, not that Divine, but this Humane Felicity; since in a Wise man it is always as the Condition of the present time will permit him to make it.

X. WE confess, that in the midſt of his torments, he cannot but be sensible of pains; and may sometimes, by the violence of them, be forced to groan and roar out; but,

in the mean while, because calmly submitting to the necessity of his suffering them, he doth not exasperate or encrease his pains, either by his Impatience, or Desperation, but rather mitigates and lessens them, by as great Constancy of mind, as his generous resolutions can fortifie him withal: in that respect, doubtless, he must be much more happy, than if he had, with pusillanimity, fear, reluctancy, and despair, entertained them; or than another man, who being under the same torments, doth not endure them with equal courage and constancy, as not having the like encouragements and supplies from Wisdom: (which adfers, at least, Innocence of life, and security of Conscience) by which those torments might be lightned.

XI. WHEREFORE, there is no reason neither, why any man should, by way of Cavil, object unto us; that according to this Assertion, *Phalaris* Bull, and a bed of Roses must be all one to us; and consequently, that a Wise man ought, while he is in the flames of that Brazen Engine of torture, to smile, and cry out, *O how pleasant this is! O how much am I above these torments! how little do I fear or care for them!* Forasmuch as we do not gainsay, but there are some things, which a wise man had rather should happen to him, as the health of his Body, exemption from all incommodity, and freedom of his Mind, that so he might solace himself in the contemplation of his Goods: and other things, which though he would not, they should befal him; yet when they do befal him, he doth not only constantly and bravely endure, but also welcomes and commends them, insomuch as they give him an opportunity to experiment and gratulate his Virtue, and with internal alacrity, to exclaim, *I am burned, but not overcome; why should it not be more desireable, not to have the fire overcome my Constancy, than not to have it consume my Body?* And this we say, in regard it is not to be expected, but that a Wise man may also be obnoxious, as to

the pains of Diseases, so also to the tortures of Tyrants: though he neither incur those, nor provoke these willingly, so far forth as he can, with safety of his Virtues, avoid it.

CHAP. III.

That pleasure (without which there is no Notion of Felicity) is a Good, of its own Nature.

FORASMUCH as it's sweet, or pleasant, for a man to live without pain; and sweet, or pleasant likewise, to enjoy Good things, and be recreated by them: it is an evident truth, that without both these sweetnesses or Pleasures, or one of them at least, Felicity cannot be understood (for, we accept Pleasure, Suavity, Jucundity, and other Terms of the like importance, for one and the same thing:) though there have not wanted some, who with great pomp and ostentation, have so discoursed of Pleasure, as if it were a certain Evil, in its own nature; and upon consequence, concluded it to be not only inconsistent with, but wholly Alien from wisdom and Happiness. And therefore, before we come to enquire, whether *Felicity doth consist in pleasure*, or not; requisite it is, that we remonstrate, that *Pleasure is a real good, in it self*; and that its Contrary, *Pain, is a real Evil, in it self.*

II. SINCE that is Good, which helpeth, which pleaseth, which is amiable and inviting to the Appetite; and on the contrary, that is Evil, which harmeth, which displeaseth, which is ungrateful, and so inciteth the Appetite to an odium and aversion: certainly there is nothing, which doth more please, more delight, is more amiable, more desiderable, than Pleasure; and on the contrary, nothing that doth more incommode, more offend, is more to be abhorred and avoided, than pain: Wherefore, Pleasure seems to be not

only a Good, but also the Essential *Reason*, or very *Root* of Good; insomuch as it is that very and only thing, for whose sake, or in respect whereof an object is Good or Desirable: as on the reverse; pain seems to be not only an Evil in it self, but also the Formal *Reason*, or very *Root* of Evil; insomuch as it is that alone, in respect whereof any thing is Evil or Hateful. For, though we sometimes avoid Pleasure; yet it is not the pleasure it self we avoid, but some pain that is annexed unto it, or impendent on it: as likewise if we sometimes court and pursue a pain, it is not the pain it self, that we pursue, but some pleasure that is conjoyned unto it.

III. TO speak more expresly; No man doth neglect, hate, or decline pleasure, as it is pleasure, but, because usually very great pains follow and overtake such, who know not to follow Pleasure with Reason and Moderation; nor is there any man, that loves, desires, and pursues Pain, simply as it is pain; but because he expects some very great pleasure to accrue to him thereupon; and such frequently may be the constitution of the time, as that he hath no other way that leads him to the pleasure he aims at, but what lies in the rough tract of Labour and Pain.

IV. TO instance in very small things; who is there among us, that undertakes and endures any laborious exercise of the body, unless to the end, that he may thereby acquire some commodity or benefit? And who can justly reprehend him, who desires and endeavours to enjoy that pleasure, upon which nothing of trouble or discommodity doth attend? Or him, who endeavours to eschew that Pain, by which no Pleasure can be procured? But, we may justly accuse, and esteem those persons worthy of contempt, who being intricated and corrupted with the blandishments of present Pleasures, do not foresee nor provide against those pains and troubles, that must ensue, as being

inevitably impendent upon all heads that are blinded with cupidities. The like blame is due also to those who forsake their stations, and desert the duties of their places and offices, out of a certain softness and weakness of Mind, *i.e.* of Fear, of Labour, and Pains.

V. NOW, of these things, the *Distinction* is easie and expedite. For, in times of freedom, when all lies open to the arbitrary disposition of our own choice, so that there is no impediment, but we may do that which is most pleasing to us ; in such case, it is lawful for us to pursue and embrace all pleasure, and avoid all pain. But, such frequently may be the constitution of the times, as that pleasures are rather to be repudiated, and labours and troubles not to be refused.

VI. SO, though we esteem all pleasures to be a real good, and all pain to be a real evil ; yet we do not therefore affirm, that we ought, at all times, to pursue that, and avoid this. For, it is good for us, to sustain some pains, that we may afterward enjoy more abundant pleasures ; and expedient to abstain from some pleasures, that we may not by them incur more grievous pains.

VII. HENCE, as from a Fountain, was it, that discoursing of the true *Criteria*, or judges of good and evil, we deduced several Canons, or Rules, for the guidance and regulation of our Affections, or Passions : accounting Pleasure and Pain, for the most certain Criterion of Election and Aversion. And this upon very good reason ; seeing that from the Benefit or Harm that redounds unto us from the fruition of them ; all the Objects of our Affections or Passions ought to be judged Good or Evil ; and that we sometimes use Good as Evil, and other times Evil as Good.

VIII. FROM these Considerations, therefore (that we may inculcate the matter) we conclude, that no pleasure is of it self Evil ; but some things there are, which albeit they

afford some pleasures, yet they are such, as occasion and induce pains much greater than themselves. Whereto, by way of Consequence, we superadde this ; if any one pleasure could be so collected into it self, or sequestred from all dross, as that it should neither comprehend in it, nor leave behind it any the least measure of pain : assuredly, by that Collection and simplicity, it would become no less perfect and absolute, than are the chiefest Works of Nature ; and so pleasures could have no Difference either of Qualities or Degrees among themselves, but would all be equally desireable.

IX. FURTHER, if those very things, which are the Efficients of Pleasures to *Luxurious* men, were such, as that they could render them superior to the terrors of Meteors, Earthquakes, Thunder, and Lightning, Eclipses, and other the like accidents, caused by bodies superterrestrial ; and free them from the base fears of pains and death : truly, we could find nothing in them to be reprehended ; insomuch as they would be wholly filled with Pleasures, and could not, in the least, know any thing of Pain, of Trouble, of Sickness, *i.e.* of Evil.

CHAP. IV.

That Felicity doth consist Generally in Pleasure.

WE are now come to our main purpose, *viz. That Felicity is rooted in Pleasure* ; and therefore, we are first to demonstrate it to be so in the *General*, that we may afterward the more securely determine in what Pleasure it doth consist in *Special.*

II. IN the General, pleasure seems to be as the beginning, so also the end of a happy life ; forasmuch as we deprehend it to be the first Good, and Congenite to our Nature, and

to all other Animals whatever; and that very and only thing, according to which we direct our selves, in the Election and Rejection of any Object whatever, and define it to be Good or Evil.

III. THAT Pleasure is the *First Good*, and Congenial, or, as Philosophers speak, the First *Aptum* and *Accommodatum* to Nature, may be demonstrated from hence; that every Animal, as soon as born, doth affect, pursue, and delight in Pleasure, as its chiefest Good: and on the contrary, doth hate, avoid, and to the utmost of its power, repel Pain, as its Chiefest Evil; provided that the sense of the Animal be not depraved, but its Nature remain in its primitive perfection, so as to enable it to judge truly.

IV. THIS considered, there is no further need of any Reasoning, or Disputation to evince, why Pleasure is to be desired, and pain to be avoided; since the sense alone doth evidently demonstrate it, no less than it doth that Fire is hot, that Snow is white, that Hony is sweet: and sufficient it is for us only to observe it. For, if when we have taken away from man all his senses, the Remainder must be nothing; necessary it is, that what is according to Nature, what against Nature, must be judged by Nature it self: and consequently, that Pleasure is to be desired for it self, and pain to be avoided for it self. For, what perceives, or what judges, that it may either pursue, or avoid any thing, beside pleasure and pain?

V. THAT Pleasure is also the *Last* or *Highest of Goods*, or the end of all desiderable things, may be soon understood even from hence; that it is Pleasure alone, for which we desire all other things: and never desire Pleasure for any thing but it self. For, other things we may desire, to the end we may be affected or delighted with Pleasure: but no man did ever require a reason, why we would be affected and delighted therewith; truly, no more, than for what

Cause, or to what End we should desire to be happy. Seeing that Pleasure and Felicity ought to be reputed as in the same degree, so also for one and the same thing: and consequently, for the end, Extreme, or Supreme of Goods, to which all other things subordinately conduce, and which is it self subordinate or referrible to nothing.

VI. THE same may be Confirmed from hence; that (as we have premonished) Felicity cannot be understood, unless it be conceived to be a certain state wherein a man may live most sweetly, most pleasantly, *i.e.* in the greatest Pleasure, of which his Nature is capable. For, but take away from life that sweetness, that jucundity; and pray, what Notion of Felicity can remain? we say of Felicity; not only such as we termed Divine, but also that, which we account Humane, and which is not otherwise capable of more and less, or of Intention and Remission, than only as it may admit of more and less of Pleasure.

VII. THAT we may further manifest this Truth, by a Comparation of Pleasure with pain; let us suppose a man to enjoy many, great, and lasting pleasures both in mind and body; no pain molesting him in the present, nor threatning him in the future: and then what state can be imagined more desireable, more happy than this? For, in him, who is thus affected, there must be a Constancy or firmness of Mind, fearing neither Death, nor Pain; because Death is insensible of any pain, and in life, if pain be long, it must be light, if great, it cannot be long; so that the Brevity is a comfort against the violence thereof, and the Levity against Diuturnity. When a man arrives at such a Condition, as that he doth not tremble at the thought of Divinity, nor suffer the present pleasures to slip away unenjoy'd, while his mind is taken up either with the memory of past Goods, or expectation of future; and doth every day solace himself with the assiduous recordation of them: what greater

Good is there, that can be added to encrease the Happiness of this mans Condition ?

VIII. SUPPOSE again, on the other side, that a man is afflicted with as great anguish of Mind, and violent pains of Body, as his nature can receive ; that he hath lost all probability, all hopes of any the least Extenuation of his Miseries ; and that his tempestuous thoughts cannot lay hold of any comfort in the apprehension of any pleasure, past, present, or expected : and what can be imagined more wretched, more miserable than this man ?

IX. IF, therefore, a life surrounded with pains, be most chiefly to be avoided : seriously, the Highest Evil, is to live in pain ; and of necessary consequence, *The Highest Good is to live in Pleasure.* Nor, indeed, hath the mind of Man any other point, wherein, as in the Centre and Period of all his hopes and desires, he may consist, but only Pleasure. And all Diseases, Languors and Distempers are referred to pain, nor is there any thing beside pain, that can invade Nature in her Throne, eject her from it, or dissolve her.

CHAP. V.

That Pleasure, wherein Felicity doth consist, is the Indolency of the Body, and Tranquillity of Mind.

FORASMUCH as there are *Two* kinds of Pleasures, *viz. One*, that may be considered as dependent upon, or radicated in *Quiet* ; and so is nothing else but a constant Placability, Calmness, and Vacuity or Immunity from all perturbation and dolour : and *Another*, that may be considered as resident in *Motion* ; and so consisteth only in a certain sweet affectation, or pleasant titillation of the sense, as may be exemplified in joy, hilarity, eating and drinking when we are hungry and thirsty, the pleasure of all which

doth arise only from a pleasant motion in the Organs: therefore is it necessary for us to determine, *Whether Felicity doth consist in both these Kinds of Pleasures conjoyned; or in one of them alone; and in which of the Two.*

II. ACCORDINGLY, therefore, we affirm; that the Pleasure, wherein Felicity doth consist, is only the Former, *i.e.* in the stable kind of pleasure: and so can be no other, *but the Indolency of Body, and Tranquillity of the Mind.*

III. AND, therefore, when we say; that Pleasure in the General is the end of a happy life, or the Chiefest Good; we are very far from understanding those Pleasures, which are so much admired, courted and pursued by men wallowing in Luxury, or any other pleasures that are placed in the meer motion or action of Fruition, whereby the sense is pleasantly tickled; as some, either out of Ignorance of the right, or dissent of opinion, or prejudice and Evil will against us, have wrongfully expounded our words: but only this (the importance of the matter will excuse our repetition of it:) Not to be pained in Body, nor perturbed in Mind.

IV. FOR, it is not perpetual Feastings and Drinkings; it is not the love of, and Familiarity with beautiful boys and women; it is not the Delicacies of rare Fishes, sweet meats, rich Wines, nor any other Dainties of the Table, that can make a Happy life: But, it is Reason, with Sobriety, and consequently a serene Mind; investigating the Causes, why this Object is to be Elected, and that to be Rejected; and chasing away those vain, superstitious and deluding opinions, which would occasion very great disquiet in the mind.

V. NOW, that you may the more clearly understand, why we affirm this kind of pleasure alone to be the end of life, or chiefest good; be pleased to observe, that Nature doth not tend to any other pleasure, primarily, or as to her

principal scope, but only to what is *ſtable*; which follows upon the remove of all pain and Moleſtation. For she doth not propose to her self the Moveable pleasure, as the end at which she aims; but hath provided it only as the means conducible to that end, that it might be as it were a Condiment to sweeten that Natural operation which is necessary to the Eradication of all Pain and Moleſtation. For inſtance; seeing that Hunger and Thirſt are things troublesome and incommodious, in the present, to an Animal; the Primary End of Nature, is to conſtitute the Animal in that ſtate, in which it may be free from that trouble and offence: and because that cannot be effected, but by Eating and Drinking; therefore hath she wisely provided, that the Action of Eating and Drinking should be accompanied with a certain pleasantness and jucundity, that so the Animal might be thereby invited the more willingly and readily to perform that necessary action.

VI. MOST men, indeed, living præpoſterously, and being carried away with inconsideration and intemperance, propose to themselves, as the summary of their desires, and accomplishment of all their Hopes, that meaner Pleasure, which depends upon Motion: but, Wisdom being called to our aſſiſtance, doth soon reduce all Pleasures to Order and Decorum; and teacheth us that we are not to look upon any Pleasure, as the perfection and End of our lives, but what Nature her self hath ordained for that End, and which can be no other, but what we have declared. For while Nature is our Guide, whatever we do, muſt conduce only to this; that we may not be pained in body, nor perturbed in mind: and when we have once attained to that ſtate, all the Tempeſts of our mind cease, and all our Hopes and Desires are loſt in Fruition, and there can be nothing beyond it, to which to aspire, in order to the Complement of our Happiness. For, we then want Pleasure, when the

absence of it doth produce pain in us : but, when we are not pained, then do we want no Pleasure.

VII. HENCE comes it, that the Sum or Height of all Pleasures doth consist only in the Amotion of all Pains, or in that state which follows upon that Amotion : for, wherever Pleasure is, there can be nothing of pain, of anxiety. And hereupon it follows also, that the highest Pleasure terminated in the privation of pain, may indeed be varied and distinguished ; but can never be augmented or amplified ; for, Nature so long as she hath taken away all pain, doth encrease pleasure ; but, all pain being removed, she suffers not pleasure to be encreased in Magnitude, but only admits some certain Varieties thereof, that are not then at all necessary, as being such, that are not comparated to this, that we may not be pained.

VIII. MOREOVER, from hence it appears, that those men insult without cause, who accuse us, not to account this, *To want all Pain*, to be something consisting in the middle betwixt pain and pleasure : but, so to confound it with the other member of the Division, as to make it not only a Pleasure, but even the *Highest of all Pleasures*. For, because, when we are Exempted from pain, we join in that very Exemption and Vacuity from all molestation, and every thing wherein we joy is a pleasure ; as every thing wherewith we are offended, is a pain : therefore is the privation of all pain, by us, rightly named a Pleasure. For, as when Hunger and Thirst are expelled with meat and drink ; that very Expulsion of the trouble of them doth adfer the Consequution of a pleasure : so, in every thing else, the very Amotion of pain causeth the succession of pleasure.

IX. HENCE also may we desume a convincing reply to those who urge against us, that there is no Reason, why this Middle state of Indolency should be esteemed rather a

pleasure than a pain. For, upon the detraction of pleasure, discontent doth not presently ensue, unless perhaps some pain immediately succeed into the room of that former pleasure: but, on the contrary, we always conceive a joy upon the loss of any pain, though none of those pleasures succeed, which consist in the delightful affection of the Sense. By which we may clearly understand, how great a pleasure it is, *Not to be in Pain*: whereof if any man doubt, let him ask of those, who are infested with those sharp pains of the Gout, Tooth-ach, or any other acute disease.

X. THERE are also, who deride this our opinion; Objecting, that this pleasure of Indolency, is like the condition of a sleeping man, and fit only for *Slothful and Unactive* spirits. But, these consider not, that this Indolent constitution is so far from being a meer Torpor, or sluggishness, as that it is the only state, wherein we can perform all the actions of life vigorously and cheerfully. And, as we would not have the life of a wise man to be like a Torrent or rapid River; so would we not have it to be like a standing and dead Pool: but rather as a clear stream sliding on in a constant silence and gentleness. Wherefore we contend; that a Wise mans pleasure is not that which is Dull, Heavy, and Unactive; but that which Reason makes Constant, Firm, and Sprightful unto him.

XI. BUT, to leave these our Opponents, and return to our Theme; there are two good things, of which our Highest Good, or chiefest Felicity doth consist; *viz. To have the Mind free from perturbation, and the Body free from pain*; and so, that these goods be full, and above the capacity of Encrease. For, how can that which is full be encreased? If the Body be immune from all pain, what addition can be made to that Indolency? If the Mind be constantly serene and Imperturbed, what Addition can be made to that Tranquillity? Nor do those External Blandishments of

the Sense, in any measure augment; but only serve to condite and sweeten this State of Highest Felicity: for, that Consummate Good of Humane Nature, is contented with only the peace of mind, and quiet of body.

CHAP. VI.

Of the means to procure this Felicity.

NOW seeing that this Tranquillity of mind, and Indolency of Body, do constitute the chief Felicity of man; nothing can more concern us, than to consider those things, which conduce to the attainment and conservation thereof: insomuch as while we have that, we have all things; and while we want it, all we do is to attain it, though (for the Causes aforesaid) we seldom do attain it.

II. IN the first place, therefore, we are to reason of Felicity, no otherwise than of Health; it being manifest, that that State, in which the mind is free from perturbation, and the body from pain, is nothing else, but the perfect Health of the whole man: and naturally consequent thereupon, that as in the body, so also in the mind, those things which produce and conserve Health, are the very same with those, which either prevent the Generation of Diseases, or cure and expel them when they are generated.

III. AS for the Diseases of the *Body*; since the excellent Art of Medicine is ordained as well for the prevention, as Cure of them; leaving the præscription of both præservative and curative remedies to the learned professors of that Art, we shall sufficiently discharge our present duty, if we admonish you of only two things. The *one* is, that we always observe *Temperance*, and live soberly and continently, to the end that we may avert all diseases, or at least make them more gentle and more easily curable; since for

the moſt part, the Harveſt of Diseases doth arise from the seeds of Intemperance and Incontinence. The other, that when we are invaded with Diseases, we inſtantly have recourse to Fortitude; that so we may both endure them with Conſtancy of Mind, and not exasperate them by impatience, and comfort our selves with this, that if our pain be great, it muſt be short; if long, light.

IV. AND as for the Diseases of the Mind, againſt them Philosophy is provided of Remedies; being, in that reſpect, juſtly accounted the Physick of the Mind: but it is not with equal facility consulted, nor applied by those who are sick in Mind. And this, because we judge of the Diseases of the body, by the Mind: but the diseases of the Mind we neither feel in the body, nor know or judge of them as we ought; because that, whereby we should judge, is distempered.

V. HENCE it appears, that the *Diseases of the Mind are more grievous and dangerous than those of the Body*: as among Diseases Corporeal, those are moſt dangerous, which deprive us of our senses; such are the Apoplexy, Lethargy, Phrensie, *&c.* Again, that the Diseases of the Mind are more pernicious than those of the Body, is manifeſt from the same reason, which demonſtrateth that the Pleasures of the mind are much better than those of the Body, which is this, that we feel in the body nothing but what is present, but in our mind we are sensible of also what is paſt, and what's to come. For, as the Anxiety of the mind arising by consent from the pains of the body, may be very much aggravated, if we have possessed our selves with a conceit, that some Eternal and Infinite Evil is impendent over us: so may it be very much mitigated, if we fear no such Evil. And this likewise is manifeſt; that the greateſt Pleasure, or Trouble of the mind, doth more conduce to an happy, or miserable life; than either of the other two, though it should be equally laſting in the body.

VI. NOW, because there are two Capital diseases of the Mind, namely Cupidity and Fear, with their several branches, and with discontent or trouble conjoyned, after the same manner as pain is adjoyned to the diseases of the body; therefore is it the part of Philosophy to apply such Remedies, as may prevent them from invading the mind; or at leaſt overcome and expel them, when they have invaded it. Such chiefly are the vain Desires of Wealth, of Honours, of Dominion, *&c.* and the Fear of Cœleſtial Powers, of Death, *&c.* which having once assaulted and taken possession of the mind, they leave no part thereof sound or unshaken.

VII. NOW the Remedies, which Philosophy doth apply, are the *Virtues*, which being derived from Reason, or more General Prudence, easily drive away and expel those Desires and Fears. We say, from Reason, or more General Prudence; because, as there is a more Special Prudence, inservient to the direction of all the particular actions of our lives: so also is there a more General Prudence, which is nothing else but very Reason it self, or the Dictamen of Reason, and is, by moſt, accounted the same with Sapience or Wisdom: and Virtue is only a certain perfect Disposition of the Mind, which Reason or Prudence doth create, and oppose to the Diseases of the Mind, *i.e.* to the Vices.

CHAP. VII.

Of Right Reason, and Free Will, from whence is all the praise of the Virtues.

HENCE we are to advance to the consideration of Virtue, and the several Species thereof; but, not without præmising a few Observables, touching Reason it self, and that which doth consiſt therein, *viz.* Free-will:

forasmuch as all the praise belonging to Virtue, doth derive its right only from thence; as likewise doth its Opposite, Blame, which is due to Vice.

II. SINCE Reason, in the General, is nothing else but the Faculty of Ratiocinating, or judging, or inferring one thing from another; we do here understand that Reason, in Special, which discourseth, judgeth, and determineth of such things, as fall under the power of mans Election, or Refusal.

III. BUT, because this Reasoning or judgment may be as well False as True, Wrong as Right; therefore can we not well allow that Reason, which makes a false judgment, to be called Reason, but rather Opinion: however, if you please to keep constant to the vulgar phrase, let it still be called Reason, provided it be understood to be Wrong; as on the other side, Right Reason may also be called Opinion, provided we understand it to be Right.

IV. AS for Right Reason; that ariseth to us both from the Goodness of our Nature, or Ingenuity, and from the sedulous Observation or frequent Experience of things: whence it comes, that being grounded upon firm and corrected principles, our Reasoning comes at length to be solid; and we of right appeal to the judgment of him, who is Expert and Prudent in the things, of which judgment is to be given.

V. IN the mean while, when we say, *of things which fall under our power of Election or Refusal*; we suppose, that there is in us also a *Free* or *Arbitrary* power of Reason, *i.e.* a Faculty of Electing and Prosecuting what Reason it self hath judged to be Good; and of Refusing and avoiding what it hath judged to be Evil.

VI. NOW, that this Arbitrary Freedom of our Will, is the congenial prærogative of our Nature; is Demonstrated unto us not only by our own Experience, but also by Common Sense: which manifesteth, that nothing is worthy

of Praise or Blame, but what is done Freely, Voluntarily, deliberately, and of Election; and therefore must depend upon something within us, which is above all Compulsion, superintendency, command, or controllment, and in respect whereunto all Rewards and Punishments are rightfully ordained by the Laws: Than which Laws nothing can be more unjust, if the actions of men were to be imputed to that rigid Necessity, which some have derived from Fate, as the sole Commandress of all things; declaring, that what event soever comes to pass, or whatever action is done, doth inevitably flow from an Eternal Decree, and the succession of connected Causes.

VII. TRULY, it is much better, to be addicted to that false Opinion, which vulgar heads entertain, of the Government of the Universe, and all things in it, by the Gods; than to be slaves to the belief of the Fate of some Naturalists, imposing the same upon our necks, as a Sempiternal Lord, or Tyrant, of whom we are to be afraid night and day. For, that opinion, that the Gods are to be Revered and Entreated, hath the Comfort of Hope annexed unto it: but, the other of Fate, imports an inexorable Decree, an indeclinable Necessity, and consequently the highest of miseries, Despair.

VIII. MOST true it is indeed, that in things void of Reason some Effects are Necessary (though not so necessary, as not to have been prevented, as we have declared in our Philosophy) but in Man, endowed with Reason, and especially so far forth as he makes use of that reason, there can be no Necessity at all: and therefore was it, that we endeavoured to assert the Declination of motions in Atoms, to the end we might from thence deduce, how Fortune might sometimes intervene and put in for a share in the success of Humane affairs, and yet the Freedom of mans Will remain absolute and Entire.

IX. AND requisite it is for us, to turn the edge of our Wit wholly against Fate or Necessity; that we may by all means possible conserve our Will free from that Sempiternal Motion imagined by the Fatist; and so not permit Pravity or Wickedness to escape inculpable.

X. BUT, what we here say of Fortune, doth not in the least import, that we ought to ascribe any Divinity thereunto; not only as the Vulgar, but those Philosophers also, who accounting Fortune as some instable Cause, though they do not conceive, that she doth distribute to men any thing of Good or Evil, that may conduce to an happy life; do yet think, that she doth give occasions of very considerable Goods and Evils. All that our words of Fortune imply, is only this; that as many things are effected by necessity and Counsel, so also by Fortune: and therefore, that it is the Duty of a wise man, to arm and provide himself against Fortune.

XI. NOW, seeing that whatever of Goodness, or Malice there is in Humane actions, hath dependence upon no other foundation, but only this; that a man doth those Actions Knowingly and Willingly, or Freely: therefore is the Mind to be accustomed to this, that it may know truly, *i.e.* use Right Reason; and Will truly, *i.e.* that the Will be bent to that, which is truly Good, and averted from what is truly Evil. Forasmuch as this Assuefaction doth beget that Disposition in the mind, which we have defined Virtue to be: as the Assuefaction of it to the Contrary, doth beget that disposition, which we may justly define Vice to be.

XII. WE insist not upon this; that that is *truly Good*, which produceth Pleasure, as sincere, so also without any pain, trouble, or repentance attending and ensuing thereupon: and that *truly Evil*, which produceth pain, as sincere, so also without any Pleasure to succeed upon it. Only we touch upon both, that we may discriminate either from

what is only *Apparent* and Dissembled ; such as that Good, which creating present pleasure, introduceth future pain and trouble : and that Evil, which procuring pain or trouble in the present, draws on pleasure and content in the future.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Virtues, Generally.

FORASMUCH as Virtue is either Prudence itself, or the very Dictamen of Right Reason, as we accustom our minds to the constant exercise thereof ; or is, at least, regulated by, and dependent upon Prudence, or the Dictamen of Right Reason : from thence it is manifest, that to this Latter Kind belongs both that Virtue, whereby a man stands affected toward himself ; and that, whereby he is affected toward others ; since Prudence is that, whereby a man is comparated and enabled to Govern not only himself, but others also.

II. THAT Virtue, which relates to *Others*, is commonly called by the name *Justice* : and that, which concerns only a *mans self*, is vulgarly Distinguished into two branches, *viz.* *Temperance* and *Fortitude*. But, we use to comprehend both under the simple term of *Honesty* ; as when we say, that to do an act out of Virtue, is no more nor less than to do Prudently, Honestly, Justly : and this, because they, who live soberly and continently, are said to live honestly, according to Decorum, or as becomes them ; as they, who behave themselves Magnanimously, or Bravely, are reputed to behave themselves honestly or Becomingly.

III. HEREUPON, we (as others) make Virtue Fourfold, *viz.* *Prudence*, *Temperance*, *Fortitude*, and *Justice*. But so, as that we oppose not *Prudence* so much to any affection, as to

Incogitancy, *Ignorance*, *Foolishness*; unless it be by accident only, as any perturbation doth eclipse Reason, and make a man do imprudently: nor *Justice* so much to any Affection, as to *Malice*, whereby a man is inclined to Frauds; unless by accident only, in as much as Anger, Hate, Avarice, or some other passion may cause a man to do unjustly: and *Temperance* we oppose to *Cupidity*, and *Fortitude* to *Fear*.

IV. IT appears from hence, that what we formerly said [*viz. that it is sober and well ordered Reason, which procures a pleasant or happy life*] aimed at this; that Right Reason doth produce a pleasant or happy life, by the means of those Virtues, which it ingenerateth and maintaineth. Likewise, that what we subjoined, as the Reason thereof, [*viz. that Reason doth investigate the true Causes, why things are to be Elected, or Rejected, or chaseth away such opinions, as might occasion very great Perturbations of mind*] was intended only to teach, that Right Reason is the very same with more General Prudence, the Principle upon which we ground all our Elections and Avoidances, and so a very great Good; because the Virtues, arising from that Reason or Prudence, are able to appease and prevent all Perturbations, and this by convincing, that no man can live pleasantly or happily, but he that lives Prudently, Honestly, Justly; as (*è converso*) that to live Prudently, Honestly, Justly, is to live pleasantly or happily.

V. BY this you may perceive the Ground of our Assertion, That *Happiness and Virtue are Convertible*; or, that the Virtues are Congenite and Essential to a happy life, so as it is impossible to separate these from that. For, all other things, as being caduce and mortal, may be abstracted from germane and constant pleasure: but, Virtue alone, being a perpetual and immortal Good, can never be separated from it.

VI. FROM these things we may further understand, *that*

all the Virtues are connected together; and that by a twofold relation: the First, because all the other Virtues are conjoined to, and dependent upon their Princess, Prudence, as the members of the body are conjoined to the Head; or as the streams are conjoined to the Fountain, from which they flow; the other, because as well Prudence, as all the others concurr and unite in the point of a happy life; being that a happy life cannot consist without the Virtues, nor the Virtues without a happy life.

VII. HOWEVER, though the Virtues be all Connected thus together; yet are not they therefore all *Equal*; as some have conceived, who contend that all Vices and Faults, or Crimes are also Equal. For, a man may be comparated more to Justice than to Temperance; and Temperance may be more perfect in one man, than in another; as may be exemplified in *My Self* (without envy be it spoken) who have attained to so high a degree of sobriety, that I make a sufficient meal usually for less then an half-penny; and *Metrodorus*, my Friend and Companion, who cannot satisfie himself with altogether so course and spare a diet. Besides, experience assures, that one man is Wiser than another: and all that walk in the ways of Virtue, have not the like Rewards allotted to them; nor all Delinquents the like Punishments. Lastly, we appeal to Common sense, whether or no they are in the right, who make all Virtues, and all Vices Equal; that he offends as highly, who beats his servant without Cause, as he who beats his Father; that it is all one, for to eat a Bean, or ones Fathers Head.

VIII. OTHERS there are, who condemn and bitterly inveigh against us, for affirming, that the End of all the Virtues is Pleasure; as if we meant that kind of Pleasure, which is obscene and infamous: but, let these men rail upon us as they please, we are wholly unconcerned in their

malice. For, as they, so likewise do we make Virtue the *Summum Bonum*; at least, if the discourse be touching the *Means* that conduce to an happy life: nor is there ought doth so much conduce thereunto, as Virtue: but, if the discourse be touching *Happiness* it self, why should not Happiness or Pleasure be a greater Good than Virtue, since it is the End, to the attainment whereof Virtue is but inservient?

IX. THEY cry out upon us again, for making Virtue Enervous and Ineffectual, while we seem not to allow it to have so much power, as to render a Wise man Superior to all Passion or affection whatever, but leave him obnoxious to sundry vexations, as (for instance) to lament, weep, sigh, and with all the expressions of sorrow to deplore the death of a friend: but, seeing we put a very high value upon Virtue, in that it is able to exempt us from vain Terrors, and superfluous desires, which are the Heads or Fountains of all Grievous Perturbations; manifest it is, that we grant it to be of such excellent use, as to moderate all subordinate affections, insomuch as it refracts and reduceth them all to such a mediocrity, in which there remains some sense of Humanity.

X. CERTAINLY, that Total Exemption from Grief and Sorrow, which these men so much boast of; must proceed from some Greater Evil, *viz.* from Immanity, immoderate ambition of vain Glory, and in a manner downright madness. So that it seems much better, to feel some Passion, to be affected with some Grief, to shed such tears, as are to distil from their Eyes, who profess Love and tender affection: than to Grin, and declare a Brutish insensibility, according to the rigid rules of that inhumane Wisdom, to which these so much pretend.

CHAP. IX.

Of Prudence General.

THUS far of the Virtues in General; we now come to treat briefly of Each in *Particular*. Which that we may do the more methodically, let us begin at *Prudence*: whose office being to Govern a mans life, and so to provide, as that all Occurrents may be directed only to Happiness; well may we allow it to comprehend the offices, or Duties of all the other Virtues.

II. AND, that it is the Office, or Duty of Prudence, to order and compose all the accidents and actions of a mans life, so as that they may conduce only to Felicity, or the Pleasure formerly described: is more than manifest. For, as we esteem the Knowledg of Physicians, not for the Art of Physick it self, but the End of it, Health; and as the skill of a Pilot is not liked of and commended for the ingenuity, but Utility of it: even so Prudence, which is the art of Living well, would never be considered nor desired, if it were of no use or benefit in a mans life; and it is studied and desired, as the sole art, by which Happiness, or pleasure is to be acquired.

III. FOR, it is Prudence (or wisdome) alone, which doth not only prevent the incidence of any thing, that may cause Pain in the Body; but also above all things doth expel sadness from the mind, and suffers us not to startle at those things, at the very mention whereof the multitude usually trembles with fear: and which being our Directress, conducts us to tranquillity, by extinguishing the ardor of all cupidities. For, cupidities are insatiable, subverting not only single persons, but also numerous and opulent Families, yea sometimes the most potent and flourishing Common-wealths. From Cupidities arise Hatred,

Dissentions, Seditions, Wars; nor do they only diffuse themselves abroad, or invade others with blind fury: but being included in private breasts, they cause intestine mutinies therein, and totally evert the œconomy and peace thereof. So that it follows, that they must of necessity make life most irksom and bitter; and that none but the Wise, or Prudent man, who hath cut off all Vainess and Errour, and circumscribed his desires with the modest boundaries of Nature; can live without sollicitude, without Discontent, without Fears.

IV. IT being evident, therefore, that all the Perturbations of our life arise originally from Errour and Indiscretion; and that it is Prudence alone, which vindicates us from the violence of Lusts and Fears, and teacheth us gently to bear the injuries of Fortune, and pointeth out unto us all the ways, that lead to Quiet and Tranquillity: pray what reason is there to discourage us from affirming, that Prudence is to be sought after, in respect of Pleasure; and Imprudence to be avoided, for the prevention of Troubles?

V. NOW the Reason, why we say, *that a Prudent man doth temperately bear the injuries of Fortune*, is this; that albeit he doth not previse and provide against any injury in particular, yet doth he foresee and provide against all in General. Nor doth he, if any misfortune intervene cross to his Hopes, or Counsels, therefore afflict himself: because he well knows it not to be in the power of Humane Reason, Sagacity, or Policy, either to previse, or prevent the intervention of every adverse and troublesome Accident. Yea, he holds it much better, to be Infortunate with Reason and sage advice (such as Human frailty will admit) than to be Fortunate with Inconsideration and Temerity: and thinks nothing more grateful, than, if Fortune bring about any thing fairly and prosperously unto him, that he did not enterprise it without judgment and deliberation.

VI. HE moreover so deports himself, as that cutting off all vain Cupidities, he contracts his desires to only Necessaries; which are indeed, so few and small, as scarce any unkindness of Fortune can rob him of them: so that since very little of Fortune can intervene to a wise man; he may well say to her, *I have prevented thee, O Fortune, and so barricadoed all thy ways of access, as that thou canst not approach me!*

VII. BUT, concerning the way of Cutting off all Cupidities, hereafter; in present, forasmuch as Prudence may be considered, either as a man doth thereby govern himself, or order his Family, or govern a City, or a Common-wealth; and so as it is distinguished into *Private, Domestique, Civil*: it is convenient, that we speak somewhat of each.

CHAP. X.

Of Prudence Private.

OF Private Prudence the whole sum consisteth in no more but this, that a man well understanding his own Genius, and enterprising nothing, to which Nature hath a repugnancy, he looks well into the conditions of that state, in which he is to spend his whole life, and to which he is so to accommodate all his actions, as that, as much as possible, he may live in Indolency and Tranquillity.

II. FOR, it behoves him to have the Eye of his mind constantly and immoveably fixt upon this end, or scope of his life; and consulting with right reason, to proceed according to the evidence of those Criteria, by which we are wont, when we perpend the Good or Evil of objects, to erect our determinations. Since otherwise, all things will be full of indiscreet temerity and confusion, and late Repentance will attend upon all his undertakings.

III. MOREOVER, in case you do not direct every one

of your Actions, upon what occasion soever, as to this grand scope, so also to that very end of Nature which you proposed to your self in the designment of it; but turn aside to any other sinister purpose, either in the prosecution or avoidance of any Object whatsoever: then, certainly, shall not the Actions of your life be consentaneous to your discourses; but extolling Tranquillity (for instance) in your words, you shall betray your self to be really addicted to multiplicity of business, and obnoxious to very much trouble.

IV. NOW, that man doth clearly understand the Ends prescribed by Nature, in the course of life to be instituted and undertaken; who well knows, how easily that is procurable, which is necessary to life, or what is sufficient to the detraction of all, that can, by indigence, cause pain in the Body. For, from thence he so well knows how to order the whole series of his life, as always to be above the want of such things, as are full of business, and Contention, and consequently of Chance and Danger.

V. HEREUPON a Wise man hath no reason to be much afraid of Poverty; because it is very rare to find a man so poor, as to be in want of those things, which are necessary to life. But in case our Wise man should be reduced to such a low ebb of Fortune, as to want things necessary to the sustenance of his life: yet will he not, with the Cynicks, betake himself to the shameful refuge of Begging; but, rather undertake the Erudition of some others in Wisdom, that so he may both take a course beseeming the dignity of his Prudence, and at the same time deservedly accommodate himself with necessaries, from those, who have abundance.

VI. AND while he is constrained, to take this, or some other honest and beseeming course, that by an acquired confidence of mind, he may generously receive those things, which happen to him for the instant day, he is to have

recourse to the Oracle of his own Wisdom, and call Philosophy to his relief: for we then resign the arbitration of those things, that so neerly concern us, to an Evil Councellour; when we measure and provide against indigence, by any other proportion but the simple necessities of Nature, and the rules of Philosophy.

VII. WHEREFORE, it behoves a Philosopher to provide for such competent means, as may supply his necessities; and so long to apply himself to that provision, as till his diligent care hath furnished him: but, so long as any part of them may be spared, and his confidence yet remain perfect; he is in no case to addict himself to the getting of riches, and storing up of provisions.

VIII. IN the provision of these things, therefore, our care is to be proportioned by Philosophy; and so, in a short time, we shall come to know, what a Virtue, and how great a Good it is, to require only what is simple, light, and very small: because, what is most sweet, and free from trouble in all a mans life, depends wholly upon this; to be contented with the least, *i.e.* only so much, as sufficeth nature. And, as for those impediments, which the sollicitous hunting after more doth draw upon us; when they once discover themselves (as soon they must) either by the great labour of the body, or the difficulty in the very procuring them, or the abduction of the mind from more worthy and advantageous speculations (which we ought evermore highly to esteem) or the insatisfaction resulting from the fruition of them: certainly, we shall clearly perceive the same to be altogether fruitless, and insufficient to compensate the consequent perturbations.

IX. AND, whereas we premonished, that every man should, before he determines, on what course of life to put himself, strictly examine his own Genius, and advise with himself concerning the inclination thereof; that so he may

at length happily devote himself to that, which he finds most agreeable to the Destination of it: our purpose therein was, to intimate, that nothing can be more miserable and more inconsistent with tranquillity, than for a man to be engaged in that course of life, to which Nature made him unfit.

X. IT follows from hence, that an Active life is not fit for a slothful and heavy person; nor a slothful lazy kind of life fit for an active: for as idleness is quiet, and action labour to the one; so to the other idleness is a labour, and action quiet. Thus, a Souldiers life is unfit for a Timorous and softly man; and an umbratile life odious to an impatient and bold man: for one cannot endure the heat of War; nor the other the cool shadow of peace. So that nothing can be more safe or hopeful, than for a man to devote himself to that, to which he finds no adverseness or repugnancy in his nature.

XI. WHEREUNTO you may please to add this one rule; that every man, to the end the state of life which he chooseth, may be the more secure and tranquil, ought to choose a mean state, or such as is neither very eminent, nor very abject; at least if it be in his own power. Because, it behoves him to live in a Civil society, neither as a Lyon, nor as a Gnat: lest he be exterminated, as the one; or ensnared and crushed, as the other.

CHAP. XI.

Of Prudence Domestick.

THIS sort of Prudence divides it self into Two branches; the *First* concerns a man in the capacity of a *Husband*, and a *Father*; the other, as he is a *Master* of Servants, and *Possessor* of House, Goods, Lands, *&c.*

II. CONCERNING the Former, *viz*. *Conjugal* and *Paternal* Prudence, let us observe only what may be inferred from the Premises, touching the Directions of a man, in the Election of his course of life. Thus if you find your Constitution to be such, as that you cannot, without the ardors of the flesh, live single; that you can with patience endure a morose and unquiet Wife, and untoward and undutiful Children; that you shall not be subject and apt to vex, repine and grieve, when you shall hear your Children crying and bawling, see them groaning on the bed of sickness, or snatcht away by death before you; and that you shall not be perplexed and distracted with those cares and sollicitudes, that accompany the provision of all things necessary to a Conjugal state: why then, indeed, it may be convenient for you, to take a Wife, and beget Children; for which you may provide by a Conjugal and Paternal Prudence.

III. YOU may presume, indeed, that your Wife will be sweet and Complacent; that your Children will be of ingenious and tractable dispositions; that your cares for them will not be great, nor many; that you have so laid your designs, as that you cannot expect any thing but prosperity and good success: and yet you can but presume all this, nor do I know any God, who will oblige himself, that your affairs shall succeed according to this your presumption. Wherefore, seeing the business is very doubtful; it is far below the part of a Wise man, willingly to put himself upon Chance, to undergo the hazard, and engage himself in that condition, from whence, in case he should afterward repent, he cannot withdraw himself.

IV. WE say, *Willingly*; because there may be some such Circumstance, as may require a man, though much against his will, to marry and generate Children; as, for instance, in case he live in a Country but thinly peopled, and where he is to be serviceable to the Common-wealth by encreasing

the members of it. Some, we know, pretend the propagation of their species, to which Nature seems to oblige all; but certainly, there is no fear that mankind should fail, there being in all times and places enough that give themselves to Marriage and Procreation: so that some few Wise men may well be permitted to abstain, and leave the business of Propagation to be performed by others.

V. NOW if any such Case, or certain Counsel, or any necessity shall constrain you to marry; then are you so to dispose your Wife, as that she may be loving and complacent to you, and a partner in your Cares: and to take such care for your Children as is prescribed to you partly by Nature, which by strong instinct obligeth us to love & cherish them as soon as they are born (and so much even Wolves, Tygers, and all other wild Beasts always do) and partly by Prudence, which admonisheth us so to educate and instruct them in the rudiments of Morality, as that they may be obedient to the Laws of the Country, and desire nothing so much, as to be made Wise themselves.

VI. NOR are we to take this care only for our own Children; but also for those of our friends, and especially if they be our Pupils. For, nothing is more beseeming the Dignity of Friendship, than for a man to become a Tutor, and supply the place of a Parent to those, whom his deceased Friend both dearly loved, and left as Orphans, and so in need of Protection and Tuition.

VII. AND as for the other branch of Domestick Prudence, which teacheth a man how to deport himself in the Capacity of a *Master*, or as he hath Servants at his Command, and *Possessions* at his Dispose; both which though necessary, are yet, for the most part, not very pleasant: the sum of it consists in this. Let him endeavour to prevent the sawciness, morosity, and insolence of his Servants; deport himself with mildness and gentleness toward them, so far as

may ſtand with his ſuperiority, and their obedience; with a kind of unwillingness Chaſtise and Correct even the perverse and disobedient, as remembring that they also are men; Connive at some involuntary faults, and forgive some others, especially if they be diligent, and not of an evil disposition. Nor this only, but, if he find them to be capable of, and inclined to the ſtudy of Wisdom (such as we have sometimes met with, and chiefly my servant *Mus*) it is his duty to encourage and assiſt them therein, to allow them the Familiarity of Friends, and account it pleasant or good to permit them to Philosophize together with himself.

VIII. IN the matter of his Eſtate, he is not only to live within compass, but so to proportion his Expences, as ſtill to be laying up somewhat for the Future; yet without Avarice, and the sordid desire of heaping up wealth. For, it is not the part of a Wise man to neglect his household Affairs; insomuch as his livelyhood depends thereupon, and if he through negligence permit all to run to ruine, so that he come at length to want Necessaries; he muſt very much obſtruct his progress in Philosophy: being that then he muſt either addict himself to the laborious Getting of what might have been kept with little Care; or to the importunate Begging of that at the Charitable hands of Others, which his own easie Providence might have furnished him withal; or grow old, crazy, diseased, and die in such want, as muſt be no small hindrance to the Tranquility of his mind.

IX. AND besides such things as are absolutely necessary to the uses of life; there are also others, that may be accounted necessary Reſpectively, or according to the Condition of the Person, Place, Time, and other Circumſtances, and therefore they ought not to be neglected. But the chiefeſt of our Familiar Care muſt be for those things, without which, Nature her self muſt suffer and decay, and

such is chiefly the provision of Grain and other lasting Fruits of the Earth ; and for that reason we more commend those, who have their Granaries well stored with Corn, than those who have their Houses adorned with gawdy and rich Furniture. It much delights me to remember, that not long since, when, in our City long and straitly besieged, many perished by Famine ; we were able to preserve our selves and divers Friends in good plight : not with delicate Cates, but good plenty of Beans, whereof each person had a certain number allowed him daily.

CHAP. XII.

Of Prudence Civil.

LASTLY, as for the concern of *Civil Prudence* ; we are likewise to deduce the sum of it, from what we have insinuated touching the Course of life to be elected.

II. THUS, if there be any, who are by Nature ambitious, desirous of Glory, Active and fit for the manage of Publick Affairs ; and have besides the advantages of Birth, Fortune, and opportunity that seem not only to invite, but also to open them an easie and safe way thereunto : for these men it may be convenient to obey the inclination of their Genius, by addicting themselves to action, and the administration of affairs, wherein the Republick is concerned ; because, They are so disposed by their Constitution, as that they cannot but suffer perturbations and disquiets in an obscure and unactive life, while they labour with a restless desire of what they do not obtain.

III. BUT, as for those, who are not by Nature Comparated to much imployment, but to Quiet and Ease ; or have by force of Reason repressed their Natural Ambition and vain affectation of Popularity ; or having learned, by their

own costly Experience, the certain troubles, and uncertain duration of Grandeur, have withdrawn themselves from the storms, that frequently threaten men of Publick Charges; or have been made wary and cautelous by the sad Examples of other Statesmen, whose aspiring humours occasioned their præcipitous Downfalls: good reason is there, that these should esteem the quiet of a private condition, much better than the disquiet and dangers of a popular; unless, perhaps, some accident intervene on the part of the Commonwealth, that doth require their industry. And hereupon we conclude, *That a Wise man is not to engage himself in the administration of Publick Affairs, unless some intervening Necessity call him thereunto.*

IV. AND why should we not thus conclude; since to a Wise man, addicting himself to Leasure and Quiet, it may be both much more easie, and safe to attain to that End, which ambitious men propose to themselves to be acquired by Dangers and restless Labours?

V. FOR, that we may speak of the scope, or end, at which the ambitious aim, there never wanted some, who, to the end they might attain security from others (and according to the condition of Principality and Dominion, by which they conceived that security chiefly acquirable) have affected to render themselves illustrious with Glory and Renown: thinking by that means to advance themselves to a state of security and tranquillity. But, if the lives of these proved really secure and tranquil (as in truth it could hardly be) then did they indeed attain that very thing, which, to Nature is so good and pleasant: and if they were not, then did they fall from their hopes, and wholly miss their aim, insomuch, as they in vain sought after what is congruous to Nature, in Greatness and Dominion.

VI. NOW, seeing the scope of a Wise man is the very same, namely, Security and Tranquility of life; pray, by

how much nearer a way doth he arrive at that end, when avoiding the tumults of a civil life, he directly and immediately placeth himself in a most profound quiet, and a state of highest silence and tranquility? Truly happy is that man, who knows, that the chiefest good, or a happy life, doth not consist in power and Sovereignty; not in a full Exchequer, nor in ample possessions: but, in freedom from pain, a calm of all affections, and that disposition of mind, which circumscribing all his desires by the simple boundaries of Nature, makes him content with a few things, and so to be Master of that, which the ambitious despair to obtain, unless they could bear rule over all others, and heap up Treasures inexhaustible.

VII. CERTAINLY, if it be fit for me to speak of my self, I account it for a very great Felicity, that I never yet interposed my self in the Factions of our City, nor ever sought to flatter, please, and endear the people. And what Reason, why I should; since the people doth not approve what I know, nor I know what the people approve? Besides, how far was it from Harm, that I and my familiar friend *Metrodorus* have lived together, not only privately, but in a manner concealed: when among so great Goods, as we were capable of enjoying in my narrow Gardens, and in obscure *Melite*, we were not only unknown, but almost unheard of in our own noble Country of *Greece*.

VIII. WE said, *Unless something intervene on the Common-weals part*: because if the Republick call a Wise man to the Helm, and really stand in need of his advice and assistance: in such a case it would be downright inhumanity in him, not to do a Publick Good, when it lies in his power; nay, he would be injurious even to himself, because unless the Common-wealth be in safety, he can very hardly obtain what he chiefly desires, Leasure and Quiet.

IX. LET not a Wise man, therefore, behave himself, as

we have observed some to do; who professing Wisdom, have, through excessive pride, had so high a conceit of their own judgment and abilities in the Politicks, as that they were confident they could rival, if not outdo even *Lycurgus* and *Solon*, in the Art of Ruling.

X. BUT, in case he be desired to make Laws, and to prescribe both a Form of Government, and Charges for the several Magistrates: He is in no wise to decline it; as well knowing, that those, who first made Laws, and Ordinances of Justice, and constituted Government and Magistracy in Cities, did principally aim at, and prudently provide for Tranquillity and Security of life; forasmuch as if those Laws and Constitutions be once taken away, we should lead the life of Wild Beasts, and the stronger would at least despoil, if not devour the weaker.

XI. AGAIN, if he shall be Elected to the Highest Soveraignty, and to rule according to the Laws formerly made, and the Government already established; neither will he refuse that: as well knowing, that though the condition of a Prince be for the most part full of incertitude, and above all others open to sinister Chance; yet a Wise man may look so profoundly into all Affairs, and so provide against Casualties, as that while Fortune intervenes in some less important Occurrences, the Greatest and most weighty Affairs of State are happily managed by his Counsel and Reason. His chief and first Endeavours will be, to provide, that the weaker, while they do their duties toward the stronger, be neither oppressed by them, nor live in want of those necessaries to life, wherewith the others superabound. For, the end of every Society of men, or Common-wealth, is only the Common Good, or that all conspiring and co-operating to the Publick interest, the life of every man may be safe, and (as far as may be) Happy.

XII. FINALLY, in case his Prince, upon some urgent

occasion, summon him to come and afford him his Counsel, or Assistance; neither will he refuse that: as knowing, that, since it is not only more honourable, but also more pleasant to give, than to receive a Benefit, it must be an Act as most honourable, so also most pleasant, to confer a benefit upon a Prince, from whom it is to redound to Millions of others. And thus much of the Principal, and Source of all the Virtues, *Prudence*.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Temperance in General.

THE next place belongs to *Temperance*, which is the first part of *Honesty*, and that which seems to comprehend the chief Reason of what is Honest, or Beseeming. For, since it is the office of Temperance to repress a Desiring, so is it of Fortitude to erect a Fearing mind; it is justly accounted a less Indecorum to be let down by Pusillanimity, than to be wound up by Cupidity, and, therefore, it is a greater Decorum to resist Cupidity, than to strive against Fear.

II. CONCERNING Temperance, this is first to be observed; that it is not to be affected and pursued for its own sake, but for the Pleasure it brings with it, that is, because it adfers peace to a mans mind, and pleasantly affects it with a certain Concord. For, its proper operation is the Moderation of our Cupidities; and therefore, that we may follow the conduct of Reason, in the Election or avoidance of Objects, it admonisheth us, that it is not sufficient for us to judge rightly what is to be done, or not to be done: but it behoves us also to stand to and execute that judgment.

III. MOST men, being not able to hold and keep to what they have resolved upon, as overcome and enfeebled by the

apparence of a present Pleasure; resign up themselves to the fetters of Lusts, and never foresee what is to follow thereupon: and, for the same cause, inconsiderately pursuing a small, transitory, and unnecessary pleasure, and such as they might have otherwise enjoyed, or wholly wanted, without any offence to Nature; they precipitate themselves into grievous diseases, into losses, into disgrace, and many times into the penalties decreed by the Laws.

IV. BUT, they who would so enjoy pleasures, as that no pains shall ensue thereupon; and constantly retain their judgment, not to be overcome by Pleasure, to the doing of what they know ought not to be done: these men acquire the greatest Pleasure, by pretermitting Pleasure; and frequently suffer some pain, to prevent their falling into greater.

V. AND hence is it understood, that Temperance is to be desired, not because it avoids some Pleasures, but because by restraining a man from them, it declines Troubles, which being avoided, he afterwards obtains greater Pleasures. And this in the mean time it so doth, as that the action becomes Honest and Decent: and we may clearly understand, that the same men are lovers as of Pleasure, so also of Decorum; yea, and that such, who esteem and pursue all Virtues, do for the most part perform those actions, and attain to those Ends, as that by them it is made manifest, how odious to all men Cruelty is, and how amiable Goodness and Clemency; and that those very Pleasures, which Evil men most eagerly desire and hunt after, do fall into the laps of only good men.

VI. MOREOVER, for as much as among Cupidities, about the restraint and Moderation of which Temperance is imployed, some are Natural, others vain or meerly opinionative; and of the Natural ones some are necessary, others Not-necessary (we omit, that of the Necessary ones,

some pertain simply to Life; such is the appetite of meat and drink, together with the Pleasure, which consists only in Motion: and others absolutely to Felicity it self; such as that of Indolency and Tranquillity, or the stable Pleasure) manifest it is, that not without good cause we have, in our Physiology, made Three kinds of Cupidities, *viz.* (1.) some that are both *Natural and Necessary*: (2.) others that are *Natural, but Not-necessary*: and (3.) others that are *neither Natural nor Necessary*, but meerly Vain, or arising from vain *Opinion*.

VII. AND because we said, that those are Natural and Necessary, which cause damage and pain in the body, if they be not satisfied; it is evident, that such Cupidities, which infer no damage nor pain, if not satisfied, and yet are joyned with earnest and vehement instigations, do become such, not by any Necessity, but by Opinion; and though they have their seeds from Nature, yet when they run up to Excess, their growth is caused only by the evil, but powerful influence of Opinion; which makes men far worse than Beasts, since they are not obnoxious to any such diffusion, or Excess; and again, that such Cupidities may be proved to be not only Not-necessary, but also Not-natural, only by this, that they import an appetence in Excess, and very hardly or never to be satisfied, and are, for the most part, worthily accounted the Causes of some Harm or other even to Nature.

VIII. NOW, that we may discourse of the chief sorts of Temperance, respectively to the Chief sorts of Cupidities; we are to pitch upon (1.) *Sobriety*, which stands opposed to *Gluttony*, or the excessive desire of meat and drink: (2.) *Continence*, which confronts *Lust*, or the unbridled desire of *Venus*: (3.) *Lenity*, the adversary to *Anger*, or the desire of Revenge: (4.) *Modesty*, the contrary to *Ambition*, or the affectation of Honour: (5.) *Moderation*, the antagonist to

Avarice, or the Cupidity of Riches: and (6.) in respect of the affinity betwixt Desire and Hope, *Mediocrity*, the mean betwixt *Hope* and *Desperation* of the Future.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Sobriety opposed to Gluttony.

IT can hardly be expressed, how great Good redounds from Sobriety; which reducing a man to a thin, simple, and spare Diet, by happy experience teacheth, how little that is, which Nature requires, and that her Necessities may be abundantly satisfied with slender and easily provided Aliment, such as decocted Barly, Fruits, Herbs, and Fountain Water.

II. FOR, these things sufficiently remove the trouble of the body arising from want of sustenance; are every where to be had, in good plenty; and contain the Faculties of dry and moist Aliments. Whatever is more than this, amounts to Luxury, and concerns only the satisfaction of a Cupidity, which is neither Necessary, nor occasioned by any thing, whose defect doth necessarily infer any the least offence or detriment to Nature: but ariseth partly from hence, that the want of somewhat, after which the exorbitant appetite longeth, is imagined real, and born with impatience; partly from hence, that an absolute Delight, or such as is entire and neither accompanied with, nor attended on by any trouble, is presumed from the satisfaction thereof.

III. AND forasmuch as such things, as are commonly provided to our hands, abundantly suffice to supply all Natures wants; and these Aliments are such, as partly for their simplicity, partly for their Exiguity, are easily providible: hence it follows, that he, who feeds upon flesh, hath need of other things to eat with it; when he, who is

satisfied only with Inanimates, hath need of but half so much as the other, and sustains himself with what is easie in the provision, and of small cost and pains in the preparation.

IV. NOW, as for the *Commodities*, which redound from Sobriety, they are principally *Four*. The *First* is, that it brings and conserves Health, by accustoming the body to simple, course, and spare Diet. For, sumptuous Feasts, and full meals, and various dishes, are they which generate, exasperate, and prolong Crudities, Head-achs, Rheums, Gouts, Fevers, and other Diseases: not that plain and simple fare, which Nature affordeth both as Necessary and wholsom, and this not only to other Animals, but also to man, who yet depraves them by his exorbitancy, and corrupts them by such Delicates as which while he affects, he affects only his own Destruction.

V. WHO so is Wise, therefore, let him always beware of that Dish, which his irregular Appetite earnestly covets and pursues; and upon which he cannot feed, without being afterward convinced, that it was grateful to him only to his own harm. Of this sort are all costly, fat, and luscious meats; and therefore the use of Flesh must be rather Hurtful, than Beneficial to Health; of which this may be a very good Argument: that since Health is preserved by the same means, which restore it, when lost; and abstinence from flesh is generally prescribed by learned Physicians, in most diseases, especially acute ones; certainly, the best way of conserving health, must be a spare diet, and no Flesh.

VI. IT is no wonder, that the People commonly cry up the use of Flesh, as an Aliment highly conducing to Health; for, they magnifie all things that please the Gust, and think that the direct way to Health lies in the wallowing in Pleasures, nay, even of Venereal pleasures; whereof, not-

withſtanding, there is none which is beneficial to any man, and that conſtitution is very rare, to which it is not hurtful at all times.

VII. THE *Second* is this; that it makes men ready, vivacious, and quick, in the doing of all actions necessary to life. For, if you regard the Functions of the Mind, it conserves the same in serenity, acuteness, and vigour: if the offices of the Body; it conserves it in health, and so in ſtrength, agility, and hardiness. Whereas, on the other side, Repletion, overmuch satiety, surfeiting, beclouds the mind, dulls the edge of it, and brings it to an unmanly languor and ſtupidity: and the body it makes as diseased, so feeble, unactive and burdensom. Now I beseech you, what great matters can you expect from that man, whose members are oppressed, joints enfeebled, sinews relaxed, head beclouded, tongue heavy and paralytical, eys floating in rheums, veins glowing with heat and Choler, mouth full of brawling and clamours, and all by reason of Wine drunk in excess.

VIII. VERILY, a Wise man, who ought to content his ſtomack either with less then a pint of small Wine, or with Water from the Fountain, the moſt not only wholsom, but sweet of all Drinks; will be very far from spending the night in Compotations and Drunkenness: and as far from gorging it, and oppressing Nature with meats fat, sweet and guſtful, and of heavy and slow digeſtion; since he well knows, that the moſt simple Cates, such as only Nature gives and Cooks, will equally satisfie the ſtomach, and better preserve Health.

IX. AND, what though such simple and slender Diet will not make a man as ſtrong as *Milo* was, nor pamper the flesh and corroborate the sinews? yet this doth no way disparage the use of it to a Wise man, who hath no need of such Robuſtness of body, and intension of ſtrength, the

business of his life being chiefly Contemplation, not Activity and Petulancy.

X. A *Third* advantage accruing from Sobriety, is this; that a sober man, coming to a Feaſt, eats his meat with ten times more delight than another, because he brings an exact palate to taſt, and a clean and sharp ſtomach, to entertain it. Not that course and homely Cates do not afford as much delight both to the Guſt and ſtomach, as the moſt sumptuous Banquets, when a man brings with him the beſt of sawces, hunger (for, every man knows, that in case of perfect hunger and thirſt, decocted Barly and clean Water are highly grateful, and supply that defect of nourishment, from whence the trouble of hunger and thirſt arise) but because those, who are daily used to more sumptuous entertainments, have their palats so furred and imbued, and their ſtomachs so oppressed and weakned by the continual use and ingurgitation of them, that they neither relish nor swallow their meats and drinks with pleasure comparable to that, which a sober man receives, whose Guſto is sincere, and Appetite ſtrong. Thus also a Wise man, who comes but now and then to publick shews and spectacles, is sensible of far more pleasure than those, who daily frequent them.

XI. NOR can what we say, concerning the resultance of as much pleasure from the courseſt food, as from dishes of the greateſt coſt and moſt exquisite Cookery; be contradicted by any, but him, who exposeth himself to the Tyranny of vain opinions; who doth not observe, that those only enjoy magnificence with greateſt pleasure, who do the leaſt need or care for it; and who never taſted the pleasure of Bread and Water, when pressed with pure hunger and thirſt. For mine own part, seriously, when I feed upon simple Bread and Water, and sometimes (when I would entertain my self somewhat more splendidly) mend

my chear with a little Cheese ; I apprehend abundant satisfaction therein, and bid defiance to those pleasures, which the ignorant and sensual Vulgar so much like and cry up in the magnificence of great Entertainments : and hereupon, if I have no more than brown Bread, Decocted Barly, and clean Water ; I think my Table so well furnished, as that I dare dispute Felicity even with *Jove* himself.

XII. WE farther affirm, that the magnificence of Feasts, and variety of Dishes, do not only not exempt the mind from Perturbations ; but not so much as heighten the pleasure of the Body : forasmuch as the end of Nature in Eating, is the remover of Hunger. For Example ; the use of Flesh doth neither more especially take away any thing, that is a trouble to Nature ; nor perform any thing, which might occasion or convert to a trouble, if not performed. But, in the mean time it doth affect nature with a certain violent Gratefulness, and such as perhaps may be contrary to it, insomuch as we observe, that it doth the least of all meats conduce to the prolongation of life : and all that it serveth to, is the Variation of Imaginary Pleasures, like the blandishments of *Venus*, and the drinking of Exotique wines, without which Nature, or Life might very well last ; since those things, without which nature cannot subsist, are altogether compendious, and may with great ease, and with the safety of Justice, Liberality, and Tranquillity, be obtained.

XIII. FINALLY, the *Fourth* advantage of Sobriety is this ; that it makes us superior to the threats of Fortune. For, they only are afraid of the frowns of Fortune, who being accustomed to live delicately and sumptuously, conceive that their lives must be most miserable, unless they can have wherewith to spend Pounds and Talents every day. And hence comes it, that such for the most part, become obnoxious to various and great troubles ; and frequently

commit Rapines, Murders, and the like horrid and detestable Villanies, and all to foment their Luxury, and maintain their Profuseness. But, as for that sober person, who contents himself with course and cheap food, such as Fruits and Sallets, Bread and Water; who hath bounded his desires with only the Necessaries of Nature; what reason is there, why this man should stand in fear of Fortune? For, who is there in the whole World so poor, as to want these things? and what malignity of Fortune hath ever reduced a man to a lower ebb, than Bread and Water?

XIV. AS for my self, truly (I speak modestly, and therefore may be permitted) I am not only well content, but highly pleased with the Plants and Fruits growing in these my own little Gardens; and have this Inscription over the door: *Stranger, Here, if you please, you may abide in a good condition; Here, the Supreme Good is Pleasure; the Steward of this homely Cottage is hospitable, humane, and ready to receive you; He shall afford you Barly-broth, and pure Water of the Spring, and say Friend, are you not well entertained? For, these Gardens do not invite Hunger, but satisfie it; nor encrease your thirst with drinks, while they should extinguish it, but wholly overcome it with a Natural and Grateful Liquor.*

XV. AND in this Pleasure have I grown old; finding upon my accounts, that my expences do not amount to quite a Half-penny a day: and yet, in some certain days, I abate somewhat of that too, and fare harder; and this, that I may observe, whether that could detract a whit from my full pleasure, or whether more than that were worth my labour of seeking after.

CHAP. XV.

Of Continence, opposed to Lust.

THE next species of Temperance, is *Continence* or *Abstinence from the sensual delights of Venus*; which being never beneficial to any, and pernicious to most (as we have already hinted) the forbearance of them must be an Eminent Virtue.

II. FOR a man to abuse venereal delights with intemperance, is, in brief, to make his life void of vigour, anxious with Cares, painful with Diseases, short in Duration: and therefore a wise man ought not to suffer himself to be Captivated by the Charms of Love, nor to conceive it to be a Divine Passion, and so to be indulged.

III. AND that he may be the less prone to be ensnared by the specious allurements thereof, and want the chief Incentives and Fewel to the flames of *Venus*; let him be punctual in the observance of a spare diet, than which nothing can be more available to Continency, in as much as the plenty and turgescence of seed, which arise from a too liberal diet, are both sparks and fewel to the fire of Love. The preservatives next to this, are constant imployment, especially about the study and practice of Wisdom; and Meditation of those many and great Incommodities, to which they are obnoxious, who suffer themselves to be carried away by the violence of Love.

IV. FOR, as to the Incommodities in the General of the immoderate courtship of either Women or Boys; they are, Consumption of strength, decay of Industry, unfitness for business and labour, neglect of Domestick Prudence, impairment of Estate, Mortgages, and Forfeitures, ruine of reputation and fame: and while the pamper'd Body shines

again with jewels and other precious Ornaments, the poor neglected Mind, as conscious to it self of its own Guilt and wretchedness, becomes its own continual Tormentor, for that it hath spent the flower of life in dull and slothful effeminacy, and suffer'd so many good years to be lost in that Nothing of Dalliance.

V. AND, as to the Special Incommodities; what Evil doth it not draw upon a man, to desire to have to do with that Woman, whose company the Laws interdict him? Doubtless a Wise man will be very far from admitting such a design into the company of his thoughts; since he must be deterred from it even by that great sollicitude, that is necessary to the very precaution of those many and great Dangers which threaten him therein: it being observable, that such as attempt to enjoy forbidden women, are frequently rewarded with wounds, death, imprisonment, banishment, and other grievous punishments. Whence it comes, that (as we said before) for a Pleasure, which is but short, little, and not-necessary, and which might have been either otherwise enjoyed, or wholly omitted, men frequently expose themselves to very great pain, or most tedious and sore repentance.

VI. BESIDES, to be Incontinent, to resign up ones self to this one kind of Pleasure, is it not in the mean time to defraud himself of other pleasures many and great? which that man enjoys, who living Continently and according to the Laws, so applies himself to Wisdom, as that he doth neither blunt the edge of his Mind, nor excruciate it with cares, nor perturb it with extravagant Affections; and for his Body, he doth neither enfeeble it with excessive Venery, nor vex and macerate it with Diseases, nor torment it with pains. And so he comes to attain the *summum Bonum*, which (as we formerly insinuated) doth not result from the familiarity and embraces of Boys or Women, nor from the

taſte of rare and delicious Fishes, or other blandishments of a Table richly furnished.

VII. WE need not to insiſt upon this; that there is no reason why any man should, from this our Commendation of General abſtinence from Venereal Embraces, infer, that therefore a man ought to abſtain from the legitimate and moderate pleasures of the marriage-bed: since, what our judgment is of that particular, we have formerly declared. What is more necessary here to be added, is this; that what we said, of *Loves being no Divinely-immitted Affection*, hath this importance, that if a man have no issue by his Wife, he is not to ascribe it to the anger of those Imaginary Deities, *Cupid* and *Venus*, but only to some natural Defect, on his own or his Wifes side: and consequently that he is not to hope to become a Father by Vows, Prayers, and solemn Sacrifices, rather than by Natural Remedies.

VIII. We superadde this also; that a wise man ought not to live after the beaſtly manner of the *Cynicks*, or to deport himself with that Immodeſty and Impudence, which they not only shew but boaſt of in publick. For, when they plead, that they therein follow the directions of Nature, and reprehend and deride us, for calling such things Flagitious, Filthy, or shameful, which have no Turpitude really, or in themselves; and calling by their names such things, as are full of real Turpitude (for, to rob, defraud, commit adultery, is filthy in reality, but named without obscœnity: and to beget a Child, is an act honeſt and decent in it self, but obscœne in the name) and alledge divers other arguments againſt shamefaſtness: They seem not sufficiently to consider, that they live in a Civil Society, and not single, and at random abroad in the fields, and after the manner of Wild Beaſts.

IX. FOR, from the time we have given up our names to a Society, Nature it self commands us to observe the Laws

and Customs of that Society; to the end, that participating of the Common Goods, we draw no Evil upon our selves, such as is the Infamy at least, or Ignominy, which follows upon that Impudence, or the want of such shamefastness, as the Customs and Manners of the Society, wherein we live, commonly prescribe, and from the observance of which in voice, aspect, and other seemly gestures, that Verecundity, which all virtuous persons so worthily commend, is derived and denominated.

X. FINALLY, we adde, that it doth not a little conduce, as to Verecundity in special, so also to Continency in General, to abstain from Musick and Poetry; insomuch as they conjunctively afford those amorous songs, and passionate streins of the voice, which diffusing themselves with a certain sweet violence upon the sense, prove very strong allurements and incentives to Lust.

XI. AND this is the ground of our Opinion, that a Wise man ought to have no more to do with either Musick or Poetry, than what may consist with right Reason, and the severe rules of Virtue. Because, while others being most easily taken with the flattering temptations of each, indulgently devote themselves to both; the Wise man duly perpending and foreseeing the Evil consequent upon them, doth wholly repudiate them: declaring that Musick is an allurement to drink, and exhauster of moneys, a friend to Idleness, an impediment to every good, honest and generous work; and that its sister Poetry is that, which hath in all ages corrupted mens manners, made them prone to all sorts of Vices, and chiefly to Lust, and this by the Examples of even the Gods themselves. Whom the Poets have feigned and frequently introduced as inflamed with Anger, so furiously enraged with Lust: and in their Fables we read of not only their Divisions, Animosities, Discords, Wars, Conflicts, Wounds, Deaths, but also their Complaints,

Laments, Imprisonments, Coition with Mortals, and Mortal Births of Immortal Parents; and other the like Wildnesses, from which every man, in his right mind, doth abhor.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Lenity, opposed to Anger.

ANOTHER species of Temperance is *Lenity*, *Mansuetude* or *Mildness*; comprehending also *Clemency* and *Pity*, or *Commiseration*. This is so excellent an Antidote against the malignity of Anger, or the Desire of Revenge; that it is worthily esteemed a most laudable Virtue: forasmuch as Anger, if high and excessive, is a perfect Madness, for the time. For, in a fit of anger, the mind is inflamed, the light of reason eclipsed, the blood boyls with choler, the eyes sparkle with fire, the breast distended and ready to burst with rage, the teeth gnasht, the voice interrupted, the hairs stand on end, the face glowing with heat, and distorted with menacing postures, becomes horrid, truculent, and frightful; so that all the frame or œconomy of Nature seems wholly subverted, and the mind as well to have lost the command of it self, as to have forgotten all decency and Decorum: but then comes Lenity, and that recompenseth all again, becalms the mind, and keeps it in such a becoming temper, as that it is neither moved in it self, nor suffers any passionate eruption or salley of the spirits and blood forth into the members, that may cause any the least indecorum.

II. BUT, forasmuch as anger is commonly kindled and blown into a flame by the opinion of some injury received; and no man doth an injury to another, but upon the score of either Hatred, or Envy, or Despite and Contempt: how can it be, that a Wise man should so bear an injury, as to deport himself with Lenity and sweetness toward him,

who offer'd him that injury? Why, truly, only by committing himself to the government of right Reason, by which we have already declared he is to fortifie himself against the blows of Fortune. For, he accounts an injury among Casualties, or things of meer Chance; and well knows, that it is not in his power, to make other men just, honest, and superiour to the transports of unruly passions: and therefore he is as little moved by wrongs done him by men, as by the incommodities or losses sustained by misfortune, and generally by any other event occasioned by things beyond his power of ordering and controulment.

III. HE is not moved (for example) by those extream Heats and Colds of different seasons or tempests; because he knows the Nature of such seasons to be such, as he cannot alter. Nor is he moved by injuries, which petulant, dishonest, and malevolent men do him, because it is from the depravity of their nature that they do them: and it is not in his power to amend that depravity, and make them do otherwise. Again, he conceives it not to be Congruous to Reason and Wisdom, to add one Evil to another (*i.e.*) to the harm arising to him from Causes without him, to superadd a greater harm from Causes within him, namely, to raise a perturbation in his mind, (by opinion) or because another man would afflict his mind with vexation and anxiety, thereupon to be so foolish, as by admitting and fomenting that vexation, to prosper that design, and gratifie the evil intention of his Enemy.

IV. FIT it is, we confess, that a Wise man should so far look to his Good Name, and be careful of his Reputation, as not to lye open to Contempt and Scorn; seeing there are some Pleasures that arise to a man from a Good Fame, and the esteem from thence resulting; as on the contrary there are some Troubles, that arise from Contempt, and the Con-

sequents thereof: but yet is he not to be tender of his Good Name so much for the Revenging of injuries, or offending of those that do them; as for living well and innocently, and giving no man a just cause or occasion of Contumely and Malediction. For, thus to do, is wholly in his own power: not to hinder another from discharging the malignity of his Nature upon him.

V. HEREUPON, in case a person, who hath, though without cause, conceived an anger against you, and declared himself your Adversary, shall demand any thing of you, upon pretext of expiation or satisfaction; you are not to refuse to give it him: provided, what he demand be Lawful, Honourable, and conducible to your certain security from his rage; because he differs not from an angry and invading Dog, and so is to be appeased with a morsel. Nevertheless nothing is either more honourable, or more safe, than to confront his malice with Innocence of life, and the security of your own Conscience, and for the rest, to declare your self to be above his injuries.

VI. MOREOVER, it may come to pass, that a wise man may be sued at Law, brought to the Bar, and there in the face of the whole Court suffer not only injuries, but gross calumnies, false accusations, yea, and receive condemnation: and yet he ought still to remember, that though it be in his power to live uprightly and Virtuously, yet it is not in his power not to fall into the hands of such, as may shew themselves Envious, malignant and unjust toward him; nor to hinder them from accusing him contrary to all right and equity, or himself from receiving a sentence from unrighteous Judges. It becomes him not therefore to be angry with either his Accusers, or the Witnesses, or the Judges; but trusting in a good Conscience, still to keep up his Lenity and Tranquillity at the highest; and accounting himself far above this infortune, to entertain it without

fear or trouble, and deport himself toward his Judges with constant courage and serene boldness.

VII. NOW, there is not why any man should *Object*, that what we here advise concerning Lenity, is repugnant to what we formerly said of the Wise mans *Chastising of his offending Servants* : Because we there limited this Castigation only to Refractory, obstinately Perverse and disobedient Servants : and manifest it is, that punishment ought to be inflicted as well upon the delinquents in a private Family, as in a State or Common-wealth ; and as the Prince, or Magistrate doth punish the Crimes of Subjects without anger at their Persons ; so likewise may the Master of a Family punish the offences of his Servants, not only with Lenity, but Good will also to their persons.

VIII. WE add, that a Wise man is not only to bear injuries from others, with Lenity ; nor only to pardon the faults of his Servants, with mildness and sweetness : but even with kindness to encourage and gratulate such as Repent of, and resolve to reform their evil ways. For, since the first degree of Reformation, is the Knowledge of ones Fault ; therefore is this Gratulation and Encouragement to be given to the penitent Delinquent, that as he is affected with contrition and horror at the apprehension of the foulness of his offence, so he may be re-animated by the pulchritude of what he ought to have done formerly, or is to do in the future.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Modesty, opposed to Ambition.

CONCERNING this great Virtue, which is the Fourth branch of Temperance, there is very little need of saying more, than what we have formerly intimated, when

we declared it not to be the part of a Wise man, to affect Greatness, or Power, or Honours in a Common-wealth; but so to contain himself, as rather to live not only privately, but even obscurely and concealed in some secure corner. And therefore the advice we shall chiefly inculcat in this place, shall be the very same we usually give to our best friends. Live private and concealed (unless some circumstance of State call you forth to the assistance of the Publick) insomuch as Experience frequently confirms the truth of that proverbial saying, *He hath well lived, who hath well concealed himself.*

II. CERTAINLY, it hath been too familiarly observed, that many, who had mounted up to the highest pinacle of Honour, have been on a sudden, and as it were with a Thunderbolt, thrown down to the bottom of Misery and Contempt: and so been brought, though too late, to acknowledge, that it is much better for a man quietly and peaceably to obey; than by laborious Climbing up the craggy Rocks of Ambition, to aspire to Command and Soveraignty; and to set his foot rather upon the plain and humble ground, than upon that slippery height, from which all that can be with reason expected, is a precipitous and ruinous Downfal. Besides, are not those Grandees, upon whom the admiring multitude gaze, as upon refulgent Comets and prodigies of Glory and Honour; are they not, we say, of all men the most unhappy, in this one respect, that their breasts swarm with most weighty and troublesome Cares, that uncessantly gall and corrode their very Hearts? Beware, therefore, how you believe that such live securely and tranquilly: since it is impossible but those, who are feared by many, should themselves be in continual fear of some.

III. THOUGH you see them to be in a manner environed with Power, to have Navies numerous enough to

send abroad into all Seas, to be in the heads of mighty and victorious Armies, to be guarded with well armed and faithful Legions ; yet for all this take heed you do not conceive them to be the only Happy men, nay, that they partake so much as of one sincere Pleasure : for all these things are meer pageantry, shadows guilded, and ridiculous Dreams ; insomuch as Fear and Care are not things that are afraid of the noise of Arms, or regard the brightness of Gold, or the splendor of Purple, but boldly intrude themselves even into the Hearts of Princes and Potentates, and like the Poets Vultur, daily gnaw and consume them.

IV. BEWARE likewise, that you do not conceive, that the Body is made one whit the more ſtrong, or healthy, by the Glory, Greatness and Treasures of Monarchy ; especially when you may daily observe, that a Fever doth as violently and long hold him, who lies upon a bed of Tissue, under a Covering of Tyrian Scarlet, as him that lies upon a mattress, and hath no Covering but Raggs ; and that we have no reason to complain of the want of Scarlet Robes, of Golden Embroideries, Jewels, and ropes of Pearl, while we have a Course and easie Garment to keep away the Cold. And what if you, lying cheerfully and serenely upon a truss of clean ſtraw, covered with raggs, should gravely inſtruct men, how vain those are, who with aſtonisht and turbulent minds gape and thirſt after the Trifles of Magnificence, not underſtanding how few and small those things are, which are requisite to an happy life ? believe me, your Discourse would be truly magnificent and High ; because delivered by one, whose own happy Experience confirms it.

V. WHAT though your House do not shine with silver and gold Hatchments ; nor your arched roofs resound with the multiplied Echoes of loud Musick ; nor your walls be not thickly beset with golden Figures of beautiful youths holding great lamps in their extended arms, to give light to

your nightly Revels and sumptuous Banquets: why yet, truly, it is not a whit less (if not much more) pleasant, to repose your wearied limbs, upon the Green Grass, to sit by some cleanly and purling stream, under the refreshing shade of some well-branched Tree, especially in the Spring time, when the head of every Plant is crowned with beautiful and fragrant Flowers, the merry Birds entertaining you with the musick of their Wild notes, the fresh Western Winds continually faning your heats, and all Nature smiling upon you.

VI. WHEREFORE, when any man may, if he please, thus live at peace and liberty abroad in the open Fields, or his own Gardens; what reason is there, why he should affect and pursue Honours, and not rather modestly bound his Desires with the Calmness and security of that Condition? For, to hunt after Glory, by the ostentation of Virtue, of Science, of Eloquence, of Nobility, of Wealth, of Attendants, of rich Cloths, of Beauty, of Garb, and the like: seriously, it is altogether the Fame of ridiculous Vanity; and in all things Modesty exacts no more then this, that we do not, through Rusticity, want of a decent Garb, or too much Negligence, do any thing, that doth not correspond with Civility and Decorum. For, *it is equally vile, and doth as much denote a Base or Abject mind, to grow insolent and Lofty upon the possession of these adjuncts of Magnificence: as to become Dejected, or sink in Spirit, at the Loss or want of them.*

VII. NOW, according to this rule, if a Wise man chance to have the Statues, or Images of his Ancestors, or other Renowned Persons of Former Ages; he will be very far from being proud of them, from shewing them as Badges of Honour, from affecting a Glory from the Generosity of their Actions and Atchievements: and as far from wholly neglecting them, but will place them (as Memorials of Virtue) indifferently either in his Porch, or Gallery, or elsewhere.

VIII. NOR will he be sollicitous about the manner, or place of his Sepulture; or command his Executors to bestow any great Cost, or Pomp and Ceremony, at his Funeral. The chief subject of his care will be, what may be beneficial and pleasant to his Successors: being well assured, that as for his dead Corps, it will little concern him, what becomes of it. For to propagate Vanity even beyond Death, is the highest madness: and not much inferior thereto is the Fancy of some, who in their lives are afraid to have their Carcasses torn by the teeth of Wild Beasts, after their death. For, if that be an Evil; why is it not likewise an Evil, to have the Dead Corps burned, Embalmed and immersed in Honey, to grow cold and stiff under a ponderous Marble, to be pressed down by the weight of Earth and Passengers?

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Moderation, opposed to Avarice.

NOW comes *Moderation*, or that Disposition of the Mind, which makes a man contented with a little, and than which he can hardly possess a greater good. For, to be content with little, is the highest preferment, the greatest wealth in the world: as on the other side, great riches without moderation, are but great poverty. Thus, to have wherewithal to prevent Hunger, Thirst, and Cold; is a Felicity not much inferior to that of Divinity: and whoso possesses so much, and desires no more, however the world may account him poor, he really is the richest man alive.

II. AND how honest a thing is this Poverty, when it is Cheerful, Serene, and Contented with only what is sufficient, *i.e.* with those riches of Nature, which suffice to preserve

from Hunger, from Thirſt, from Cold? Truly, seeing that these riches of Nature are Terminated and easily acquirable; but those, that are coveted out of vain opinions, are difficult in the acquisition, and have no measure, no end: we ought to be highly thankful to the Wisdom and Bounty of Nature, which made those things easily procurable, that are Necessary; and those Unnecessary, that are hard to come by.

III. AGAIN, since it behoves a Wise man to be always Confident, that in the whole course of his life he shall never want Necessaries, doth not the very easie parability of such few, small, cheap, and common things, as are necessary, abundantly cherish that Confidence in him? when, on the other side, the Difficulty of acquiring those many, great, sumptuous and rare things, that belong to superfluity and magnificence, cannot but very much ſtagger and weaken it. And this clearly is the Reason, why the vulgar, though they have great poſſessions, do yet uncessantly toil and afflict themselves in the acquisition of more: as if they feared to outlive their riches, and come to want, what, if they used with Moderation, they could never live to spend.

IV. THIS considered, let us endeavour to content our selves with what is moſt simple and moſt easily procurable; remembring, that not all the wealth of the world, congeſted into one heap, can avail in the leaſt measure to cure the leaſt disease, or perturbation of the Mind: whereas mean Riches, such as Nature offers to us, and are moſt useful to remove that indigence, which is incommodious to the body; as they are the occasion of no Care or other passion, during life; so will it not be grievous to us to part with them, when we think of Death.

V. MISERABLE truly, are the Minds of men, and their Hearts surrounded with blindness; in that they will not see, that Nature doth dictate nothing more to them than this: that they should supply the wants of the body, and for the

rest, enjoy a well pleased mind, without care, without fear; not that they should spend their days in scraping together more than Nature knows how to make use of, and that with greediness, as if they meant to outlive Death, to prevent want in their Graves, or never bethought themselves of the uncertainty of life, and how deadly a Potion we all drink at our very entrance into the World.

VI. WHAT though those things, which are purely Necessary, and in respect whereunto no man can be poor, do not afford those Delights, which Vulgar minds so much love and court; yet Nature doth not want them, nor doth she in the mean time cease to afford real and sincere pleasures in the fruition of meer Necessaries, as we abundantly declared. Hereupon the Wise man stands not only so indifferently affected toward those things, in relation whereunto money is desired (such are Love, Ambition, Luxury, *&c.* all which require expences to maintain them) but so far above them, as that he hath no reason either to desire or care for money.

VII. NOW, as for what we said, of the *Immensity of such Riches, as are coveted upon the suggestion of vain Opinions*; the Reason of it is this, that when Nature is satisfied with Little, vain Opinion ushering in Desire, always engageth the mind to think of somthing, which it doth not possess, and, as if it were really needful, converts and fixeth the Desire wholly and entirely upon it. Whence it comes, that to him, who is not satisfied with a little, nothing can ever be enough: but still the more wealth he possesseth, the more he conceives himself to want.

VIII. WHEREFORE, seeing there can never be want of a Little, the Wise man, doubtless, while he possesseth that little, ought to account it very great Riches: because therein is no want, whereas other riches, though great in esteem, are really very small, because they want multiplication to

infinity. Whence it follows, that he who thinks not his own Estate, how small soever, sufficiently ample; though he should become Lord of the whole World, will ever be miserable. For, misery is the companion of Want; and the same vain opinion, which first perswaded him that his own Estate was not sufficient, will continue to perswade him that one World is not sufficient, but that he wants more and more to infinity.

IX. HAVE you, then, a design to make any one Rich indeed? Know, that the way is not by adding to his Riches, but by detracting from his desires. For, when having cut off all vain and superfluous desires from his breast, he shall so compose himself to the prescripts of Nature, as to covet no more than he needs and requires: then at length shall he find himself to be a Rich man in reality, because he shall then find that nothing is wanting to him. Hereupon may you also inculcate this maxim to him; *If you live according to Nature, you shall never be poor, but if according to Opinion, you shall never be rich. Nature desires little, Opinion infinite.*

X. TRULY, this Disposition, or (if you please) Faculty of the mind, whereby a man moderating himself, cuts off the desire of whatsoever is not Necessary to Nature, and contents himself with provisions the most simple and most easily procurable; this Disposition, we say, is that, which begets that Security, that is perceived in a pleasant Retirement, and Avoidance of the Multitude; forasmuch as by the benefit thereof, when a man converseth with crouds of people, he shall want no more, than when he lives sequestred.

XI. FINALLY, when a man wants this Faculty of Detracting or Abdicating from his Desires, whatever is not purely Necessary; how great is the Misery, to which he is continually subject? his mind being, like a vessel full of

holes, always in filling, but never full. And certainly (that we may not insist upon this, that most who have heaped up vast masses of Wealth, have therein found only a Change, not an End of their misery; either because they loaded themselves with new Cares, to which they were not subject before; or because they gave them occasion to fall into new Vices, from the snares whereof they had formerly escaped) this alone is a very high misery; for a man to have his Appetite Encreased by the satisfaction of it, *i.e.* the more plentifully he feeds, the more to be tormented with hunger.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Mediocrity betwixt Hope and Despair of the Future.

FINALLY, since all Cupidity, or Desire whatever is carried to that, which is not possessed, but proposed as possible to be attained, and accompanied with some *Hope* of obtaining it; and that Hope, as it were nursing and cherishing that Desire, is accompanied with a certain pleasure; as the opposite to Hope, *Desperation*, creating and fomenting Fear that what is desired may not be obtained, is accompanied with a certain trouble upon these considerations; it seems necessary for us to bring up the rear of this File of Virtues, with the discourse of *Mediocrity*; which is of very great use, as well in respect of objects in the General, either hoped for, or despaired of, in the Future; as in particular of the Duration, or rather perpetuity of life, whereof as there is a Desire kindled in the breasts of most men, so doth the Despair of it torment them.

II. IN the first place, therefore, we are to adhere to this, as a General Rule; that *what is to come, if it be in the number of simple Contingents, is neither absolutely ours, nor absolutely Not*

ours. More plainly ; we are neither so to hope for a thing that is Contingent, as if it were certainly to come ; because it may be prevented or diverted by some cross accident intervenient : Nor so to despair of it, as if it were certainly not to come ; because it may fall out, that no accident may intervene to prevent or divert it. For, by the observation of this maxim, we shall reap the benefit of Moderation ; so as not being destitute of all Hope, we shall not be without some Pleasure : and being altogether frustrated of our hopes, we shall be affected with no trouble.

III. FOR, herein consists the Difference betwixt the Wise man and the Fool ; that the Wise doth, indeed, expect things Future, but not depend upon them, and in the mean time enjoys the Goods that are present (by considering how great and pleasant they are) and gratefully remembers what are past : but the fool, fixing all his thoughts and dependance upon the Future ; makes (as we said in the beginning) his whole life unpleasant and full of fears.

IV. AND how many may we daily see, who neither remember goods past, nor enjoy present ? They are wholly taken up with Expectation of Future things, and those being uncertain, they are perpetually afflicted with anguish of mind, with fear, and at length become most grievously perplexed, when they too late perceive, that they have in vain addicted themselves to the getting of Riches, or Honours, or Power, or Glory : in respect they fail of obtaining those Pleasures, with the hopes whereof being inflamed, they had undergone many and great Difficulties and Labours. That we may not say any thing of that other sort of fools, who being abject and narrow-hearted, despair of all things, and are for the most part, Malevolent, Envious, Morose, Shunners of the light, Evil-speakers, Monsters.

V. NOW the Reason, why we say, that *the wise man doth gratefully remember Goods past*, is, because we are generally

too ungrateful toward the time Preterite, and do not call to mind, nor account among Pleasures, the Good things we have formerly received: forasmuch as no pleasure is more certain, than what cannot now be taken from us. For, present Goods are not yet Consummate and wholly solid; some chance or other may intervene and cut them off in half; Future things hang upon the pin of uncertainty, what is already past, is only safe and inamissible.

VI. AND among Past Goods we account not only such as we have enjoyed; but also our avoidance of all those Evils, that might have fallen upon us; and our Deliverance from such other Evils as did fall upon us, and might have lasted much longer; as also the Recordation, Reputation, Gratulation, that we sustained them constantly and bravely.

VII. AS for the *Desire of prolonging life to Eternity* (the special Evil to be prevented by Mediocrity) we have already hinted, that a Wise man is to entertain no such desire: because thereupon instantly succeeds Desperation, which is always accompanied with trouble and anguish. And this Cogitation imports thus much, that the greater Pleasure cannot be received from an Age of infinite Duration, than may be received from this, which we know to be finite; provided a man measure the Ends of it by Right Reason.

VIII. FOR, seeing that to measure the Ends of Pleasure by right reason, is only to conceive, that the Supreme pleasure is no other but an Exemption from Pain and Perturbation; it is a manifest Consequence, that the Supreme Pleasure of man cannot be encreased by the length, nor diminished by the shortness of Time.

IX. THE Hopes of a more prolonged pleasure, or of a longer age, we confess, may seem to render the present pleasure more Intense; but, it can seem so only to such, who measure the Ends of pleasure not by right Reason, but by vain opinion, and the Consequent thereof, Desire; and

who look upon themselves so, as if, when they shall cease to be, they should be sensible of some trouble from the privation of pleasure, as they might in case they should survive. And hence it comes, that perfectly to understand that Death doth nothing concern us; makes us fully to enjoy this Mortal life, not by adding thereunto any thing of uncertain time, but by cutting off all Desires of Immortality.

X. WHEREFORE, since Nature hath prescribed certain bounds or ends to the pleasures of the Body; and the Desire of Eternal Duration takes them wholly away: necessary it is, that the mind, or Reason supervene, so as by ratiocinating upon those ends, and expunging all desires of Sempiternity, to make life in all points perfect and consummate, and us so fully content therewith, as not to want any longer Duration.

XI. AND this Reasoning moreover, causeth, that we shall not be frustrated of pleasure even then, when Death shall take us by the hand, and shew us the period of all these mortal things, insomuch as we shall thereby attain to the perfect, and so delectable End of a very Good Life, rising from the table of the world as Guests well satisfied with the Good Entertainments of life, and having duly performed all those Duties, which to perform, we received life.

CHAP. XX.

Of Fortitude, in General.

HITHERTO of Temperance, and the chief sorts of it, respective to the chief Objects of our Cupidities. We are now come to a new Lesson, *FORTITUDE*; which we called the other part of Honesty, in respect that the use of it is against Fear, and all its Causes, and that those, who

behave themselves, in any Difficulty or Dangerous Enterprise, as especially in War (from which the Vulgar seem to have transferred the word to all Generous actions) not timidly and unmanly, but couragiously and valiantly, are generally said to behave themselves Honestly and Becomingly.

II. THAT this Virtue also is to be embraced, in order to Pleasure, may be inferred from hence; that neither the undergoing of great labours, nor the suffering of great pains, are things inviting and desirable in themselves; as likewise is not Patience, nor Assiduity, nor Watchings, nor Industry it self, which is so highly commended; nay, nor Fortitude: but the reason why we commend, and pursue them, is to the End we may live without Care and Fear, and so free both body and mind (as much as possible) from all molestation.

III. FOR, as by the Fear of death (for example) the quiet of life is wholly perturbed; and as to yield to pains, and endure them with a dejected and weak mind, is a great misery, and by that baseness and weakness of Spirit, many have utterly lost their Parents, Friends, Country, and most themselves: so, on the other side, doth a strong and sublime mind make a man free from all Care and Anguish, insomuch as it contemns death, upon this account, that all who suffer it, are in the same case, as before they were in being; and is fortified against all pains, as being assured, that the greatest pains are soon determined by death, that small pains have many intervals of quiet, that mean pains are not above our patience; that if they be tolerable, they are to be endured with constancy, which much mitigates them; and if intolerable, he is quietly to depart the world, as a Theatre that doth not please him.

IV. NOW, from these considerations it is plain, that Timidity and unmanliness are not to be dispraised, nor

Fortitude and Patience to be praised, for their own sakes : but those are Rejected, because they induce Pain ; and these Embraced, because they produce Pleasure.

V. AND, as for what we said of the Efficacy of Fortitude both against Fear, and all things that are wont to cause it ; the intent thereof is, that we may understand, that they are the very same Evils, which torment when they are present, and are feared, when expected as future : and consequently that we learn not to fear those Evils, which we either feign to our selves, or any ways apprehend as to come ; and with Constancy and Patience to endure those that are present.

VI. NOW, among such Evils, as we *Imagine* to our selves but are not really Future, the chiefest are those which we fear either from the *Gods*, as if they were Evil themselves, or could be the Authours of any Evil to us ; or from *Death*, as if that were evil in it self, or brought us to some eternal Evil after it : & among such Evills, as are in *possibility*, and may come, and do sometimes come and affect us with pain and trouble ; they are all such, as infer either *Pain* upon the *Body*, or *Discontent* upon the *Mind*.

VII. THOSE which produce *Pain*, are Diseases, Scourgings, Fire, Sword, *&c.* and those which induce *Discontent*, are *External* Evils, and either *Publique*, of which sort are Tyranny, Wars, destruction of ones Country, Pestilence, Famine, and the like ; or *Private*, of which sort are Servitude, Banishment, Imprisonment, Infamy, Loss of Friends, Wife, Children, Estate, *&c.*

VIII. NOW, the difference betwixt all these things, on the one part, and pain and discontent on the other, is this ; that Pain and Discontent are absolute evils in themselves : the others are evils only Respectively, or as they may be the Causes of pain and discontent ; nor is there any reason, why they should be avoided, unless in that respect only.

IX. UPON the Chief of these Causes of fear we shall

touch, and in order as they are here enumerated. In the mean time be pleased to observe, that Fortitude is a Disposition of the mind, not ingenerate by Nature, but acquired by long consulting with Reason. For, Fortitude is very much different from Audacity, Ferocity, inconsiderate Temerity, which is found even in the Brute Animals: and being proper to man, and to such men only as act according to Prudence, and the advice of right Reason; is not to be measured by the hot Temperament and strength of the Body, but by the firmness of the Mind, constantly adhering to an honest intention or purpose.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Fortitude, opposed to the Fear of the Gods.

IN the first place it seems convenient, that we discuss a certain Twofold Fear, much transcending all others; forasmuch as if any thing hath produced the Supreme Pleasure, and that which is proper to the Mind; doubtless, it hath been the Expunction of all such Opinions, as have impressed the greatest Fear upon the Mind. For, such is the condition of miserable Mortalls, that they are generally led, not by sound opinions, but by some certain Affection void of Reason: and so, not defining Evil by reality, but imagination, they render themselves obnoxious to, and frequently suffer as high perturbations from such things, as they only Imagine to themselves, as if they were Real.

II. AND that, which is the Ground of the Greatest Fear, and consequently of the Greatest Perturbation to men, is this; that conceiving there are certain *Blissful and Immortal Natures* (which they call *Gods*) in the World, they do yet think them to have such Wills, such Passions, such Operations, as are plainly repugnant to those Attributes of Beati-

tude and Immortality; such are perpetual Sollicitude, Imployments, Fits of Anger and Kindness: and hereupon they infer, that Losses and Afflictions are by way of punishment, derived to Evil men, and Protection and Benefits, by way of reward and encouragement, derived to Good men, from the Gods. For, Men, being nursed up in their own, *i.e.* Humane affections, imagine and admit Gods in most things like themselves: and what they find incorrespondent to their own inclinations and passions; the very same they conclude to be incompetent to the Deities.

III. HEREUPON it cannot be exprest, how great unhappiness Mankind hath drawn upon it self, by ascribing such attributes to the Gods, as resemble those of Humane nature, and especially those of Anger and Vindictiveness; in respect whereof mens minds being made low and abject, as if the Gods perpetually threatned to call them to a severe account for their actions, and to inflict punishment upon them: you shall scarcely find a man, who is not appaled and strook with terror, at every clap of Thunder, at every Earth-quake, at every high wind, at every storm at Sea, and the like natural occurrents.

IV. BUT, so are not Those, who being educated in the School of Reason, have learned, that the Gods live in perpetual security and Tranquillity; and that their Blissful Nature is so far removed from us and our Affairs, as that they can neither be Pleased, nor Displeased at our actions. And, unfeignedly, if they were touched with Anger at our misdeeds, or heard the prayers of men: the whole race of man would soon be destroyed; there being not an hour, wherein Millions of men do not imprecate mischief and destruction each to other.

V. BE very Cautious, therefore, that when you have conceived *God* to be an *Immortal and Blissful Nature* (or Animal, as the common Notion, concerning God, doth suggest) you

do not destroy that Conception, by giving any other Attribute to him, which may be either inconsistent with, or repugnant to those of his Beatitude and Immortality.

VI. GODS, in truth, there *are*; for the Knowledge of them is evident, as we have elsewhere declared: but, they are not such as men commonly conceive and describe them to be. For, when they have described them to be Immortal and Blissful, they contradict themselves, by affixing other Repugnant Attributes upon them; as that they are always taken up with business themselves, and create business for others; that they are affected with pleasure or displeasure at the good or bad Actions of men; that they are delighted with humane adoration and sacrifices *&c.*, all which presuppose great Disquiet, Imbecillity, Fear, and the want of external assistance.

VII. NOR need you fear, that this Tenent should subject you to the censure of being *Impious*; because, in truth, He is not Impious, who denies and cashiers the Vulgar Gods of the multitude: but he who ascribes to the Gods the opinions of the multitude. For, those are not Genuine Prenotions, but False Opinions, which are commonly delivered by men, concerning the Gods.

VIII. BY the same reason likewise, he is not the truly *Pious* man, who bows down upon every stone, sacrificeth upon every Altar, and besprinkles the doors of every Temple with the blood of victims: but, *He*, who contemplating all things with a serene and quiet mind, frames to himself, out of a genuine Prenotion, true and correspondent conceptions concerning the Divine Nature; and being thereunto induced, not by hope or reward, but meerly by apprehension of the Majesty and Supreme Excellency of its essence, doth love it, and worship it with the highest Reverence and Veneration of his mind; and admitting no such Cogitations, as may suggest any Opinion repugnant

to its Attributes, and destructive to the Veneration due unto it, doth thereby exempt himself from that base fear, which others suffer, in whose minds that Contrariety of Attributes doth beget the highest and most lasting of all Perturbations.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Fortitude, opposed to the Fear of Death.

THE other thing which invades, and strikes the Minds of men with extream Fear and Terror, is *Death*; and this, because of we know not what Everlasting Evils, that are expected immediately to ensue thereupon (and that's very strange, you'l say, that men should fear to suffer Evil, then when they shall be deprived of all sense, and utterly cease to be) they being ignorant, that all those solemn stories, that are commonly told of Hell, Rhadamanth, the Furies, *&c.* are the meer Fictions of Poets: and that if they contain any thing of truth in them, they are but cunning allusions to the miseries, which many men suffer during life, since those, who are uncessantly vexed with vain Fears, superfluous Cares, insatiable Desires, and other violent Passions, lead lives so truly miserable, as that they may well be said, to suffer the torments of Hell.

II. THAT you may exempt your self, therefore, from these Terrors; accustom your mind to this thought, *That Death doth nothing concern us*; and upon this Argument: whatever of Good or Evil we are capable of in life, we are capable thereof only in respect of our Sense; but, Death is a Privation of all Sense, therefore, *&c.* That Death is a Privation of all Sense, is consequent from hence, that it is a Dissolution; and what is once dissolved, must henceforth remain without all Sense. So that Death seems a thing most easily Contemptible; insomuch as it is an ineffectual

Agent, and in vain threatens pain, where the Patient is destroyed, and so ceaseth to be capable of pain.

III. TRUE it is, indeed, and too true, that men generally abhor Death, sometimes because they look upon it as the Greatest of Pains, sometimes because they apprehend it as the cessation of all their enjoiments, or privation of all things that are dear to them in life; but in both these Respects, altogether without cause: since this thing, *Not-to-live*, or *Not-to-be*, ought to be no occasion of Terror; because when once we come to that, we shall have no faculty left whereby to know, that Not-to-live hath any thing of Evil in it.

IV. HEREUPON we may conclude that those are great Fools who abhor to think, that after Death their Bodies should be torn by wild beasts, burned in the flame of the funeral pile, devoured by worms, *&c.* for, they do not consider, that then they shall not be, and so not feel, nor complain, that they are torn, burned, devoured by corruption or worms. And that those are Greater Fools, who take it grievously, that they shall no longer enjoy the conversation of their Wives, Children, Friends, no longer do them good offices, nor afford them their assistance; for these do not consider, that then they shall have no longer Relation to, nor Desire of Wife, Children, Friends, or any thing else.

V. WE said, that *Death* (accounted the King of Terrors, and most horrid of all Evils) *doth nothing concern us*, *because*, while we are, Death is not; and when Death is, we are not; so that he, who profoundly considers the matter, will soon conclude that Death doth concern neither the Living, nor the Dead; not the living, because it yet toucheth them not, not the Dead, because they are not.

VI. AND, as the assurance of this, that Death nothing concerns us, doth exempt us from the greatest of Terrors, so

also doth it make us to enjoy life to the most advantage of pleasure, not by adding thereunto any thing of uncertain Time, but by Detracting all desire of Immortality. For, in life there can be nothing of Evil to him, who doth perfectly understand, that there can be nothing of Evil in the privation of life.

VII. AGAIN, He cannot be excused of Folly, who saith, that He fears Death, not because of any trouble or Anguish that it can bring, when it comes; but because of the perpetual Grief, and Horror, wherewith it afflicts the mind, till it comes, or while it is expected: forasmuch as that, which can bring no trouble or anguish with it when it comes, ought not to make us sad before it comes. Certainly, if there be any thing of Incommodity, or Fear in the business of Death, it is the fault of him that is Dying, not of Death it self: nor is there any trouble in Death, more than there is after it, and it is no less folly to fear Death, than to fear old Age, since as old Age follows close upon the heels of youth, so doth Death upon the heels of old Age.

VIII. FURTHER, we are to hope at least, that when we come to the point of death, and are even at the last gasp, either we shall feel no pain, or such as will be very short; for as much as no pain that is Great, can be Long; and so every man ought to be confident, that though the dissolution of his Soul and Body be accompanied with some torment; yet after that's once past, he shall never feel more.

IX. THAT Philosopher was very ridiculous, who admonisheth the young man to live Honestly, and the old to die Honestly; because a Good Life and a Good Death are not things to be parted, and the Meditation of living Honestly and dying Honestly, is one and the same: and this in respect that a young man may die immaturely; and to an old man something of life is remaining, and the

laſt act of his life is a part, yea, and the Crown of his whole life.

X. AND both young and old are to consider this, that though man may provide for his Security, as to other things, yet againſt Death there is no security, the youngeſt nor ſtrongeſt cannot promise themselves immunity from it, for so much as one hour; all men living as it were in a City without Walls, without Gates, to keep out that common Enemy.

XI. MOREOVER a young man may die Happy, who considers with himself, that should he live a thousand years, yet he could but see and act over the same things again: and an old man may live unhappy, who, like a vessel full of holes, receives the Goods of life only to let them run through him, and so is never full of them, nor as a sober Gueſt of Nature, after a plentiful meal of all her beſt dishes, willing to rise and go take his reſt.

XII. THIS considered, we are not to account an old man Happy, in that he dyed full of years, but in that he dyed full of Goods, and sated with the World.

XIII. FINALLY, moſt of all foolish and ridiculous is he, who saith, it is good either not to be born at all, or to die as soon as born. For, if he speak this in Earneſt, why doth he not presently rid himself of life, it being very easie for him so to do, in case he hath well deliberated upon the matter beforehand? And, if in jeſt; he is perfectly mad, because these are things that admit not of jeſting. Again, in life there is something amiable in it self; and therefore he is as much to be reprehended, who desires Death, as he that is afraid of it. For, what can be so ridiculous, as for a man to desire Death, when himself makes his life unquiet by the fear of Death? or out of a weariness of life, to fly to the Sanctuary of Death, when his own Imprudence and Irregular course of life, is the only cause of that weariness?

XIV. EVERY man, therefore, ought to make it his care, so to live, as that life may not be ingrate or tedious to him; and not to be willing to part with life, till either Nature, or some intolerable Case call upon him to surrender it. And in that respect, we are seriously to perpend whether is the more Commodious, for us to stay till Death come to us, or to go and meet it. For, though it be an Evil, indeed, to live in Necessity; yet is there no necessity for us to live in necessity: since Nature hath been so kind as to give us, though but one door into the world, yet many doors out of it.

XV. BUT, albeit there be some Cases so extream, as that in respect of them we are to hasten and fly to the Sanctuary of Death, lest some power intervene and rob us of that liberty of quitting life: yet nevertheless are we not to attempt any thing in that kind, but when it may be attempted conveniently, and opportunely; and when that time comes, then are we to dispatch and leap over the battlements of life bravely. For, neither is it fit for him, who thinks of flight to sleep: nor are we to despair of a happy Exit even from the greatest Difficulties, in case we neither hasten before our time, nor let it slip when it comes.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of Fortitude against Pain of the Body.

Corporal Pain is that alone, which deserves the name of Evil in it self, and which indeed would carry the Reason of the Greatest of Evils, if so be our own delusive opinions had not created and pulled upon our heads another sort of pain, called the *pain of the Mind*; which many times becomes more grievous and intolerable than any pain of the Body whatever, as we have formerly

deduced. For, Discontent of mind, conceived upon the loss of Riches, Honours, Friends, Wife, Children, and the like; doth frequently grow to that height, that it exceeds the sharpest pains of the Body: but still that which gives it both being and growth, is our own Opinion, which if right and sound, we should never be moved by any such loss whatever; in regard that all such things are without the circle of our selves, and so cannot touch us but by the intervention of Opinion, which we coin to our selves. And thereupon we may infer, that *we are not subject to any other real Evil, but only the Pain of the Body*: and that the mind ought to complain of nothing, which is not conjoyned to some pain of the body, either present, or to come.

II. THE Wise man, therefore, will be very cautious, that he do not wittingly draw upon himself any Corporal pain; nor do any action, whereupon any such pain may be likely to ensue: unless it be in order either to the avoidance of some greater pain, that would otherwise certainly invade him; or the comparation of some Greater pleasure dependent thereupon; as we have formerly inculcated. This considered, we may very well wonder at those [Philosophers] who accounting Health, which is a state of Indolency, a very great Good, as to all other respects; do yet, as to this respect, hold it to be a thing meerly Indifferent: as if it were not an indecent playing with words, or rather a high piece of Folly, to affirm, that to be in pain, and to be free from pain, is one and the same thing.

III. BUT, in case of Necessity either of his native Constitution, in respect whereof his body is infirm and obnoxious to Diseases; or of any External violence done him, which (so subject to Casualties and the injuries of others, is the condition of frail man) he could not prevent or avoid; (for experience attesteth that a Wise and Innocent person may be wounded by his malicious Enemies; or called to

the bar, impleaded, condemned, and beaten with Rods, or otherwise cruelly tormented by Tyrants) we say, in case either of these shall have brought pain upon him: then is it his part, to endure that pain with Constancy and Bravery of mind, and patiently to expect either the Solution, or Relaxation of it.

IV. FOR, certainly, Pain doth never continue long in the Body; but, if it be Great and Highly intense, it ceaseth in a short time, because either it is determined of its self, and succeeded if not by absolute Indolency, yet by very great mitigation; or is determined by Death, in which there can be no pain. And as for that pain, which is lasting; it is not only gentle and remiss in it self, but also admits many lucid intervals, so that there are not many days, nay, nor hours, in which the body may enjoy not only ease, but very much pleasure also.

V. AND may we not observe, that all long or Chronique Diseases have many more hours of Ease and quiet, than of pain and trouble? For, (to omit this, that if a Disease encrease our Thirst, it doth as much increase our pleasure in drinking) they give us time for our Refection, frequent respites to hold comfortable Conferences with our Friends, leasure to recreate our selves with some gentle Game, and admit many and long intervals of ease, in which we may apply our selves to our studies and any other necessary affairs. Whereupon it is most evident, that Great pain cannot be Long; nor Long pain Great: and so, we may consolate our selves against the Violence of pain, by an assurance of the shortness of it; and with the Remissness against the Diuturnity of it.

VI. LET this, therefore, be our frequent succour, that *No pain is either Intolerable, or Perpetual*; because, if it be long, it must be light; if great, short. Provided always, that we remember the ends or bounds prescribed to things

by Nature ; and do not by our own opinion adde any thing thereunto, which may make our pain greater, or us to apprehend it to be greater, than really it is. For the only way to heighten pain to the degree of intolerable, is to exasperate it by impatience, and oppress and wear out nature by effeminate Complainings : whereas, on the other side, nothing doth so much alleviate, mitigate, and blunt the edge of any pain, as Constancy, and Custom of suffering ; since thence it comes, that a Wise man, who hath been used to diseases and pains, doth very often rejoyce and smile even in the highest fury of his sickness.

VII. THUS much we can testifie of our friend *Metrodorus* ; who hath at all times born himself undauntedly, and with exemplary Constancy, as against Death, so against all Pain. For concerning *our selves*, we need not say much ; it being very familiar to us, to suffer such tortures of the Bladder and Bowels, as none can be greater : and yet, as we find them fully compensated with that alacrity of mind, which redounds to us from the remembrance of our Philosophy and former Inventions ; so do we entertain them with that Constancy and Patience, as that we are not destitute of very great delights even in those very days, wherein we are most tormented with those sharp Fits of the Stone and Colick.

VIII. AND indeed, this is the very Reason, why we formerly said, that *a wise man, though invaded and surrounded with the cruellest of Torments, may yet keep possession of his happiness* : because he doth both by his Patience soften that Necessity which he cannot break ; and as much as possible, withdraw his mind from being concerned in the sufferings of his body, conversing no more with it, than as with a fragil and complaining part. He reflects the eye of his mind backward, and considers what Honest, what Generous and Magnanimous Actions he hath at any time done ; and

fixing his cogitations upon those things, which he hath most admired, and which have most delighted him: he recreates his mind with the remembrance of Past Goods, for which he is very far from shewing himself Ungrateful, as Unwise men usually are.

IX. HE considers, that he can do nothing more worthy that Virtue and Wisdom, which he professeth, than not to yield the victory to pain, the most hard to be sustained of all things; than to hold up his head nobly in so difficult a conflict; to vanquish so potent and malicious an Enemy, and at length to make so perfect a Conquest thereof, as that the very Remembrance of it will be at all times delightful, and especially in the time of absolute Indolency; which will be so much the more Grateful, by how much the greater pains shall have preceded, as a Calm or Haven is always most welcome after a Tempest.

X. NOW, if a Wise man is not without his Alleviations and Comforts even in the most Grievous pain; what shall we say of him in Remiss and Gentle pains, or in the loss of some Member, or privation of some one of his Senses? Truly, it was not without good reason, that we formerly said, that *a Wise man might still be happy, though deprived of the best of his Senses, his Sight*: for, if the Night doth not diminish the Happiness of life; why should Blindness, that so neerly resembles Night, do it? and however he may want some pleasures, that depend upon the light: yet are there many others that lie open to his enjoyment, and what is much above all others, the pleasure of Contemplation.

XI. FOR, seeing that to a wise man, *to live, is to Think*, certainly his Thoughts are not beholding to the assistance of his Eyes, in the business of investigating Truth. And that man, to whose Doctrine we sometimes gave up our Name, did live long and happy, without being able to distinguish of Colours: but, without the Notion of Things, he could

not have lived happy. Nay, that Great man was of opinion, that the Perspicacity of the Mind was very much dimmed by the sight of the eyes : and while others could scarcely be said, to see the things, that were before them ; the opticks of his reason flew abroad into all Infinity, nor could the acies of his mind be terminated by the Extreams of the Universe.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Fortitude, againſt Discontent of Mind.

YOU may remember, we said even now, that all Discontent of Mind is conceived for such things, that are External Evils, and the Contraries to those Goods that we most love and desire. For, men usually call some things Adverse, and others Prosperous : and we may generally observe, that the Mind, which is elevated and insolent with Prosperity, and dejected with Adversity ; is low, abject and base. This considered, you may easily collect, that all we should in this place say, concerning Evils inducing Discontent, and in respect whereof we have need of Fortitude ; may be sufficiently inferred from what we formerly said, concerning those Goods, that are the General Objects of our Desires or Cupidities, and in respect whereof we have need of Temperance.

II. LET this General Axiom, therefore, suffice ; that *Discontent of Mind is not grounded upon Nature, but upon meer Opinion of Evil* ; and in respect thereof it becomes necessary, that every man be in Discontent, who conceives himself to be under some Evil, whether only prevised and expected, or already come upon him. For, how comes it, that a Father, whose Son is killed, is not a whit less chearful or merry, if he know not of the death of his Son, than if he

were yet alive and in health? or, that he, who hath lost much of his good fame abroad, or all his goods and Cattel by robbery at home; is not at all sensible of either loss till he hears of it? Is it not Opinion alone, which makes him sad and discontented thereupon? Certainly, if Nature it self were the Author of that sadness, the Fathers mind would be struck with a sense of the loss of his Son, in the same moment wherein he was slain: and in like manner, he that hath suffered Detraction from his honour, or been robbed of his Goods and Cattel, would in the same instant receive intelligence of his loss, from the secret Regret impressed upon his mind.

III. TO the production of Discontent, therefore, in the mind, it is absolutely necessary, that Opinion (not Nature) intervene betwixt the supposed Evil and the Mind. However, that you may be the more confirmed in this truth, be pleased to observe this; If a man have an Opinion, that such a one is his true Son, who was indeed begotten by another man; and again, believe, that such a one is not his Son, though himself be the right Father of him: let it be told him, that he, whom he accounts not to be his true Son, but really is so, is Dead; and he shall never be moved at the sad tidings: but let him hear of the death of the other, whom he took for his true Son, but really was not so, and he shall instantly be moved at the news, and suddenly break forth into sorrow and laments. And this, not from any Natural Instinct, or Sentiments Paternal: but only from the delusive suggestions of Opinion, that the one, who was his Son, was not so; and that the other, who was not his Son, was so.

IV. HENCE is it a perspicuous Truth, that those things, for which the mind becomes malecontent and contristate, are not Real Evils to us; forasmuch as they are without the orb of our Nature, and can never touch us immediately or

of themselves, but by the mediation of our own Opinion. And this was the ground of our former Assertion, *that it is Reason alone which makes life happy and pleasant, by expelling all such false Conceptions or Opinions, as may any way occasion perturbation of mind.* For, it is Discontent alone, that perturbs the mind, and wholly subverts the Tranquillity, and so the jucundity thereof.

V. BUT, how can Reason expel all such erroneous Opinions, after they have once taken possession of the Mind? Why, truly, only by teaching the Wise man to arm his mind against the blows of Fortune. For those very External things, which perswaded by opinion, we conceive to be Good, and for the loss of which we conceive such Discontent of mind; are also justly called the Goods of Fortune; because they are not really our own, but may be possessed, or taken away, as Fortune pleaseth.

VI. THIS the Wise man well knowing, accounts such goods no more his own, than other mens, and doth never so possess them, as not to be willing and ready at any time to part with them. For, he hath divested his mind of that opinion, which would perswade him, that they are real Goods, that they are his own, that they are permanent and inamissible, and put on that right opinion, which assures him, that they are neither really Good, nor absolutely his own, nor inamissible, but transitory and subject to be blown away from him by every gust of adverse Fortune. And hereupon he foresees what to do, in case he should be deprived of them; that is, not to cruciate himself with vain sorrow and fruitless Discontent; but to take it quietly and contentedly, that Fortune hath redemanded what she did not give, but only lend him.

VII. CERTAINLY, to those, who account it an Evil to be deprived of these External Goods, it cannot but prove of grievous consequence, that Premeditation should encrease

those Evils which it might very much have diminished at least, if not wholly prevented. For by this they come to be discontented not only at present infortunes, but also at such as they apprehend are likely to befall them, but perhaps may never befall them: and so every Evil is troublesom, not only when it comes, but when it is only expected, though it never comes. Doubtless, it is most vain and foolish in a man, to run into a voluntary misery; and he that doth so, shall always be Discontented, either by receiving, or thinking of Evil: for, whoso always thinks, that some Evil or Adversity may befall him; this very thought doth prove an Eternal Evil to him.

VIII. AND, as for the Wise man, in case it happen, that by being long accustomed to the possession and use of the Goods of Fortune, he hath not totally expunged out of his mind that Opinion, that they are real Goods, and wholly his own; and so some little of Fortune intervene, and give him a blow, that may put him to some small Regret and Discontent: in this case, he is for the Alleviation of that his Discontent, to have recourse to those two things formerly prescribed by us, as the most potent remedies for the mitigation of Pain in the body; *viz.* Avocation of his thoughts from his loss and the Causes of it; and Revocation of them to those things, which he knows to be Grateful and Pleasant to his Mind.

IX. FOR, the Mind of a Wise man is instructed to conform to the Laws of Reason, and precisely follow the conduct thereof; and Reason forbids him to fix his cogitations upon those things, which may advance and foment his discontent, and by that means helps him to abstract his thoughts from all regret, and convert them upon Goods either to come, or formerly enjoyed, and especially such as he hath frequently found to be delightful.

X. AND, what though sad and importune thoughts are

apt frequently to recur; yet is he still to insist upon that Avocation and Revocation of his Mind: because the mind, by continual Diversion to other objects, is brought by little and little to wear out and deface the Characters of sorrow imprinted upon it by a misfortune; nor, indeed, doth Time conduce to the cure of Discontent, by any other way, but only by exhibiting various occasions of divertisement, by which the mind being by degrees taken off from the Cause of its trouble, is brought at length to almost an absolute forgetfulness thereof.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Justice in General.

THUS far of that part of Honesty, which concerns Ones self: we are now come to the other, that relates also to others, and belongs to a man as living in a Civil Society; and that is *Justice*. For, most certain it is, that Justice is as it were the common Tye, or Ligament, which holds men together in peace, and without which no Society can subsist: insomuch as it is *a Virtue, which gives to every one his Due, and provides that Injury be done to none.*

II. WHAT we have formerly said, of the Foundation and Benefits of the other Virtues, hitherto handled; doth exactly correspond also to this Virtue: for as we have taught, that Prudence, Temperance and Fortitude are inseparably conjoyned to Pleasure; so may we affirm the very same of Justice, which doth not only never cause Harm to any man, but on the contrary, always preserve and nourish something, that may calm and quiet the minds of men; and this as well by its own and Natures power, as by a constant Hope, that none shall ever want any of those things, which pure and depraved Nature can desire.

III. AND, as Temerity, Lust, and Cowardice do always excruciate the mind, and stir up troubles: so is it impossible, that a mind, which lodgeth Injustice, should at any time be quiet and at peace either with it self, or others; because though such a mind should attempt any unjust action, with the greatest secrecy imaginable; yet can it not perswade it self, that the Injustice thereof shall never be brought to light. And though some may think themselves so great, as to be walled in and fortified against all revenge of their Injustice, by their Riches, Honours, Powers, *&c.* yet do they still lye open to the revenge of an Evil Conscience, which whispers them in the ear, every moment, that all those sollicitudes and perturbations, wherewith their minds are uncessantly tormented, are inflicted upon them, by the Immortal Gods, by way of punishment for their improbity.

IV. THERE is no man can propose to himself a Diminution of the troubles of life, by any unjust way; but he must be sure to find them to be highly Encreased and Aggravated by the remorse of Conscience, the penalties of the Laws, and the Odium of all his fellow-Citizens. And yet notwithstanding there are Millions of men, who never think they have enough of Riches, or Honours, or Power, or Lusts, of Riotings, and the like exorbitant Cupidities; which no wealth unjustly gotten can diminish, but doth rather encrease and enflame: so that such men seem fitter to be Restrained by severe Laws, than to be instructed by the mild precepts of Reason.

V. ALL sound and judicious men, therefore, are by Right Reason invited to Justice, Equity, Faith; and as for Impotent persons, and such as are in their Non-age, neither can unjust actions any way avail them, who can neither easily effect, what they endeavour, nor obtain their Ends, when they have effected it: and Riches are more convenient

to Fortune, or Liberality of ingeny; which whoever use, thereby procure to themselves the Respect and Goodwill of others, and (what is most conducible to quiet living) render themselves Dear and Beloved; especially when there is no cause of offending.

VI. FOR, those Desires that arise from simple Nature are easily satisfied: and all others, that are derived from vain Opinions, are not to be obeyed, but suppressed; because they incite us to the fruition of nothing that is truly Desiderable, and always there is more of Detriment accruing from the injury it self, than there is of Emolument or advantage from those things that are gotten by that injury.

VII. NEVERTHELESS, no man can say rightly, that Justice is a Virtue to be wished for, embraced, and pursued, immediately for it self; but mediately, or for the great pleasure it brings with it. For, to be beloved by, and to be Dear to others is very Pleasant; why? only because it conduceth to the greater Safety, Peace, and Pleasure of a mans life. This considered, we infer, that Improbity is to be avoided, not only in respect of those many and great external Incommodities, which happen to Unjust persons; but also, and much more, in respect of those internal Disquiets and Perplexities of mind, which it always causeth.

VIII. NOW, though these Considerations seem sufficient to the Endearment of this excellent Virtue, Justice; yet we are concerned to enlarge our Discourse, partly touching *Right*, or what is Just, that so we may come the better to understand the *Original* of Justice, among *whom* it is to be practised, and with what *Advantages*: and partly touching some *other Virtues*, that are nearly allied to Justice, as *Beneficence*, *Gratitude*, *Piety*, *Observance*, and *Friendship*.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Right, or Just; from whence Justice is named.

IN the first place, therefore, forasmuch as it is evident, that *Justice* is denominated from hence, that the *Right* of another man is conserved, or that what is *Right* or *Just*, is performed: it is worth our knowing what that is, which ought to be accounted Right or Just.

II. SINCE Justice was excogitated and instituted in order to the Common Good; necessary it is, that that Right or Just, to which Justice hath respect, should be such a certain Good, as may be in *Common* to all and every single member of the Society. And, because every one, by the direction of Nature, desires what is Good for Himself: it is also necessary, that what is Right, or Just, be something of Natures own institution, and so may be called *Natural.*

III. NOR is it for nothing that we touch upon this particular; because it sometimes comes to pass, that in a Society that may be prescribed for Right and Just, which is not really Good for the Society: and so being not Natural, or according to the dictates of Nature, it cannot, but by abuse, be reputed Right or Just; since that, which hath the true reason of Right or Just Natural, is such, as that it is not only prescribed as Profitable and Good, but is also Really so.

IV. TO speak plainly and properly, therefore; Right or Just Natural, is nothing else but *Tessera Utilitatis*, the Symbol of Utility, proposed and agreed upon by the concurrent votes of all in the Society, to the end, that they may be kept from mutually harming each other, and that each one may live securely; which as it is a Good, so doth every man, by the direction of Nature, desire it.

V. HERE we take Profitable and Good, for the same thing; and judge that there are two Reasons, that require

the preservation of Right: the one, that it may be *Profitable*, or respect the Common Utility, *i.e.* the Common Security; the other, that it be *Prescribed* by the Common Consent of the Society, for nothing is compleatly Just, but what the Society hath, by common Consent, or Common Pact, decreed to be observed and kept inviolate.

VI. AND hence is it, that the name of Right or Just is usually given to each of these Two; since not only what is profitable is said to be Just, but also the very Paction, or Agreement, or Prescription of the Society; which is also called Law, as being that, which expressly prescribes to every one what is Profitable or Just.

VII. SOME there are, we know, who conceive and affirm, that all things, that can be said to be Just, are so of their own proper and invariate Nature; and that Laws do not make them to be just, but only declare and prescribe them to be so, in respect of their own Nature: but truly the matter is far otherwise, the case in this point being as in most other things that are Useful and Profitable, as in those which concern Health, and many others of the like nature; of which some may be beneficial to one man, and hurtful to another, and so being oftentimes misapplyed, they fail of the end proposed, as well in common, as in private.

VIII. AND, certainly, since every thing is every where, always, and by all men, deprehended to be such, as really it is in its own Nature; because that Nature is invariate: we may justly demand of the Authours of that opinion, whether or no such things as are accounted just at some times, in some places, by some men, are so at all times, in all places, and to all men? Ought not such to have observed, that many of those things, that are constituted by Laws, and so accounted Lawful and Just; are not so constituted, nor accounted among all Nations; but are partly neglected as

things Indifferent, by many; and partly rejected as Hurtful, and condemned as absolutely Unjust, by as many others? And are there not some, who accept some things as Universally Profitable, which really are rather universally Destructive; and accordingly embrace and enact them to be Universally Accommodate, in case they judge them to be Accommodate, and to promise some General Emolument to that particular Society, in which they live?

IX. THIS duly considered, the most that can be said, in favour of that Opinion, is only this; that that is Universally Just, which is Profitable, or conform to the Notion of Right or Just, even now described: for, in special, indeed, as Utility is varied among various Nations, so also is Right or Just; so as what may be accounted and really is Just in respect of one Nation, may be Unjust in respect of another. And, therefore, if it be demanded, *Whether or no the same thing be Right or Just among all men?* our answer must be, that as to the General, it is the same, as being somewhat that is profitable in mutual Society; but as to particulars, it may come not to be the same among all men, particular Countries, and particular Causes in several Nations considered.

X. AND (that we may deduce a few observations from hence) whatever is by Experience found to be Profitable to mutual Society, or the Common participation of such things, as are reputed Just; that, certainly, hath truly and fully the nature of Just, in case it be such, as that the Utility thereof may be extended to all: but, if any man shall determine and establish such a thing for Just, and the same shall notwithstanding happen not to be Profitable to mutual Society; in that case, it doth not fullfil the nature of Just.

XI. AGAIN, and though the Utility of that, which was accounted Just, and so embraced, doth sometimes fail; yet nevertheless, if there be some Utility therein sometimes, so that it respond to the Notion, which we have given of what

is Juſt; it is truly Juſt, for that time: especially with those, who do not confound themselves with vain loquacity, and look into Humane Affairs with the eye of more General observation.

XII. FINALLY, where, no new Circumſtance of Affairs intervening, those very things, that were accounted and decreed to be Juſt, concerning the actions of men, are found by experience, not to be fully correspondent or congruous to the Notion of Juſt: there are they in no sort juſt. But, where, upon the innovation or change of affairs, those things, which were formerly decreed to be juſt, have ceased to be Profitable: there also do they cease to be juſt; because, when they cease to be Profitable to mutual Society, they at the same time cease to be congruous to the Notion of Juſt.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of the Original of Right and Juſtice.

BUT, that we may go much higher, and derive Right or Juſt from its firſt Fountain or *Original*; it appears that Right and Juſtice are as antient as Societies of men.

II. FOR, in the Beginning or firſt age of the World, men lived wandering up and down, like wild Beaſts, and suffered many incommodities both from the fury of Wild Beaſts, and the inclemency of the Aër; till, Reason advising them thereunto, they convened and conjoined themselves in certain Companies or Societies, that so they might the better provide againſt those incommodities, by Building themselves Huts or Cottages, and furnishing themselves with other Defensatives againſt the fury of Wild Beaſts, and againſt the injuries of weather. But, in this ſtate every one being desirous to have his particular condition better than

another, and ſtriving to make it ſo; there arose various Contentions and Clashings among them, about Food, Women, and other Commodities, which the ſtronger always took from the weaker: until at length they found, that they could not live ſecure and commodiously together; unleſs they made a Common Agreement, and entred into mutual obligations not to do Harm or Injury each to other; and that in caſe any one did harm or injure another, the reſt would punish him for it accordingly.

III. AND this was the firſt Tye, or Bond of Society; which, as it ſupposed, that every one might have something peculiar and proper to himſelf, or that might be called his own, as being his either by primire uſurpation, or by gift, or by purchaſe, or by invention, or by acquiſition of his own induſtry, or otherwiſe: ſo did it provide, decree and enact, that the ſame ſhould continue entirely his Own, till he ſhould willingly and freely alienate his propriety therein, by diſposing of it to another. And this Bond, or General Paction among them, was nothing elſe but a Common Law, which all were equally bound to obſerve, and which did confirm to every man a certain Right or Faculty of Using and Diſposing of whatever was his own, according as himſelf thought meet. Whereupon that very Law alſo came to be (as we formerly intimated) as it were the Common Right of the Society.

IV. WE need not commemorate, how the whole Society, by Common Conſent, transferred their Power of Coercing or Punishing Delinquents, upon ſome few Wiſe and Good men; or upon One ſingle perſon, who had the reputation of being the Wiſeſt and beſt among them all. That which will be more pertinent and uſeful for us to obſerve, is this; that in a Society thoſe only were accounted Juſt, or Favourers and Maintainers of Juſtice, who being content with their own Rights, did not invade the Rights of any

other man, and so did injury to none : and those Unjust, or Doers of Injustice, who being not content with their own Rights, did fly out and invade those of others ; and so doing them harm either by rapine, or personal violence, or some other way, were the Authours of an Injury.

V. AND thus, truly, for some time, men lived Peaceably and Happily, and especially under either many Wise and Good Governours, or one only Wise and Good Prince or King ; who being wholly intent upon the conservation of the publick Utility, made, and by the Consent of the People, established divers Laws, by which they might either prevent Dissentions among the People, or compose them, if any did arise. But, (such was the Corruption of mens manners) in process of time ; it came to pass, that the Government delapsed into the hands of Princes, or Kings that were not Good, but Vicious and Tyrannical : and they being either Deposed, or killed, the whole returned again upon the People, who instantly destroying each other, by reason of Tumults and the Factions of those who affected superiority and aspired to Empire ; and being at length weary of living by force and hostility, and exhausted by Enmities and Dissentions, they became willing again to submit to the Government of Magistrates, Princes, or Kings. But, having by sad experience found, that the Wills and mandates of Princes had formerly passed for absolute Laws ; the People enter into certain Compacts, or Covenants with their Governours, about those Laws, according to which they desired to be Governed : and thus they again brought themselves under Laws, *i.e.* under strict Rights.

VI. BUT, not to descend to Latter times ; and that we may touch upon only that Chief Head, which regards the preservation of mans *Life*, (as the Dearest of things) whereof special Care was had from the beginning, that every mans security might be established by Common Pactions and

Laws: it appears that those most Wise and Good Founders of Laws, fixing their eye of Providence upon the Society of life, and those things, which men usually do each to other; did not only declare that it was a wicked act and hainous Crime, to kill a man, but also decree that the Murderer should be punished with more than common Ignominy, and the loss of his Head. And to this they seem to have been induced, partly by considering the Conciliation of men among themselves (of which we hinted somewhat even now) in respect whereof men ought not to be as forward to destroy an Animal of the same species with themselves, as to destroy one of another species, over whose life they have a power granted them by Nature: and partly by the consideration of this, that men ought to abhor that, from which no emolument or advantage toward the quiet and happy spending of their days can accrue, but on the contrary, must be wholly destructive thereunto.

VII. FOR, indeed, from the Beginning, to those, who fully understood and attended to the Utility of that Constitution; there was no need of any other Cause or Respect, to make them contain themselves from doing any act toward the Violation thereof: but, as for those, who could not sufficiently comprehend of what high moment or Concern that Cause, the common Utility, was; these absteined from committing mutual slaughters, only upon the account of Fear of those sharp Punishments, which the Laws, in that case made, threaten to inflict upon those who break them. And this we may observe to be frequently Exemplified even in our own days. And, truly, whoso well consider, how great the Utility of such a Constitution is; they are sufficiently instructed and comparated to the constant observance thereof, without any other sinister respect: but, such as are not capable of understanding that grand and fundamental respect, the Utility of it, do

conform themselves thereunto only out of Fear of those Punishments, that the Laws threaten them, and which were, by the more prudent sort of men, invented and made againſt such, as had no regard to the Utility of the Conſtitution, the Major part of the multitude admitting them as Legitimate.

VIII. FOR, at firſt, no one of those Laws, which have been either in Writing, or by Tradition, derived to us, and are to descend down to our poſterity, did subsiſt or depend upon any Force or Violence whatsoever; but (as we touch't before) upon the meer Consent of the People that used it. For, it was not by ſtrength of Body, or imperious sway, but only Prudence of mind, whereby those transcended the Vulgar, who proposed those Laws to the suffrage of the People; and this by inducing some men to consider what would be profitable (especially, when they did not before so well underſtand it, as they ought) and by terrifying others meerly with the greatness of the punishments annexed. Nor could they, indeed, make use of any other remedy for the Cure of the peoples ignorance of the Utility of those Laws, than that of their own Fear of the Punishments prescribed by the Laws: because even in our days, it is Fear alone which contains Vulgar men within the bounds of their duty, and hinders them from committing any thing againſt either the publick or private Commodity.

IX. AND, assuredly, if all men could equally both underſtand, and bear in mind, what is truly profitable; they would need no Laws at all, but would of their own accord beware of doing such things, as the Laws forbid, and do such as the Laws prescribe and injoin: since, only to know what is profitable, and what hurtful, would be more than sufficient to induce them to avoid this, and pursue that. But, as for those, who do not discern what is Beneficial, what Hurtful; doubtless, the Commination of Punishments

against them, is highly necessary: insomuch as the very Fear of the Punishment impendent doth cause them to suppress and bridle those heats of their passions, which instigate them to unjust actions; and in a manner compel them, though against their Wills, to do what is right and consentaneous to Reason.

X. HEREUPON was it, that the Antient Lawmakers ordained, that even the Involuntary and meerly Casual slaughter of a man, should not be free from all Mulct, or punishment. Not that they might not, to such as affected Voluntary man-slaughter, give any occasion of pretext or excuse for what they should do of set purpose in that kind: but that they might not seem not to have used sufficient Caution and Diligence, as to that Difficult particular. Nor could this course but prove Beneficial, for the same Causes, for which men were expresly prohibited to kill each other. So that considering, that of those actions of this kind that are done involuntarily, some happen to Humane Nature from Causes that could not be foreseen, nor any ways prevented; and others again happen meerly through our Negligence, want of circumspection, and incogitancy of the danger imminent: therefore, that they might, as much as possible, prevent our negligence and heedfulness, that may conduce to the destruction of our Neighbours; they provided, that even an involuntary slaughter of a man should not pass altogether unpunished, and by the very fear of that punishment or Mulct, making men more heedful and circumspect, they most happily diminished the Frequency of this Crime of Homicide.

XI. NAY, we farther conceive, that even those slaughters of men which were permitted by the Law, were made lyable to those accustomed Expiations by publick Lustrations, for no other cause but only this; that those, who first introduced the use of those solemn Expiations of Humane blood,

had it in their thoughts, to deter men from involuntary slaughter, which was too too frequent.

XII. FOR the Vulgar sort of men stood in need of something to restrain even their Heedlessness, that so they might be kept from doing, out of rashness, any action, that should not conduce to the Publick Utility, or Security which the Antient Sages and first Lawmakers well understanding, did not only decree severe Punishments, but strook also a certain grievous Fear into their Minds, the Reason of which was not equally manifest to common heads, with that of the punishments expressed: and this chiefly by declaring, that such, who had killed a man, by what means or Accident soever, should remain Impure and Polluted, till they had purged themselves of that blood by solemn Lustrations.

XIII. FOR, the Brutal part of the Soul, or that wherein the Affections and Passions have their residence, being by wholsom Laws as it were new moulded and framed, came at length to that Mansuetude and Gentleness, which now adays so much flourisheth in the World: those Arts of Taming and Civilizing mens minds, which were from the beginning invented and practised by those Sages, who first ruled the rash multitude, being applyed as Soveraign and effectual Remedies against the violence of their Wild and furious Affections; of which this is one chief act among the rest, that men should not indiscriminately destroy each other.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Between whom Right and Justice is to be exercised.

THE premises considered, it may with good reason be enquired of us, *between whom aswell Right and the violation of it, which is Injury, as Justice and what is opposed unto it, Injustice, doth properly consist, or is to be found?* and therefore

we are to state and explicate the matter, by a comparison betwixt Men and other Animals.

II. AS therefore, there is no Reason of Right or Injury, or Just and Unjust, betwixt Animals that could not make a common Agreement, not to hurt, nor be hurt by mutual invasion: so neither is there between those Nations which either would not, or could not enter into a Common Pact and reciprocal Engagement, not to hurt each other, or to suffer hurt each from other.

III. FOR, Just or Right, the conservation whereof is Justice, hath no being at all, but in mutual Society, and so Justice is a Good of a Society, insomuch as the effect of it is, that every single person of the Society may live in security, and void of that anxiety, which the continual Fear of harm doth create. Whence it evidently follows that whatever Animals, or whatever men either cannot or will not make an Association among themselves, upon the condition of mutual safety, must want that Good, or be reciprocally obliged by no bond of Right or Justice, in order to their living securely: and so to them there can remain no other Reason of security, but only this, to do harm to others, that they be not harmed themselves.

IV. AS, therefore, when one of those Brute Animals, among which there hath past no such Agreement or Pact, doth hurt another; though it may be said that he doth harm or hurt to the other, yet it cannot be said, that he doth an Injury to the other, because he was not bound by any Right, Compact, or Law, not to hurt him: exactly so, if one man of that Nation, among which is no Paction or Society, doth hurt another man; though it may be said, that he doth hurt him, yet not that he is Injurious to him; or doth him an Injury, because he was not obliged by any Compact or Law, not to hurt him.

V. WE here speak of Brute Animals, not as if there were

any even of those, who live in Herds or Companies, that are capable of entring into Agreements or Pacts not to harm each other; and so might be conceived to be Just, if they do not hurt each other, and Unjust, if they do: but only to the end, that from thence it may be the better understood, that even among Men Justice of it self is nothing, insomuch as it is found only in the mutual Societies, according to the amplitude of every Country, in which the Inhabitants may conveniently enter into Agreements and Covenants of doing nor receiving any hurt; since otherwise, and in a man considered as Solitary, or out of all Society, there can be no Justice at all; and what is Justice in one Society of men, may be, and frequently is, in respect of Contrary Pactions and Covenants, downright injustice in another.

VI. BUT *can Justice intervene betwixt Men and any other Animals*? Certainly, *not*. For, if men could make a Covenant with Brute Animals, as they can with other men, that they should not Kill, nor be indiscreetly Killed by them; then, indeed, might the Reason of Just or Right be founded betwixt them and us, insomuch as the end of that covenant would be the Security of both Parties: but, because it is impossible, that Animals void of Reason should be obliged by a Law common betwixt them and us, who are endowed with Reason; it must also be impossible for us to obtain more assurance of Security from Animals, than from things Inanimate; so that there is no other way for us to secure our selves from Brutes, but only to execute that power of Destroying them, which Nature hath given us.

VII. AND here, perhaps you'l ask us, by the way; *Why is it that we usually Kill even such Animals, as are weak and innoxious, and so ought not to be feared?* Whereto we answer, that most men destroy such Animals, out of Intemperance

and a certain Savageness or Cruelty in their nature; as many do, out of Immanity or Cruelty, commit outrages also upon men living out of their Society, though there be no reason why they should fear any harm from them. But, still it is one thing to offend against the rules of *Temperance*, or any of its subordinate Virtues, as Sobriety, Lenity or Mansuetude, or (if you please) meer Humanity, or Goodness of Nature: and another thing to violate *Justice*, which presupposeth certain Laws and Pacts established by mutual Consent and Obligation.

VIII. NOR can it be truly said (what some affirm) that we have a power granted to us by Law, to destroy any such Animals, as can be no way offensive or destructive to Mankind: though, to speak freely, there is scarce any kind of Living Creatures, among all those, which we have a power granted us to destroy, but, being permitted to encrease to infinite multitudes, would prove pernicious to Mankind; however, being preserved alive in Competent numbers, they are many ways very useful to our lives.

IX. THIS may be exemplified in sheep, Kine and Bulls, Horses, *&c.* which being kept alive in a Competent number, afford as many necessaries for life; but, if they were let alone to multiply to excessive numbers, certainly they could not but prove very hurtful, if not altogether destructive to us; and this partly in respect of their strength, partly in respect of their Consuming or Devouring the fruits of the Earth, that should serve for our subsistence; And, for this very cause is it, that we are not prohibited to destroy such Animals: and reason adviseth us to preserve so many of them alive, as may be both useful to us, and easily ruled by us.

X. FOR, as to Lions, Bears, Wolves, and other Beasts called Wild (whether little or great) we cannot take such a certain number of them, as being preserved may afford us

any necessary relief, or be of use to us in our lives; as we may of Kine, Sheep, Horses, and the reſt that are called Tame and Gentle Animals: and thence is it, that we endeavour wholly to exterminate and deſtroy those; and of these to cut off only so many, as are over and above a competent ſtock.

XI. HEREUPON (that we may highly touch upon that also) we may conceive, that even among those Nations, who make their choice of certain sorts of Animals for their food, the matter was determined and prescribed by certain Laws, grounded upon Reasons correspondent to those, we have now given: and as for those Animals, that were not to be eaten; there was reſpect had to their Utility, and Inutility in other reſpects, and for some reason peculiar to each Country; to the Conſtitutions whereof there is no neceſsity for us to adhere, who live not in any of those places.

XII. NOW from these Considerations we come to underſtand, that from the very Beginning a Difference was put betwixt the Killing of Men and the Killing of all other Animals. For, as to other Animals, it is manifeſt, that no one of those antient Sages, who have expresly prescribed what we should, and what we should not do, did forbid us to kill them: because that Utility, which is perceived in reſpect of them, arose from a cuſtom of acting, contrary to that, which we have mentioned concerning men; nor could it be, that men, living promiscuously among Beaſts, could preserve themselves in safety otherwise than by expelling, or deſtroying them.

XIII. BUT, as concerning Mankind; when among those, who lived in the days of old, there were some more Comely and Graceful than the reſt (and likely enough it is that such were the Firſt Perswaders of men to enter into Pact, for the Common safety) who remembring how they had sometimes abſtained from slaughter, in reſpect of that

Utility, which concerned their safety ; had also, when they were congregated into one Company, put others in mind of what had then hapned, when they lived promiscuously ; that by abstaining from the slaughter of an Animal of their own species, they might defend the Society of life, which is Generally the cause of his proper safety, to every single person, and that it had been formerly profitable to go apart from the Society of other Animals, or men flocking together, that so they might not provoke or incense them, that were ready enough of themselves to do harm : Hereupon, we say, men came to restrain themselves from laying hands upon an Animal of their own species, that came and offered himself into the Communion of things necessary to safety of life.

XIV. BUT, in process of time, their Progenies multiplying on each part, and Animals of different species being depulsed and kept apart ; men began to make use of their Reason (whereas before that time, they had trusted altogether to Memory) and to enter into Consultation, about what was to be done in order to their safety, when they should come together and conjoyn their habitations. For, they mainly endeavoured to coerce those, who rashly and impudently cut each others throats, and thereby made the mutual assistance, that men were able to afford each other, daily the weaker ; and this, chiefly because those great incommodities which had frequently fallen upon their Predecessors, in the like cases, were utterly forgotten. And earnestly striving to bring matters to that good pass, they at length made and introduced those very Laws and Constitutions, which continue in all Cities and Nations even to this very day : the multitude of their own accord consenting to them ; forasmuch as the Major part were already very sensible, how much greater Utility would from thence accrue unto them living in mutual Society. In like manner,

it conduceth also to common security, as to destroy whatever is pernicious: so also to preserve whatever is useful to the extermination of what is pernicious.

XV. AND thus is it profitable; that upon these considerations, the slaughter of all other Animals came to be permitted, and that of *Men*, expresly prohibited, by the Law: but we have stay'd too long upon this argument.

CHAP. XXIX.

With what right Justice is to be exercised.

IT being certain, then, that Justice is founded upon the mutual agreement, and Common Paction of men living in Society; it remains that every man, whether Native, or Stranger admitted, ought, from the time he hath given up his name to a Society, to account himself to be a Member of that Society, upon this Condition, either expresly, or tacitly, that he hurt none of his Fellow Members, nor be hurt by any other. Wherefore, let him either stand to this Condition of the Common Paction; or depart out of the Society: because he is not to be tolerated to live in the Society, upon any other Condition, but the very same, upon which he was incorporated into it. Whereupon it necessarily follows, that since, by Nature, no man is willing either to receive harm from, or to do harm to another: therefore ought no man to do that to another, which he would not another should do to him.

II. THIS considered, it may well be thought, that the Laws of all Societies were made principally, if not solely for the sake of Wise men; though not that Wise men should not do unjustly by others: but that others should not do unjustly by them; who are so well prepared and disposed of themselves, as to need no Laws to restrain them from

doing harm to any man. For, they have prescribed bounds to their Cupidities, and composed their Desires to the simple rules of Nature, which requires nothing that cannot be obtained but by ways of injustice: nor indeed, is there any of Natures Pleasures, that doth induce a man to do injury to another; but that which doth induce him thereunto, must be some such exorbitant Cupidity, as is created by vain and unbridled Opinion.

III. FOR, Nature having (for Example) in abundance produced Herbs, Corn, Fruits, for food competent and useful, and Water for Drink pleasant and wholsom; it cannot be the pleasure of satisfying pure Hunger and Thirst, that should cause a man to rob, spoil, defraud, or murder his Neighbour, or do any of those Injuries to others, which men usually do: but it must be the vain desire of living more opulently, splendidly and wantonly, that so he may acquire wealth enough to discharge the expences of his Luxury. The same may be said also of those, who not being content with simple Cloaths, simple Houses, simple Wives, *&c.* and carried away by Ambition, Pride, Lust, and the like enormous passions, desire infinitely more than what sober and temperate Nature either wants or knows how to use.

IV. FURTHERMORE, seeing that the Wise man doth all things for his own sake, or with reflection upon himself; nothing, certainly can more conduce to his own advantage, than strictly to celebrate, and constantly uphold Justice. For, in giving to every one his due, and harming no man; he, to the most of his power, doth keep the Society whole and sound, and consequently preserve himself in peace and safety: forasmuch as he cannot be safe, when the peace of the Society is disturbed and endangered, nor doth he provoke any man to avenge an injury suffered at his hands, or fear any Mulct or punishment to be inflicted upon him by

publick decree; and so, being Conscious to himself of no Evil by him done, he remains free from all Perturbations; from which to be free, is the chiefest of all the fruits of Justice, and while he reaps that, what can he do, that should more conduce to his own advantage?

V. NOR is there why you should conceive, that he, who violates the Right of another, though secretly and without the knowledge of any man, can live in the same security and freedom from Perturbation, as the Just man doth, because (as we said afore) he cannot assure himself, that his Injustice shall never be brought to light; for, *Crimes, though they may be secret, yet can they never be secure; nor doth it avail an Offendor, to be concealed from others, while he can never be concealed from himself.*

VI. AND, truly, though his offence be never so much concealed in the present; yet is it very uncertain, whether or no it will remain so concealed till his death. For, first, there is a Kind of Jealousie and Suspicion that always follows close at the heels of Improbity: and again, there have been many, who have detected themselves, some in dreams, others in fits of Deliriums in Fevers, others in their Wine, others out of forgetfulness for the time. So that a wicked man, though he may for a time deceive even the Gods and men (as they say) yet ought he not to be confident, that his Deceits shall always continue undiscovered.

VII. UPON these grounds, it is manifest, that notwithstanding Injustice be not Evil absolutely, or in it self, because, what is reputed Injust in one place, may be very Just, and Legal in another: yet nevertheless it is always an evil in respect of that fear which arising from, and fomented by the horrour and stings of an evil Conscience, createth a continual suspect in him, that some time or other his unjust deeds may come to the ears of the Avengers of Injustice, and so he be called to a severe account for them. And so

there is nothing that more conduceth, as to Security, so likewise to a quiet and pleasant life, than to live Innocently, i.e. upon no occasion to violate the Common Covenant of Peace.

VIII. WHEREFORE, since the Just and Unjust have this Contrariety between them; that the Just of all men are most free from Perturbations, and the Unjust, of all men, most obnoxious to Perturbations: what can be more profitable than Justice to those; what more hurtful than Injustice to these? For, can Anguish of mind, Sollicitudes, and continual Fears be profitable to any man?

IX. JUSTICE, therefore, being so great a Good, and Injustice so great an Evil; let us always embrace the one, and abhor the other. And if at any time our mind seem to stagger, and incline toward Injustice; let us think upon some Grave, Wise, and Good man, and supposing him to be always present with us, and overlooking all our actions: that so we may do nothing, which we would not do, if he were really present.

X. HEREBY we shall not only avoid the doing of any thing openly against Justice, but also of offending in secret against the rules and principles of Honesty. For, this Wise and Good man will be to us instead of a Guardian or Tutor, whom because we revere, we shall be afraid to offend. Following this Counsel therefore, thus argue with your self; if this Reverend Person were present, I would not do this: why therefore shall I do it in his absence? He doubtless, would check me for doing this, because it is Unjust: why therefore shall I not check my self, and not do it? And if you do all things so, as if some Reverend Person saw all you did; you shall soon learn to do nothing amiss: for, if you so fear another man, you will quickly come to fear your self.

CHAP. XXX.

Of Beneficence, Gratitude, Piety, Observance.

HAVING done with the consideration of Justice, we come to those Virtues that are Cousin-Germans thereunto, as we formerly intimated; in that each of them also doth concern others directly, and our selves but by reflection: and though they be not, as Justice is, prescribed by Laws and Covenants; yet do they import a certain obligation like that of Justice, and that from Decorum, Office and Use.

II. OF these, the first is *Beneficence*, or the doing of Good turns to others; to which all are obliged, who are able either by their assistance, or purse, to help such as stand in need of their help. Forasmuch as if they refuse to afford the needy their assistance, then do they inevitably incur the censure of being Barbarous, Cruel, Inhumane: and if to relieve their wants with their purse, then cannot they escape the opprobrious terms of Sordid, Tenacious, Avaricious persons. Whereas, on the contrary, if they assist them in one kind; then shall they be reputed Benign, Officious, Good natur'd: and if they relieve them in the other, presently they are cryed up for Liberal, Munificent, Magnificent, and Noble-minded persons. So that hence it appears, that all men, who are able, in respect either of Power or Estate, to assist and relieve others of the Society; are obliged thereunto, (provided it extends not to Prodigence, or the impairing of their own Fortunes) upon the Consideration of their own Good or Utility.

III. FOR, those, who practise this Virtue of Beneficence, thereby certainly procure to themselves Respect, Good-will, and (what very much conduceth to their quiet living) a Dearness or tender Estimation from those, upon whom

they practise it: as, on the other side, who neglect the exercise of it, gain to themselves the Disrespect, Ill-will, and (what very much conduceth to their troublesom living) the odium and Contempt of others. Take special heed, therefore, that you do not omit to be Beneficent at least in small matters; that so you may not lose the advantage of being accounted ready to gratifie others even in Great.

IV. IT was not without good Consideration we formerly said, that *it was not only more Honourable, but also more Delightful, to Give, than to receive a benefit*: because, the Giver thereby makes himself Superior to the Receiver, and reaps moreover the interest of Thanks; and nothing adfers more joy to a man, than to be heartily thanked for a favour. For, a Beneficent person is like a Fountain; to which if you but grant a Reasonable Soul, or Mind, what joy will it not be possessed of, when it shall see how many spacious Cornfields and Pastures do flourish and even smile again with plenty and verdure, and all by the Diffusion of its streams upon them?

V. THE second is *Gratitude*, to which every man is reciprocally obliged, who receives a benefit: at least, unless he hath a mind to expose himself to common Hatred and the greatest of shames. For ingratitude is worthily hateful in the eyes of all men: because seeing nothing can be more according to Nature, than to be propense to receive a Good; it must be highly Contrary to Nature not to be propense to return the tribute of Thankfulness to the Author of that Good.

VI. BUT, seeing that no man stands more gratefully affected toward his Benefactors, than the Wise man; it may be lawful for us to assert, that it is the Wise man only, who knows how to fulfil, and doth fulfil the duty of Gratitude: because he alone stands ready, upon all occasions,

to express his thankfulness to his Friends both present and absent; yea, though they are extinct.

VII. OTHERS, indeed, many times pay the debt of thanks to their present friends, and this perhaps for their own farther ends, and to incite and encourage them to some new favour: but, how few are there, who gratefully commemorate the beneficence and liberality of their absent Benefactors? Where shall we find him, that honours the memory of his deceased Patron? that doth not in his heart rejoice, that his Benefactor is dead; as if death had cut off all the bonds of his Gratitude, and cancelled all the obligations of his Good turns? that studies all ways of Retribution, Kindness, Respect, and Assistance to the Wife, Children, Friends, Family, and Kindred of his Dead Reliever?

VIII. THE third is *Piety*, the most sacred species of Gratitude. This Virtue we are to exercise primarily toward our Parents, to whom we are more obliged, than to all the World beside: for, we may owe our education, fortune, erudition, *&c.* to others; but to our Parents we owe even our selves: and therefore if ingratitude to others be hateful, that which is shewn to our Parents must certainly be most hateful and detestable.

IX. WE say, *Primarily* to our Parents; because Piety is secondarily, and as it were upon consequence, extended to our Kindred, and chiefly to our Brothers and Sisters, to whom we are obliged by the bond of Consanguinity, and the intervening interest of our Parents: so that we cannot shew our selves disrespectful and unkind to any of our blood, but we must be, at the same time, highly ungrateful to our Parents, Grand-Parents, and all the line of our Progenitors; who in the circle of their love, and benevolence, comprehended all that were, and should be derived from their loyns.

X. NOR is this Piety distinguishable from that Charity

or Dearness, we are to conceive, and constantly bear toward our Native Country, which comprehends our Parents and all our Kindred, and doth both receive us when we are born, and nourish and protect us afterward. Wherefore, as we are, by the relation of our blood, obliged to bear Respect and Kindness toward those of our Kindred; so are we by the more General interest of our Country, obliged to respect and tender the good of all those of our Society; but more especially the Magistrates and Princes, or Monarch thereof, who by defending our Country, and the Laws of it in general, confer this benefit upon us in particular; that under the protection of their Care and Power, our Rights are so preserved, as that we may live securely and peaceably.

XI. THE fourth is *Observance*, or that Veneration we owe to all persons of Eminency, in any kind. And this affection of Awe and Reverence is accompanied partly with Gratitude and Piety; insomuch as we cannot any way better express the gratefulness of our minds, than by giving due Veneration and Worship to our Benefactors, Parents, Governours, Princes, and all men of Dignity and Power: and partly with Honour and Respects; insomuch as it is the best testimony we can give of our internal sentiments of their deservings, who excel in Age, Wisdom, Learning, and especially Virtue; which is the most Honourable of all Humane Excellencies.

XII. TO this Observance belongs also that, which men call *Religion* and *Sanctity* toward the *Gods*, whom we are bound to Revere and Honour no otherwise than we are our Parents; yet, not in respect to any Good either received, or expected at their hands; but (as we formerly intimated) only in respect of the transcendent Excellency, Majesty, and Supremacy of their Nature. Because, whatever is excellent deserves a just Veneration; and no Excellence can equal

that of the Divine Nature, it being Immortal and most Blissful. And thus, understanding that the Gods do neither create troubles to themselves, nor give any occasion of troubles to us; we shall come to be truly Religious, *i.e.* piously and holily to Revere and admire their most Excellent Nature, without all Hope or Reward.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Friendship.

TO the exercise of this Virtue (the last of all those, that retain to Justice) all are obliged, who Love, and are beloved again by the same persons. And well may we make it the Crown of this our Discourse upon the Virtues, or means to make life happy; when nothing that lies in the power of Wisdom to obtain, doth afford more Comfort, more Delight, than true Friendship: and the same Reason that confirms the mind not to fear any lasting or eternal Evil; doth also assure, that during life there is no Sanctuary so safe, no protection so secure, as that of true Friendship, which together with that Security, doth adfer also very great pleasures.

II. FOR, as Enmity, Hate, Envy, Despite, are adverse to, and inconsistent with Pleasures; so are Friendships, and Amities not only the most faithful Conservers, but also the most effectual and certain Causers of Pleasures, and that as well to ones Friend, as to one self: in that thereby men do not only enjoy the Good things of the present more fully; but are erected and animated with hope of such as are to succeed in the future. And, since Solitude and want of Friends exposeth a man to dangers and fears; certainly it must be very highly rational in us, to procure Friendships, whereby the mind may be confirmed in the present, and

possessed with lively hopes of enjoying very great Pleasures in the future.

III. BUT, in the choice of our Friends, we are to be exceeding cautious and prudent: for it concerns us to be more circumspect with whom we eat; than about what we eat: To eat ones meat alone, and spend ones days in Solitude; indeed, is to live the life of a Lion or a Wolf: and yet no Friend is better than such a one, that is not as well pleasant, as faithful, so that his Conversation may be the best sawce to our meat. Such a Friend, therefore, is to be sought for, to whom nothing is more in esteem, than Candor, Simplicity and Verity; and who is not morose, querulous and murmuring at all things, but full of Complacency, Alacrity, and pleasant Hopes, that so his Conversation may not sowre, but sweeten the occurrences of life.

IV. FRIENDSHIP, we acknowledge, doth consist in, and is kept alive by the mutual participation of Pleasures, or Goods; and yet we cannot admit it to be therefore necessary, that betwixt Friends there should be a Community of the Goods of Fortune: as that Philosopher conceived, who was the Author of that saying, that *among Friends all things are Common.* And our Reason is, that Community of Estates implies mutual diffidence or distrust of each others Constancy, in case of Adversity or Poverty on one part: and Distrust is wholly inconsistent with friendship. They only are friends, who can with full Confidence and freedom take and make use of so much of their friends Goods or Estate, as the necessity of their present condition doth require; and this no otherwise, than as if it were absolutely their own, though each partly still reserves a propriety in the full of his own Estate.

V. THIS, we are assured, will sound strange in the ears of the Vulgar; but, what are the Common People to us,

seeing that no Faith or Constancy is to be found in their Kindness and Friendship? For, being wholly uncapable of any part of Wisdom, that might render their Conversation commendable and grateful; and as uncapable of either understanding what is privately, what publickly profitable, or what's the difference betwixt Good Manners and Bad: it is impossible they should have any Sentiments of the Goods of Amity and Friendship; and consequently that they should in any measure fulfil the duties thereof.

VI. WE speak, therefore, of Wise men only, among whom there is as it were a firm Covenant and League, not to love their friends less than themselves. Reason dictating, that it may, and should be so; and Experience assuring that it frequently hath been so. So that it is most evident, as well that such a perfect Conjunction (you may call it Union) may be made betwixt Wise men; as that nothing doth more conduce to the Quiet and Pleasure of life; than such a Conjunction once made and conserved.

VII. FOR, as it is impossible for us, to conserve the sweetness and security of our lives firm and lasting, without the influence of friendship; so it is equally impossible to conserve Friendship firm and lasting, without that Cement of Loving our Friends, at the same rate, as we do our selves. This, therefore, and Pleasure are the inseparable Adjuncts of Friendship: and who so doth not hold so full a Sympathy with his Friend, as to rejoyce at his joy, and condole with him in his sorrow; doth but pretend to the noble title of a Friend.

VIII. CONSIDERING this, the Wise man will be sure, to stand equally affected toward himself, and his Friend; what labours and pains he undergoes for his own Security and Pleasures, the same will he undergo for the Security and Pleasures of his Friend: and as he rejoiceth to think, that he hath one, with whom he may sit, and to whom he may

administer in his sickness, whom he may visit and assist in case of imprisonment, and whom he may relieve in case of want; so will it rejoice him to be confident that he hath one, who will stick close to him, in sickness, imprisonment, want and all other Calamities. And not only this; but his love will be so great to him, as to oblige him to suffer the greatest of torments, nay, if occasion be, even Death it self for his Friends sake.

IX. WE have known, Certainly (and from our Fathers, in whose memories it was fresh) that many of those Wise and Good men, who had the happiness of procuring to themselves full Confidence and Security in the Society of men, living in one and the same opinion, and the self-same affections with themselves; have lived in a most pleasant and mutually comfortable League of Friendship, and been conjoined with so absolute a Neerness each to other, as that they could heartily, and without the least of reluctancy, wish to suffer death in the place of their friend destined to die.

CONCLUSION.

AND this is the sum of all we had to say, concerning ETHICKS or MORALS, which from the very beginning we asserted to be the Noblest and most Useful part of Philosophy. We now, therefore, Conclude with this Admonition to you, whoever you are that aspire to true Wisdom (for, our Design herein was to do a piece of acceptable service to all such) that you both meditate upon, and earnestly endeavour to put in practice each one of those many Rules and Axioms of Prudence, that we have here laid down: assuring your self, that they are the very Elements or Fundamentals of the Art of Living Honestly

or Virtuously, and (upon consequence) Peaceably and Happily.

We say, to Meditate upon them night and day; and as well when you are alone, as when you are in company of some faithful Friend, such to whom you may safely and comfortably say: *We are (indeed) Alone: but so much the better, insomuch as we have the greater opportunity of discoursing things sincerely, and making the ſtricter inquiſition for Truth: I ſpeak not to many, but to you alone; and you ſpeak not to many, but to me alone, and that's enough, ſince we are an ample Theatre each to other.*

By this time, we presume, you are fully convinced, that he is the only *Brave and Happy* man, who hath his mind possessed with true and correspondent Conceptions of the Nature of the Gods: who is at all times prepared to bid death welcom, without the leaſt of Fear: who hath so reasoned concerning the end of Nature, or the higheſt of Goods, as fully to underſtand, that it may be attained with the greateſt facility imaginable: who ſtands confirmed, that whatever of Evil is to be endured by him, muſt, if Vehement, be short in duration; if not Vehement, easie in toleration: who doth not emasculate and soften himself with the Childish apprehension of any such thing as inevitable Necessity, or the vulgar belief of Fate; but well underſtands, that he hath an absolute Freedom of Will, in all his actions, and is not subject to the Control of any influence, besides that of his own Reason; and knows also that nothing at all, or (at moſt) very little of Fortune can at any time intervene to cross his designs, defeat his hopes, interrupt his Felicity: and, finally, who hath composed all his Desires to the sober model of Nature, and the Rules of Wisdom, by us prescribed in this small Treatise.

And, assuredly, when you shall come to be such a Man as this; you shall never know a Perturbation, day or night,

waking nor sleeping (for, a well composed Mind keeps the same constant tenour of Serenity as well in sleep, as waking: and unquiet Dreams are but the effects of Sollicitude and unquiet thoughts in the day) and shall live like some Deity among men. For, *that man hath sublimed himself to a whole Sphear above the common condition of Mortality, who spends his days in the possession of Immortal Goods.*

FINIS.

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